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Abstract 
 
Welfare privatisation is generally analysed as welfare state retrenchment or 
liberalisation: reducing the role of public provision is understood as reducing the role of the 
state in allocating welfare benefits. This thesis starts from the puzzling observation that 
pension privatisation seems to go hand in hand with more active state interference in the 
allocation of private pensions. In order to explain the political dynamics that drive state 
intervention in the organisation of private welfare, this project moves away from established 
explanations based on electoral politics and social partner mobilisation. Instead it focuses on 
the interaction between states as independent actors with a stake in stabilising the welfare 
system, and financial welfare providers with a commercial interest in public support for 
private welfare. 
 The first paper examines why Germany and the UK - despite having very different 
institutional backgrounds - exhibit a surprisingly similar shift away from their voluntarist 
approach to organising private welfare since the 1990s. This supports the central argument of 
this thesis. 
 The second paper focuses on explaining one important aspect of recreating social 
protection within private welfare provision: the ability to organise collective risk-sharing to 
protect against financial volatility. Whereas prevailing explanations focus on social partner 
voluntarism, this paper compares Denmark and the Netherlands to argue that analytical 
attention should shift to how regulatory frameworks are required for overcoming 
distributional struggles.  
 The third paper explains regulatory interventions that go against financial interests in 
order to achieve social objectives. Examining efforts in the UK to reduce pension charges, it 
shows that variation in regulatory decisions does not necessarily reflect differences in 
pressure by voters or organised interest groups. Instead policy-makers make their own 
assessment of whether regulatory intervention promotes the expansion of private welfare 
provision – balancing social stability with commercial viability. 
	 4	
 Acknowledgements 
 
My gratitude goes out to countless persons, but to those who follow in particular. 
 
Waltraud Schelkle is the best mentor a student can possibly hope for. Possessing the 
unique quality of being as compassionate as demanding, Waltraud has not only guided me 
past the many hurdles of the PhD but also serves as an example and inspiration for all my 
future work. The only way I can express my gratitude to her, is by pursuing the same level of 
commitment and generosity regarding others.  
 
Bob Hancké his influence goes far beyond the sharp feedback during meetings. His 
uncompromising questions (Why should we care about this? What would be the observable 
implication of that?) are permanently echoing through my head. No one should write a thesis 
on pensions without somebody like Bob as a supervisor to draw you back to the big picture. 
 
Ann-Sophie, without your love and endless patience I would have never written this 
PhD. I depended on you, more than one should – and I know there is no way I can ever thank 
you enough. If I learned anything from this project, it is the immeasurable value of every 
single moment shared with you and Oliver. Now it is time to take this lesson to heart.  
 
My mother and father have encouraged me empathically and unfailingly in all the 
major decisions of my life. Giving both the freedom to make mistakes, as well as the 
unconditional support to fall back on when things go wrong, is the most valuable gift parents 
can give their child. Karen and Jeroen, moving abroad only made me realise more how much 
I care for you.  
 
 Finally there are several people whose advice and support have thoroughly shaped 
this thesis. First of all, I want to thank Nick Barr and Noel Whiteside for their thoughtful and 
constructive comments on the first version of this thesis. I also had the good fortune to be able 
to develop my thinking by participating in the STARS project; benefiting from regular 
discussions and valuable comments by Tobias Wiss, Anke Hassel, Deborah Mabbett, Karen 
Andersen, Marek Naczyk, Margarita Gelepithis and Waltraud Schelkle. Over the course of 
the years I received useful feedback during several workshops and conferences; I am 
particularly grateful to Kevin Featherstone, Christine Trampusch, Paul Bridgen, Traute 
Meyer, Richard Deeg; Natasha van der Zwan and Abby Innes.  
	 5	
TABLE	OF	CONTENTS		Abstract	……………………………………………………………………………………………………………	3	Acknowledgements	…………………………………………………………………………………………..	4	Table	of	Contents………………………………………………………………………………………………	5	List	of	Tables	and	Figures…………………………………………………………………………………..	8		
Introduction	 	
THE	POLITICAL	ECONOMY	OF	PRIVATE	WELFARE	PROVISION	 9	 	1.	The	political	economy	of	private	pension	provision	 9	1.1	Bringing	the	state	back	in	to	explain	intensifying	intervention…………………..	13	1.2	Aligning	social	and	non-social	objectives	in	private	pension	provision……….	15	2.	Empirical	background	 19	2.1	Welfare	privatisation	as	public	retrenchment…………..………………………………	19	2.2	Increasing	state	intervention	in	private	provision……………………………………..23	2.3	Multiple	layers	of	regulation:	what	about	EU	influence?.……………………………	27	2.3.1	Direct	influence	through	EU	legislation…………..…………………………......27	2.3.2	Indirect	influence	through	policy	coordination……………………………..	30	3.	Theoretical	framework	 32	3.1	Existing	theoretical	perspectives	to	welfare	state	reform…………………………..	32	3.1.1	Functionalist	approach	to	welfare	state	development	…………………...	32	3.1.2	Interest-based	approach	to	welfare	state	development	…………………	34	3.1.3	Institutional	approach	to	welfare	state	development	……………………	37	3.2		A	‘state-centric’	perspective	to	explaining	private	welfare	reform	….…………	39	4.	Analytical	framework		 44	4.1	State	intervention	in	welfare	provision:	providing	conceptual	clarity	………..	44	4.1.1	Structuring	different	dimensions……………………………..…………………...	46	4.1.2	Distinguishing	between	public	and	private………………….………………..	47	4.1.3	Specifying	the	regulation	dimension………………………..……………………	48	4.1.4	Fiscal	intervention………………………...………………………..……………………	49	4.2	Developing	a	taxonomy:	state	intervention	and	pension	objectives	……….…..	50	5.	Presenting	research	design,	methodology	and	the	three	papers		 54	5.1	Summary	Paper	1……………………………………………………………………………………	57	5.2	Summary	Paper	2……………………………………………………………………………………	59	5.3	Summary	Paper	3……………………………………………………………………………………	61	
	 6	
	
Paper	1	
THE	POLITICAL	ECONOMY	OF	PRIVATE	WELFARE	PROVISION:	WHAT	DRIVES	ACTIVE	
STATE	INVOLVEMENT	IN	SHAPING	PRIVATE	PENSIONS	WITHIN	GERMANY	AND	THE	
UK?	 63	1.	Changing	state	involvement	in	public	and	private	pension	pensions	 63	2.	Explaining	the	relationship	between	public	and	private	pension	reforms	 68	2.1	Existing	approaches		..………………………………………………………………………………68	2.1.1	Identical	reform	dynamics…………………………………………………………...	68	2.1.2	Distinct	reform	dynamics……………………………………………………………..	71	2.2	Proposed	framework:	distinct	yet	related	reform	dynamics………………………	73	3.	Case	Study:	Pension	reforms	in	Germany	and	the	UK	 77	3.1	Reform	dynamics	in	Germany………………………………………………………………….	78	3.1.1	Public	and	private	pension	reforms	in	Germany………………………….....78	3.1.2	The	limits	of	voluntarism	in	Germany……………………………………………84	3.2	Reform	dynamics	in	the	UK……………………………………………………………………….86	3.2.1	Public	and	private	pension	reforms	in	the	UK………………………………..	87	3.2.2	The	limits	of	voluntarism	in	the	UK………………………………………………	89	3.3	Discussion……………………………………………………………………………………………….	94	4.	Conclusion	 97		
Paper	2	
ORGANISING	 PRIVATE	 SOCIAL	 PROTECTION:	 HOW	 TO	 EXPLAIN	 DIFFERENT	
EXPERIENCES	WITH	COLLECTIVE	RISK-SHARING	DURING	CRISES	 IN	DENMARK	AND	
THE	NETHERLANDS?	 99	1.	Recreating	social	protection	within	private	welfare	provision	 99	2.	Analytical	framework	 105	2.1	Existing	approaches:	Can	social	partners	fill	the	gap	of	social	protection?	…	105	2.2	The	role	of	regulations	in	structuring	distributional	conflicts……………………	106	3.	Case	Study:	Private	social	protection	in	Denmark	and	the	Netherlands	 110	3.1	Similar	systems,	diverging	experiences…………………………………………………….	110	3.2	Analysis:	Differences	in	organising	collective	risk-sharing…………………………	116	3.2.1	Differences	in	organising	collective	risk-sharing……………………………	116	3.2.2	Organisational	differences	can	account	for	diverging	experiences…	119	3.2.3	Regulatory	underpinnings	of	organisational	differences………………..	121	4.	Discussion	and	conclusion	 126	
	 7	
	
Paper	3	
COUNTERING	 FINANCIAL	 INTERESTS	 FOR	 SOCIAL	 PURPOSES:	WHAT	DRIVES	 STATE	
INTERVENTION	IN	PENSION	MARKETS	IN	THE	CONTEXT	OF	FINANCIALIZATION?		130	1.	Regulatory	politics	when	financial	and	social	interests	are	in	conflict	 130	2.	Established	explanations	for	state	intervention	in	financial	welfare	markets								134	3.	Towards	a	better	explanation:	bringing	the	state	back	in																																													136	4.	A	state-centric	approach	to	explain	the	shift	towards	stricter	regulations	 139	4.1	Why	did	Labour	relaxed	regulations	in	2004?	……………………..…………………….140	4.2	Why	did	the	coalition	government	introduce	stricter	regulations	in	2014?	..	143	5.	Alternative	explanations	and	why	they	do	not	hold	up	 150	5.1	The	role	of	electoral	considerations……………….……………………..…………………..	150	5.2	The	role	of	organised	interest	groups……………………………………………………….	151	6.	Conclusion	 155		
Conclusion	
THE	‘PRIVATE	SOLUTION’	AS	A	NEGOTIATED	OUTCOME	 158	1.	Overall	conclusions	of	the	thesis	 162	1.1	Theme	I:	A	state-centric	explanation	of	private	welfare	reforms……………..…	162	1.2	Theme	II:	Private	welfare	provision	as	a	negotiated	outcome………………….…	166	1.3	Theme	III:	Achieving	stability	through	trust	……………………….……………………	172	2.	Three	broader	contributions	 177	2.1	State-market	relationship……………………………..…………………………………………	177	2.1.1	Politics-against-markets…………...……………………………..…………………...	178	2.1.2	Politics-for-markets…………...……………………………….…..…………………...	179	2.1.3	Politics-through-markets…………...…………………………..…………………...	 180	2.1.4	Entanglement	between	states	and	markets….…………..……………………	181	2.2	Conceptualising	welfare	states	……………………………………………………………..…	185	2.3	Financialization	…………………………………………………………………..…………………			188	3.	Limitations	and	future	research	questions	 190	3.1	Limitations…………………………………………………………………..……………..…………..	190	3.2	Future	research	questions…………………………………………………………………….…	194		References…………………………………………………………………………………………………………	196	
	 8	
 
 
LIST	OF	TABLES		Table	1:	Taxonomy	of	state	interventions	in	private	pension	provision	…………….……….51	Table	2:	Organisational	characteristics	of	collective	risk-sharing…………………………..…108	Table	3:	Coverage	and	gross	pension	replacement	for	DK	and	NL…………………………….111	Table	4:	Gross	total	replacement	rates	in	DK,	2005-2050………………………………...……….111	Table	5:	Organisational	characteristics	of	collective	risk-sharing	in	DK	and	NL…………118	Table	6:	Breakdown	of	requests	for	intervention	to	address	charges	per	party…………147			
LIST	OF	FIGURES		Figure	1:	Main	reform	pressures	in	the	organisation	of	private	pensions	…………………...18	Figure	2:	Long-term	growth	in	pension	expenditure	………………..………………………………..21	Figure	3:	Evolution	of	theoretical	replacement	rates	from	2005	to	2050…………................23	Figure	4:	Three-dimensional	approach	of	welfare	systems…………………………………………45		Figure	5:	Traditional	representation	of	social	policy	approaches……………………………......64	Figure	6:	Reform	dynamics	as	a	'tug-of-war'	along	a	single	conflict	dimension	…………...70	Figure	7:	Proposed	approach:	linking	two	conflict	dimensions	…………………….…………….74	Figure	8:	Hypothetical	replacement	rates	for	selected	OECD	countries…….……………….101	Figure	9:	Pension	funds'	asset	allocation	for	selected	OECD	countries.	……………………..116	
 
 
	 9	
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY  
OF PRIVATE PENSION PROVISION 
 
 
 
1. The political economy of private pension provision 
Despite widespread concerns regarding welfare retrenchment, the state has regained 
prominence in studies of welfare reform. Many scholars have pointed out that governments 
are not simply reducing their engagement with social policy; instead their activities are 
increasingly constituting a ‘social investment state’ rather than a ‘welfare state’ (Busemeyer 
et al. 2018; Ferrera 2009; Hemerijck 2012; Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012). Even if states 
have consolidated and transformed more traditional social policies that focus on social 
protection – so the argument goes – states also expanded policies that address ‘new social 
risks’ (Bonoli 2007; Esping-Andersen 1999b; Taylor-Gooby 2004). These social policies do 
not simply compensate for loss of income, but play a productive role by focusing on 
‘creating, mobilizing, or preserving skills’ (Garritzmann et al. 2017). Furthermore, states have 
been playing an active role in the politics of welfare reform by actively ‘engineering’ new 
reform coalitions to support this modernisation of the welfare state (Häusermann 2010).  
  
 Yet even for the ‘old social policies’ – such as old age income security – it is 
increasingly clear that the hand of the state is still very visible (Hyde and Dixon 2008; 
Leisering 2011; Mabbett 2012; Whiteside 2006b). Many countries did succeed in 
significantly scaling back the level of public pension promises (Häusermann 2010; Levy 
2010; OECD 2013). But conflating ‘public’ and ‘state’ conceals that states play a 
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considerable role in shaping the private provision of welfare. In particular, it obscures how 
states steer the allocation of private welfare benefits by intervening actively in how private 
welfare provision is organised. While such efforts to reshape private provision to meet public 
policy objectives is not a new practice (Whiteside 2006a), several scholars have noted 
increasing levels of regulatory intervention; concluding that the role of welfare states is not so 
much diminishing, as it is shifting from welfare provider to regulator (Leisering 2011).  
 
This thesis starts from the observation that pension privatisation seems to go hand in 
hand with more active state intervention in the allocation of private pensions. As will be 
illustrated more extensively in the second section, most governments have sustained a 
voluntarist approach to organising non-state pension provision until well into the 1990s. This 
voluntarist approach means that the organisation of occupational and personal pensions is left 
to the discretion of private actors. Employers generally could choose whether to provide 
occupational schemes to their employees or not, while saving into a private pension scheme 
was fiscally encouraged but depended on the workers’ decision to do so. Yet since the mid-
1990s, we observe that governments are increasingly using fiscal and regulatory instruments 
in order to constrain the discretion of individual actors. In several countries, employers are 
now compelled to contribute to workers’ schemes; these schemes are often initiated without 
active decision by these workers and subject to new regulatory restrictions (for example 
regarding costs or the ability to differentiate between workers). So households as well as 
employers now have less scope to make their own decisions regarding private pensions than 
they had a few decades earlier. As a result, distributional outcome of private pension 
provision depends relatively less on ‘private initiative’. In conclusion, even though the role of 
the state in terms of allocating public pension benefits has decreased, the role of the states in 
shaping the allocation of private pension benefits has increased over the past few decades.  
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The intensifying involvement of governments in shaping private pension provision 
suggests a more complex picture of the shifting role of states in organising social protection; 
one that can neither be captured by simple welfare state retreat, nor by a shift from social 
protection to social investment. Earlier studies have made great contributions by identifying 
and documenting increasing state involvement in private welfare provision (Hyde and Dixon 
2008; Leisering 2011), yet they stop short of providing a coherent explanation for these 
reform dynamics. This thesis builds on these efforts by using a political-economic approach 
to explain why states decide to engage in or abstain from more active intervention in the 
organization of private welfare provision. Hence the main research question that motivates 
this thesis: What drives governments to shift away from voluntarism towards more active 
forms of intervention, even as they maintained the general thrust of welfare state liberalisation 
and pension privatisation?  
 
The general message of this thesis is that public and private reform dynamics cannot 
be understood in isolation from each other, but have to be analysed together. Throughout this 
thesis I will show that efforts to reduce or contain the level of direct fiscal commitments (by 
reducing public pension provision) do not mean that governments withdraw from the 
organisation of welfare provision; instead governments find themselves compelled to 
intervene more intensively in the organisation of private welfare provision. In other words, 
interventions in private welfare provision are to a large extent driven by the need to promote a 
welfare system that is both politically and fiscally stable. This thesis investigates and explains 
how public reform efforts spill over into private reform dynamics.   
 
Before discussing the key arguments, it is good to pause for a moment to ask why we 
need to explain interventions in private pension provision at all. Why would we not expect 
that governments intervene more intensively just when non-state provision becomes more 
important (especially given that voluntarism is likely to lead to socially undesirable 
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outcomes)? The reason why such interventions are not self-evident is that they do not only 
bring social and political benefits; restricting individual discretion is costly and entails 
political risks. Abandoning voluntarism always involves costs: it requires effort to make 
individuals act in a certain way if they do not do so voluntarily. In the case of steering private 
pension decisions, these costs can be very substantial. Providing tax incentives establishes a 
very considerable fiscal burden. Forcing employers to achieve security standards or to 
provide contributions creates important administrative and non-wage labour costs, hampering 
their competitiveness. Obliging individuals to save results in lower take-home pay, which is 
very often seen as an additional tax. So whether it is tax-payers, employers or workers who 
bear the costs, imposing such costs is likely to be politically unpopular (Pierson 2001; Vis 
2010). Moreover, increasing the visibility of state involvement in shaping markets can be 
politically risky in itself. If states have a heavy hand in shaping private provision, this 
increases the probability that individuals will seek recourse from governments if their 
expectations are disappointed (Mabbett 2012). In conclusion, interfering in the organization 
of private welfare is seldom unproblematic and straightforward (otherwise we should expect 
that regulatory interventions are much more widespread and consistently applied). It means 
that we have to explain why governments decide to engage in or abstain from more active 
interventions, as well as why certain interventions are preferred over others.  
 
The existing literature suggests several plausible reasons to explain why governments 
decide to intervene more intensively in the organisation of private welfare, despite the cost 
and risks involved in doing so. A functionalist approach to studying welfare states would 
suggest that the rise of interventions simply reflects the increased visibility of market failures; 
as private provision becomes more important, tackling the many market failures becomes 
increasingly important as well (Altman 1992; Gunsteren and Rein 1985). Others would point 
at the electoral benefits of regulatory intervention; the electoral benefits of intervention could 
outweigh the costs mentioned earlier (Gingrich 2011). Another plausible explanation focuses 
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on the need for governments to appease resistance against public cut-backs, this by promoting 
compensation through private provision (Bonoli and Palier 2007; Pierson 2001b). Others 
argue that interest groups use non-social objectives (such as financial market development) to 
convince governments that it is worth engaging in costly interventions in private pension 
provision (Naczyk 2013; Naczyk and Palier 2015). Section 3 will discuss these very different 
theoretical explanation in more detail. Each is plausible and touches on interesting aspects of 
the reform dynamics, yet I will show that all of them encounter difficulties in making sense of 
the observed reform dynamics.  
 
My thesis proposes a different approach to explain intensifying state intervention in 
private pension provision; it is based on two main arguments. The first argument is that a 
state-centric approach can better explain intensifying interventions in the organisation of 
private pension provision. The second argument is that, to understand when and how these 
interventions materialise, it is necessary to take into account the different political-economic 
interests regarding the organisation of private pension provision. 
 
1.1 Bringing the state back in to explain intensifying intervention 
The first argument builds on the broader research agenda aimed at ‘bringing the state back in’ 
(Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 2008). This approach starts from 
recognising that states are “autonomous actors” who “formulate and pursue goals that are not 
simply reflexive of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society” (Skocpol 
1985, 9). As such, this thesis shifts the analytical attention beyond the more traditional focus 
on non-state actors to explain differences in the organisation of private pension provision. The 
literature that studies variation in the design and outcome of occupational pension funds 
predominantly focuses on the role of social partners in shaping this variation; for example on 
basis of their different interests (G. Clark 2003; Pavolini and Seeleib-Kaiser 2016), different 
organisational capacities of social partners (Trampusch 2007; Wiß 2012), or differences in 
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relative strength between unions and employers (Ebbinghaus 2011b; Ebbinghaus and Wiß 
2011; Wiß 2015a). Also the existing explanations for intensifying regulatory intervention 
analyse regulatory decisions mainly as a response to external pressure. This can be electoral 
pressure (see for example the partisan explanation by Gingrich 2011) or pressure by 
organised interest groups (for example “vested interests” in public provision - see Bonoli and 
Palier 2007; or business and financial actors - see Naczyk 2013; and Leimgruber 2008). 
Because the existing literature focuses on the influence of non-state actors, it tends to reduce 
the role of policy-makers to that of a ‘transmission belt’ – translating pressure into decisions.  
 
Throughout this thesis I show that shifting our analytical focus to the autonomous 
role of the state, acting on basis of its own interests, provides insights into reform dynamics 
that remain obscured in these traditional approaches. More specifically, I find that 
governments are predominantly interested in ‘containing fiscal liabilities’ in the long run. 
Governments are not simply interested in ‘getting out’ of expensive public promises, but also 
in their ability to ‘get out and stay out’ in the longer run. Even if governments manage to 
successfully reform their public pension provision and reduce direct fiscal liabilities, they are 
not immune to public demands for improved old age income adequacy. When assessing the 
adequacy of their old age income, households take into account their overall pension package 
– including private pensions as well as public benefits (Grech 2013; Rein and Rainwater 
1986). The need to achieve overall pension adequacy gives governments a clear stake in the 
outcome of private provision (see also Mabbett 2012). So when private provision does not 
contribute to overall adequacy, pressure on public provision is considered likely to re-emerge. 
In order to capture this key feature that these new liabilities only materialise when pressure 
emerges, it is helpful to borrow a concept from literature on fiscal stability – namely 
contingent liabilities (Altman 1992; Heller 1998; Polackova 1998).  
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This thesis argues that interventions in private provision should be understood on 
basis of state efforts to control contingent liabilities (i.e. reducing the probability that 
contingent liabilities materialise into direct explicit liabilities). Voluntary organisation of 
private provision tends to result in low levels of coverage and adequacy, this for reasons that 
are well-understood (Barr 2012b, 158–65): the sheer complexity of the information necessary 
to select pension schemes or investment strategies often prevents people from making good 
decisions, or even from making any decision at all (i.e. bounded rationality); even when 
information is available, people are prone to procrastination and inertia (i.e. bounded will-
power). State interventions in private pension provision can improve adequacy, coverage and 
security by addressing those market failures; yet these interventions involve restricting the 
discretion of non-state actors – for example by requiring workers or employers to contribute 
to a private scheme. In each paper I find that governments are often reluctant to intensify 
social interventions in light of resistance by households, employers or other actors. 
Reluctance can be aggravated because evaluating the long-term social stability of a pension 
system involves significant uncertainty. First of all, the outcome depends on how much 
households decide to save and how markets perform. Secondly, there is no certain way to tell 
what households consider to be sufficiently adequate and at what level they will mobilise 
(Chybalski and Marcinkiewicz 2016). So even if regulatory interventions can improve social 
viability, political reluctance and uncertainty mean that there is generally quite some scope 
for assessing whether and which intervention is appropriate.  
 
1.2 Aligning social and non-social objectives in private pension provision 
The first argument stresses the important role of the state as an autonomous actor to explain 
intensifying intervention in private pension provision; yet it also recognises that there is often 
quite some scope to decide whether further intervention is necessary and in what way 
governments should adjust the organisation of private pension provision to promote social-
political viability. The second argument is that, in order to better understand when and how 
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these interventions materialise, we have to take into account how social concerns align with 
non-social interests regarding the organisation of private pension provision; this with 
particular attention to the role of financial actors.  
 
 This argument on non-social interests regarding the organisation of private pensions 
builds on the financialization literature. The main thrust of this literature is that financial 
considerations increasingly penetrate other dimensions of social life (van der Zwan 2014). 
Scholars of the ‘welfare-finance’ nexus show that welfare arrangements have important 
financial implications that shape decisions in the social sphere. For example, different ways to 
organise occupational pension schemes have different consequences for how corporations are 
financed – including their access to patient capital (Estévez-Abe 2001; Jackson and Vitols 
2001; McCarthy, Sorsa, and van der Zwan 2016; Naczyk 2015); but also for the development 
of financial markets (Naczyk 2013; Naczyk and Palier 2015). These ‘non-social’ interests 
create incentives for non-state actors to influence regulatory interventions that shape the 
organisation of private pension provision.  
 
 In line with these insights, this thesis shows that financial actors play a more complex 
role in shaping reforms than is commonly acknowledged. Whereas the existing literature 
tends to oppose financial and social interests (see Naczyk 2013), I argue that financial actors 
convince governments to engage in costly interventions by strategically aligning their 
commercial interests with broader yet less mobilised social concerns. On the one hand, 
financial pension providers have an interest in pension privatisation because they make profits 
on managing funded pensions. On the other hand, the financial sector knows that voluntarism 
results in limited coverage – which means underdeveloped market potential. This suggests 
that the pension industry has a commercial interest in encouraging state interventions that 
constrain voluntarism in order to promote the expansion of coverage and adequacy.  
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 In this thesis I find that this surprising alliance between social concerns and the 
commercial interests of financial pension providers allows the latter to convince governments 
to engage in costly interventions, especially when governments are reluctant and when 
electoral pressure is absent. This illustrates the theoretical pattern proposed by Trumbull 
(2012) – where a smaller group with specific interests manages to influence policy decisions 
by linking their narrow interest to less-mobilised interests of a much wider group. This 
analysis of the influence of financial actors differs from existing approaches in at least two 
ways. Whereas earlier work analyses the influence of finance on policy-makers by focusing 
on economic and financial arguments (see Naczyk 2013; Naczyk and Palier 2015), I show 
that financial actors aim at shaping regulatory decisions on basis of social arguments (in 
particular by stirring concerns regarding the ‘savings gap’ between what people expect to 
receive and their actual savings). More generally, traditional theory of organised interest 
pressure analyses influence on basis of instrumental or structural power (Culpepper 2010; 
Hacker and Pierson 2002). This thesis specifies that the capacity of financial actors to 
influence policymakers is mainly derived from their capacity to sway the assessment of 
policy-makers as to which regulatory decisions best promote the state’s own objectives 
regarding social-political stability. 
 
Even though this thesis finds that financial actors play the most pro-active role in 
promoting social interventions, this does not mean that unions and employers do not shape 
these decisions. Insofar as governments require their support to promote private pensions (e.g. 
employers have to accept higher contributions), social partners can hamper or promote social 
interventions. As with financial actors, I show that decisions regarding regulatory intervention 
are influenced by whether they align with non-social concerns of social partners regarding the 
organisation of private pensions. These non-social objectives of unions and employers 
regarding the organisation of occupational pensions can relate to several areas – ranging from 
human resource management and corporate finance to collective bargaining (Shalev 1996). 
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Even if regulatory interventions are not driven by those concerns, intensifying intervention 
can be acceptable to social partners when they align with these non-social objectives (even if 
it constrains their discretion) and contested when they do not. For example, in the first paper I 
show that German unions initially resisted the Riester reforms, until adjustments were made 
that would strengthen their negotiation position in collective bargaining. So even if social 
partners are not the main drivers of regulatory intervention, they do play a role in explaining 
why certain decisions are made rather than others. 
 
 
Figure 1 Overview of the main reform pressures in the organisation of private pensions 
 
To conclude, this thesis argues that reform dynamics within private pension provision 
are shaped by the tensions described in the two main arguments (see Figure 1). Efforts to 
reduce fiscal pressure result in greater reliance on private pensions to secure overall pension 
adequacy. As long as there are concerns regarding the social-political viability of  relying on 
private provision (which would result in re-emerging pressure on public provision), there will 
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be pressure on states to promote social outcomes by intervening in the organisation of private 
pensions – hence shifting further away from voluntarism. Financial actors in particular play 
an important role in cultivating pressure on states to expand coverage and adequacy. While 
those interventions improve social adequacy, they also restrict the discretion of non-state 
actors. Hence the ability of governments to promote the social viability of private pensions 
depends on their capacity to create and maintain sufficient support for these interventions. It 
remains an open question whether shaping the organisation of private pensions can ensure 
adequate levels of pension provision to avoid re-emerging pressure on public provision – this 
given the constraints of intensifying interventions. Yet this dynamic helps explaining why 
states appear to be increasingly entangled in, rather than retreating from, the organisation of 
social protection. 
 
The rest of the introduction will be structured as follows. First I present a brief 
overview of the empirical context of the reform dynamics that form the basis of the research 
question of this thesis. Next I present the theoretical framework – contrasting existing 
explanations with the proposed state-centric approach to explain intensifying state 
intervention. On basis of this theoretical framework, I develop the analytical framework that 
will be used to investigate the different ways states can intervene in the organisation of 
welfare provision. Finally, I clarify the methodological decisions and research design used to 
approach the research question, followed by a brief presentation of the three papers that will 
constitute the thesis.  
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2. Empirical background 
This section briefly explores and juxtaposes the two reform dynamics that are at the basis of 
this research project. First I discuss welfare privatisation as a process of public retrenchment. 
Subsequently I discuss reforms resulting in increasing state involvement in the organisation of 
private welfare provision. Finally I take a closer look at the main regulatory initiatives at the 
level of the European Union. 
 
2.1 Welfare privatisation as public retrenchment 
Welfare provision is one of the most visible and profound ways in which states have an 
impact on its citizens. The best known task of welfare states is that of fighting poverty and 
redistributing resources; less familiar but at least as important is the role welfare states play in 
assisting households to prevent sharp drops in income (Baldwin 1990; Barr 2001; Hacker 
2002). This includes income smoothing from working life to retirement, but also protecting 
families against the threat of social risks (such as sickness, unemployment or outliving one’s 
savings). In the absence of welfare states, families could rely on markets to borrow and save 
in order to distribute income across time; or they can participate in private insurance schemes. 
However, market-based provision of insurance is replete with failures that result in 
suboptimal outcomes (e.g. families share less risks than they would want to when given the 
opportunity); providing a strong rationale to organise collective systems through the welfare 
state (Barr 2012b). Indeed, during the past century most countries have dramatically increased 
the scope of public welfare provision – both in terms of responsibilities and channelling 
resources in order to perform these commitments (P. H. Lindert 2004; Nullmeier and 
Kaufmann 2010).   
 
The rising level of fiscal involvement of the state in the organisation of social 
protection resulted in growing pressure to reduce its direct social commitments (Flora 1986; 
Offe 1984; Pierson 1994). High levels of social expenditure were increasingly considered to 
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be a fiscal burden and argued to be unsustainable in light of slowing economic growth, 
demographic change, high unemployment and globalisation (Clayton and Pontusson 1998; 
Garrett 1998; Korpi and Palme 2003; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Schwartz 2001; Swank 
2002). This is particularly the case for pension provision; Figure 2  illustrates the fiscal 
challenges in terms of expected long-term growth in pension expenditure by 2060.   
 
 
Figure 2 Long-term growth in pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP (2010-2060) 
Source: European Commission (2013, 3): Fiscal Sustainability Report 2012.  
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Accordingly, the research literature shifted attention from explaining the expansion of 
public welfare provision to explaining retrenchment. Initial studies focused on explaining 
why welfare systems appeared largely resilient in face of these pressures (Pierson 1994, 
2001b; Esping-Andersen 1996b; Ferrera and Rhodes 2000). Yet subsequent studies showed 
that, despite resistance against retrenchment, governments still manage to privatise provision 
through less visible and gradual strategies that still add up to a ‘path-departure’ in pension 
policy (S. M. Brooks 2005; Clark and Whiteside 2003; Ebbinghaus and Gronwald 2011; 
Ervik 2005; Häusermann 2010; Hacker 2004; Levy 2010; Orenstein 2008; Palier 2010; 
Thelen and Streeck 2005). This means that, even in countries where earnings-related pensions 
used to be provided through public provision, households now have to rely on private sources 
of welfare to achieve similar replacement levels. Calculations of the expected Theoretical 
Replacement Rate1 (TRR) show that for several countries, legislative reforms are expected to 
significantly reduce statutory pensions by 2050 (Figure 3) (SPC 2006, 16).2 Accordingly, the 
European Commission concludes that:  “Generally, adequacy outcomes have become more 
conditional on longer and less interrupted working lives and on supplementary pension 
schemes that depend on returns in financial markets.”  (European Commission 2012a, 31). So 
from the perspective of public provision of old age income security, pension privatisation 
does indeed suggests the gradual withdrawal of the state from organising social protection. 
 
                                                            1 “Theoretical Replacement Rates (TRR) are defined as the level of pension income the first year after 
retirement as a percentage of individual earnings at the moment of retirement. Thus they provide a 
proxy for the standard of living that people can achieve in retirement compared to their situation when 
working.”  (European Commission 2012a, 33) 2 I present data directly from the “Report by the Indicators Sub-Group (ISG) of the Social Protection 
Committee (SPC)”. This is the same data that underpins the reports by the European Commission; yet 
these reports do not differentiate between statutory and occupational pensions.  
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Figure 3 Evolution of theoretical replacement rates from 2005 to 2050 
Source: Author representation of data from the Social Protection Committee  (SPC 2006, 16) 
 
 
2.2 Increasing state intervention in private provision 
This section shows that, if we expand our focus to take into account differences in state 
intervention in private welfare provision, the previous observation of welfare state retreat is 
less straightforward. At the same time states are scaling back their involvement in terms of 
public pension provision, we observe intensifying efforts to shape the distributional outcomes 
of private pension provision. 
 
Whiteside already revealed that states have long adapted private pensions to meet 
public policy objectives, if not to the same degree in every country (Whiteside 2006a). After 
the Second World War, governments in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden actively 
promoted occupational welfare in order to meet growing demand for income-replacing 
pensions, as well as the financing needs of companies and facilitate economic revival in 
general. By supporting social partners in terms of expanding and administering occupational 
pension schemes, these governments were able to advance social solidarity as well as their 
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economic interests (Whiteside 2006a, 51). In contrast, similar efforts to encourage the spread 
of occupational schemes in the UK remained comparatively limited; resulting in less 
outspoken concordance between the public and private pension system (Whiteside 2006b, 
49).  
 
Interestingly, such efforts to intervene in private provision in order to achieve policy 
goals are not restricted to the post-war decades; this despite the wider trend towards de-
regulation and decline in popularity of active state interference in the economy (Deacon, 
Hulse, and Stubbs 1997; Scharpf 2000). If anything, distinctions between the public and 
private sphere have been increasingly ‘blurred’ during the more recent decades (G. L. Clark 
and Whiteside 2003; Ebbinghaus and Whiteside 2012). From the perspective of this thesis, it 
can even be argued that the level of interference has accelerated during the past few decades. 
In most countries, government initiatives to promote occupational pensions were still largely 
designed in line with the principle of voluntarism until the 1990s; households and social 
partners were strongly encouraged, but ultimately able to make the important decisions on 
their own accord. Since the 1990s, however, we observe that several governments 
increasingly use tax and regulatory policies in order to constrain the discretion of individual 
actors. But even in countries where governments departed from voluntarism already before 
the 1990s, we observe further state interventions throughout the subsequent decades. 
 
Main examples of countries that experienced more far-reaching state intervention in 
the organisation of private pensions before the 1990s  are the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
Denmark. For each of the three countries, we see that also long after these initial interventions 
the state continues to be involved in re-shaping occupational pensions; both in order to 
expand coverage and to deal with vulnerabilities arising from the financial crises in the 2000s. 
In the Netherlands, the state already played an important role in expanding occupational 
pension coverage as result of the 1949 act that mandates extension of agreements across the 
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sector to employers not covered by collective agreements (Anderson 2011, 305). Subsequent 
regulations further limited the ability of funds to refuse employees; including part-time 
workers since 1996 (Anderson 2011, 305). Furthermore, since the 2000s the government has 
introduced stricter governance rules that limit the traditional discretion of social partners in 
managing occupational pension funds (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 
2006; DNB 2015). Occupational pension provision in Switzerland was made mandatory in 
1985 for employees older than 25 and with an income exceeding the ‘access threshold’ 
(Bonoli and Häusermann 2011, 333). In order to increase coverage of low-wage, part-time 
and atypical workers, often women, this access threshold has been reduced after a debate 
since the late 1990s (Bertozzi and Bonoli 2007, 128–29). During the past years, the Swiss 
government tries to pass legislation in order to preserve the financial sustainability of 
mandatory occupational pensions; yet these proposals have been rejected during a referendum 
in 2017. Finally, Denmark introduced quasi-mandatory occupational pensions in the late 
1980s; these are organised by collective agreement yet underpinned by government 
regulations. During the past years, “the focus in pension policy has been on the challenges 
caused by the maturation of a complex multi-pillar pension system.”; in particular regarding 
the ‘coverage problem’ and the ‘savings disincentive’ problem (European Commission 
2018b, 38). However, reform proposals have been held off until now by unions, employers, 
insurance companies and pension funds (European Commission 2018b, 38). 
 
Countries that shifted away from voluntarism since the 1990s include Belgium, 
Germany and the UK. In Germany, employer discretion has been restricted since reforms in 
2001 that specify that “employees can demand from the employer the opportunity for an 
employee financed pension by way of deferred compensation (Entgeltumwandlung) either 
within a company scheme or, if not existing, to an employee’s private pension insurance.” 
(Reiche 2014). More recently, new legislation has been introduced that aims for expanding 
coverage by allowing for auto-enrolment within collectively negotiated schemes (European 
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Commission 2018b, 49). Since two reforms in 1995 and 2003, Belgian employers can no 
longer differentiate between workers when there is no justifiable ground. Furthermore, the 
reforms provided the legal basis for organising collective agreements that are binding for all 
employers and employees covered in such sectors (De Deken 2011, 74). “A new scheme of 
"sectoral pensions" was introduced in 2003 (Law on the complementary pensions), in order to 
extend the second pillar of occupational pensions. Membership is mandatory at sector level, 
depending on collective agreements, but in those sectors where no collective agreement is 
concluded, enterprises can voluntarily install a second pillar pension plan. Wherever such 
pension plans exist in execution of the Law of 2003, adherence is compulsory for the entire 
workforce (of the firm or submitted to the sectoral collective agreement) and guaranteed by 
the employer.” (European Commission 2010, 3–4). Even in the UK, where employers and 
workers enjoyed almost full discretion until very recently, the Pensions Act of 2011 
introduced auto-enrolment; pushing individuals into private pension saving and forcing 
employers to automatically enrol employees in qualifying pension schemes and to contribute 
to these schemes.  
 
This does not mean that every country has shifted away from voluntarism as the basis 
for organising private pensions. Several countries have implemented regulations to promote 
expansion of supplementary pensions, but stopped short at actively restricting the discretion 
of non-state actors. For example, both France and Austria introduced such reforms in the 
early 2000s; yet arguably maintained high statutory replacement rates (da Conceicao-Heldt 
2007, 187–88) (European Commission 2018b, 188). Sweden did reduce statutory replacement 
rate during the overhaul of its pension system in 1994 yet refrained from major interventions 
in private provision (Anderson and Immergut 2007); arguably because collective agreements 
between social partners already results in widespread occupational coverage to supplement 
statutory provision (Anderson 2015a).  
 
	 27	
2.3 Multiple layers of regulation: what about EU influence? 
The focus of this thesis is on explaining intensifying interventions in private pension 
provision at a national level. Despite this focus on national regulations, it is clear that 
governments as well as social partners and the financial sector act within a broader regulatory 
context. Apart from international agreements that regulate the practice of financial firms and 
pension funds (especially in terms of accounting rules set by the International Accounting 
Standards Board), the EU shapes domestic policies both through regulations (e.g. Directives, 
Court rulings) and softer approaches (e.g. Open Method of Coordination). This thesis does 
not aim to explain regulatory reforms at the supra-national level. However, one cannot ignore 
these multiple levels of regulation insofar they could have an impact on regulatory 
developments at the national level. In this section, I briefly review the main initiatives at EU 
level – both in terms of regulations and policy coordination – to promote pension reforms; 
this in order to justify why they were not likely to play a decisive role in driving the domestic 
reforms this research project sets out to explain.   
 
2.3.1 Direct influence through EU legislation 
As Haverland remarks, the “European Union has only lately and reluctantly become involved 
in pension policy, and there is not much EU regulation focusing on the social aspects of 
pensions” (Haverland 2011, 175). Before evaluating to what extent social regulations at EU 
level could have had an impact on driving domestic regulatory developments, it is good to 
have a brief overview of the main policy decisions that affect public, occupational and 
personal pensions respectively (this overview is based on Anderson 2015b; and Schelkle 
forthcoming).  
 
 With respect to statutory public pensions, one of the key regulations coordinates 
social security systems among member states; it includes some mandatory private schemes 
(Coordination Regulation 883/2004; this regulation updated and modernised Regulation 
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1408/71). It makes public pensions portable through the ‘waiving of residence rules’.  
Moreover, Regulation 883/2004 confers individual social rights on migrant workers and their 
families who have contributed to statutory pensions in another member state. Another 
important decision was to make public pensions non-discriminatory between men and 
women, codified in the Equal Treatment in Social Security Directive 79/7/EEC, which was, 
however, only very gradually implemented.  
 
 With respect to occupational pension provision, the main regulation is the Directive 
on Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision (IORP 2003/51/EC) which is now 
overtaken by the IORP II Directive (2016/2341). This Directive aimed at facilitating cross-
border provision of occupational pensions, by harmonising prudential supervision on the basis 
of the ‘prudent person’ principle (the new Directive sets tighter governance requirements). In 
order to promote mobility, Directive 2014/50/EU gives workers the right to retain their vested 
pension rights.   
 
 With respect to personal pensions, the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) provides 
a harmonised supervisory framework that regulates the provision of life insurance and 
annuities as financial services. In terms of portability, the Safeguard Directive (98/49/EC) 
guarantees freedom of capital for pension payments. The most contentious regulation 
regarding the insurance sector is the Gender Equality Directive (2004/113/EC) after the Court 
of Justice of the European Union ruled that it had to be read as ruling out different tariffs for 
men and women in life insurance and annuities (Case C-236/09 Test-Achats).  
 
 This set of differentiated EU rules can be understood in the context of creating 
markets – both in terms of worker mobility and cross-border pension provision (Haverland 
2007). Even so, they also have an important social dimension, in particular those that protect 
the rights of economic migrants and those that require gender equality. The increasingly strict 
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supervision of the insurance sector can be considered as promoting pension security. This 
tension between market creation and seeking to promote social policy regarding pensions 
through regulatory means has been examined by Haverland (2011). He shows that several 
actors at the European level sought to promote social objectives through shaping the IORP 
Directive: socialist MEPs, the EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs and the EP 
Committee on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunity. Despite these efforts, Haverland 
(2011, 186) finds that “there was not sufficient political clout to implement solidaristic 
elements in the [pension fund] directive”. Interestingly, the main push-back came from the 
Council that emphasised that national autonomy should prevail (see also Schelkle 
forthcoming).  
 
 This suggests that the scope for EU influence through regulations on domestic 
regulatory reform processes is quite limited. Even if governments pursued regulatory reforms 
aimed at restricting market-based provision of pensions at the domestic level, they resisted 
similar social regulations that were initiated at the EU level. Such resistance can be explained 
partially on basis of Member State’s insistence on their ability to preserve national diversity 
of welfare systems (Haverland 2011, 185), as well as concerns about the fiscal implications of 
social regulations (exemplified by the strong mobilisation by Member States to contain the 
financial effects of the Barber ruling, which prohibited the use of different retirement ages for 
men and women in pension schemes; Anderson 2015b, 94). In conclusion, most pension-
related regulations at EU level have a relatively weak social dimension; resulting in a limited 
capacity to drive regulatory reforms at domestic level. Where EU social rules do have a 
significant impact on domestic regulations, they tend to be quite focused on specific areas 
(specifically gender equality and portability rights) that only represent a small part of the 
more far-reaching regulatory reforms that will be discussed throughout this thesis.  
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2.3.2 Indirect influence through policy coordination 
In the context of weak Community competences in the area of old age security, with 
governments strongly motivated to defend the prerogative of the national welfare state, efforts 
have been made to find alternative ways to shape domestic policy-making. The most 
prominent of these strategies is the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) in social policy, 
which was developed to “support welfare state reform through multi-lateral exchange among 
Member State bureaucrats and stakeholders, facilitated by the EU level” (de la Porte and 
Pochet 2012, 336). Pensions were one of these sensitive areas where an OMC process was 
launched in 2001, based on coupling social and economic goals, “thus partially rebalancing 
the more economic EU discourse on pension reform” (Natali 2009, 826; Wincott 2003). By 
including and measuring objectives such as ‘adequacy of pensions’ as well as ‘financial 
sustainability of pension systems’, the OMC method would be the more probable candidate to 
observe EU influence on domestic regulatory reform.  
 
   However, several scholars have argued that the Pensions OMC has turned out to be a 
‘light’ process of coordination – much weaker than that on employment and other social 
policies (Citi and Rhodes 2007; de la Porte and Nanz 2004; Eckardt 2005; Natali 2007). It 
allowed for “little room for learning and no fundamental alteration of the incentive structure 
of the national policy-making process”, as well as “low participation of social partners and 
civil society organizations and restricted room for public debate” (Natali 2007, 3). In order to 
explain this relative weakness of the Pensions OMC, Natali concludes that there was 
significant resistance by Member States which were “not enthusiastic about more advanced 
forms of coordination” and instead defended a “strict respect of subsidiarity” (Natali 2007, 
14). In other words, for reasons similar to resistance against legislative initiatives, it is 
unlikely that the Pensions OMC has been a main driver of regulatory reform at the national 
level.  
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 Beyond the OMC, the European Commission has remained active in promoting not 
just fiscal sustainability but also pension adequacy, for example through periodical reporting 
on ‘adequacy and sustainability’ of pensions (European Commission 2012a, 2013, 2018a). 
Moreover, in 2012 the European Commission published the White Paper ‘An Agenda for 
Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions’ (COM(2012) 55 final). It discusses the challenges 
to pension policies and presents policy proposals to address them. While the main challenge 
remains “increased financial pressure on national budgets”, the Commission includes several 
proposals aimed at supporting “complementary private retirement schemes by encouraging 
social partners to develop such schemes and encouraging Member States to optimise tax and 
other incentives” (European Commission 2012b). It is an interesting observation that the 
European Commission shows sustained interest in overall pension adequacy – not just in 
terms of poverty reduction but also income smoothing; in the conclusions I come back to this 
issue (see section 3.1 in the conclusions). However, for the purpose of the present discussion, 
the main observation is that these initiatives for policy coordination are too late in order to 
influence most of the reform dynamics we want to explain in this research project.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Existing theoretical perspectives to welfare state reform 
What drives state intervention in private welfare provision, this despite broader efforts to 
withdraw from responsibilities following from public provision and given the substantial 
fiscal and political costs involved? Over the past decades, scholars have developed a set of 
theoretical frameworks aimed at explaining which factors drive welfare state development. 
Given that the most prominent accounts within these broad frameworks have been developed 
to explain the expansion or retrenchment of public welfare provision, one should be careful 
not to transpose these insights blindly as potential explanations for state involvement in 
private welfare provision. Nevertheless, they provide a good starting point for the analysis 
within this thesis. In what follows I discuss three major theoretical approaches to explaining 
welfare state development: functionalism, interest-based approaches and new-
institutionalism. For each approach I summarise how they explain the expansion and 
retrenchment of public welfare states, followed by a brief discussion of how they analyse the 
relationship between public and private welfare reforms.  
 
3.1.1 Functionalist approach to welfare state development 
The main idea of the functionalist approach is that explanations of welfare state development 
have to be sought in socio-economic shifts and the social pressures this creates, rather than in 
political or institutional factors. Functionalist explanations have played a prominent role in 
scholarly efforts to explain both the expansion and retrenchment of public provision of 
welfare. In order to explain why welfare states dramatically increased their spending on social 
welfare during the 20th century, researchers argued that they did so in order to meet the social 
needs that resulted from industrialisation (Kerr 1960; Wilensky 1975) or the modernisation of 
society (Gough 1979; Flora and Heidenheimer 1981). Subsequently scholars tried to account 
for the welfare state retrenchment by investigating the link with economic and social change; 
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ranging from international developments such as globalisation, to shifts at domestic level 
such as unemployment or demographic change (Mishra 1999; Schwartz 2001; Tanzi 2002). 
The idea is that these social and economic developments leave little choice to governments 
but to partially dismantle the existing welfare system. Hence “problem pressure” is 
considered to be the main driver of both the expansion and retrenchment of state involvement 
in the organisation of social protection (Schwartz 2001). Even though functionalist 
explanations have been subject to widespread criticism (see below), most scholars accept that 
problem pressure is one of the main drivers of welfare reforms in general and pension reform 
in particular (Starke 2006). 
 
Maturing pension promises and demographic change have been often quoted as the 
main reasons why governments considered pension privatisation to be necessary. A similar 
functionalist reasoning has been used to suggest that “problem pressure” drives state 
involvement in private welfare provision, this following the growing need for such 
intervention given the social deficiencies of voluntaristic organisation (see for example 
Antolín and Stewart 2009; Pugh and Yermo 2008; Stewart 2010). Already during the early 
stages of privatisation, scholars anticipated growing levels of state regulation of private 
welfare provision in response to problems with efficiency and equity (Altman 1992; 
Gunsteren and Rein 1985). Subsequent advances in the field of welfare economics have 
demonstrated why the problems with market-based provision of welfare are indeed perfectly 
explainable (Barr 2002, 2012b). In light of the many market imperfections of private pension 
insurance, there is a very strong case for state involvement in the organisation of old age 
income security, both on grounds of equity and efficiency. Pension privatisation only 
strengthens the case for intervention, given the growing salience of private welfare for many 
households.  
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Even though this functionalist argument appears to explain the dual dynamic of 
privatisation and increased intervention very well, many scholars question whether problem 
pressure translates directly into policy decisions. Criticism regarding the functionalist 
explanation of the link between public and private welfare reforms is supported by the 
observation that similar levels of problem pressure result in very different degrees of state 
initiative. It is, moreover, difficult to explain on a functionalist basis why interventions are 
often not further pursued even when it is clear that not all social needs and market failures are 
addressed. The following two theories try to account for variation in state intervention by 
focusing on the political factors that mediate problem pressure and policy decision.  
 
3.1.2 Interest-based approach to welfare state development 
The interest-based approach understands welfare state development as the reflection of 
political struggles about the distributive consequences of welfare provision. In contrast to the 
functionalist claim that welfare states are inherently responsive to social needs, this interest-
based approach argues that government actions are dictated by the exercise of power and the 
ability to create class-coalitions (Esping-Andersen 1990, 105). This focus on political conflict 
and power explains why welfare states have developed differently, despite being subject to 
similar socio-economic trends. The most influential version of this approach focuses on class-
conflicts to explain variation among welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 1983, 
1989). The working class and its affiliated political parties are considered to be the main 
agents of change: better organisation of labour results not only in higher levels of public 
social expenditure, but also in more encompassing and egalitarian welfare states (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Subsequent scholars have pointed out the importance of social groups other 
than labour movements as drivers of welfare reforms; including farmers and middle-classes 
(Baldwin 1990), Christian-Democrats (Kersbergen 1995), employers (Mares 2003; Swenson 
2002) and new-social-risk groups (Häusermann 2006, 2010). Despite differences in terms of 
which actor matters most, these approaches all share the insight that state intervention is 
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driven by pressure exerted by conflicting social interests; structured through competing 
organised interest groups or partisan battles for voters.  
 
The theoretical focus on conflicts between social interests has generally been 
developed to explain welfare state expansion. Whether this approach is equally suited to 
explain welfare state retrenchment is a contested issue since Pierson argued that the 
explanatory relevance of parties and left power resources has faded (Pierson 1994; see below 
for further discussion). Pierson’s argument that the politics of welfare state retrenchment are 
different from those of welfare state expansion contrasts with Esping-Andersen’s claim that 
“a theory that seeks to explain welfare-state growth should also be able to understand its 
retrenchment or decline” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 32). Subsequent scholarship has argued 
that partisanship still matters (Anderson 2001; Garrett 1998; Hicks 1999; Korpi and Palme 
2003). Others have found mixed results (Huber and Stephens 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2003) 
or argued that partisan politics still matter but with left parties playing a different role than 
traditionally envisaged (Green-Pedersen 2002; Häusermann, Picot, and Geering 2013; Levy 
1999; Ross 2000).  
 
The predominant focus of this interest-based approach on explaining the development 
of public welfare provision does not mean that it ignores private welfare provision. In fact, 
variation in the balance between public and private welfare provision is a core characteristic 
on basis of which Esping-Andersen distinguishes between different worlds of welfare 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, chapter 4). Esping-Andersen clearly acknowledges that states play 
an important role in shaping the particular blend or mix of public and private welfare 
provision that characterises the welfare system. Not just by expanding public provision, but 
also by stimulating private welfare markets – using taxation or regulatory policy as well as 
indirect stimulus resulting from insufficient public provision (Esping-Andersen 1990, 79; 89; 
see also Hacker 2002). However, this analysis of the public-private mix builds on the 
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understanding that public and private welfare are very different ways of organising welfare: 
“A particularly important element in the identification of welfare-state regimes will, 
accordingly, be related to the blend of publicly provided social rights, and private initiative. 
In other words, regimes can be compared with respect to which essential human needs are 
relegated to private versus social security” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 80). State interventions 
aimed at expanding private welfare provision are therefore analysed as efforts to expand the 
role of voluntary initiative as the guiding principle of organising social protection; this 
reflecting the diminishing strength of organised labour in their struggle to defend public 
welfare provision as the main source of social protection.  
 
Gingrich recently proposed an interesting variation to this approach towards 
analysing the politics of public and private welfare development, based on the partisan 
benefits of shaping private provision (Gingrich 2011). She argues that both left- and right-
wing parties can shape welfare markets differently in order to disproportionally benefit their 
own constituency; resulting in electoral benefits that could outweigh the costs of intervention. 
This diverts from the traditional argument that distributional struggles shape the overall 
balance between public and private provision. Instead Gingrich proposes that the old 
distributional politics are driving state intervention within both the public and private sphere 
(hence stressing the similarities rather than the interaction between public and private welfare 
reform politics). It is not clear, however, how a partisan approach can help explaining the 
long-term developments towards increasing intervention. Governments tend to build on, 
rather than replace, existing regulatory policies; this even when the opposition takes over. 
Moreover, this approach cannot explain why governments intervene even during periods 
where they are ostentatiously reluctant to do so. 
 
Another interesting variation on the traditional interest-based explanations of state 
intervention in private pension provision focuses on how organised interest groups lobby 
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governments to pursue non-social benefits of expanding private pensions. Financial actors in 
particular are considered to play a central role in convincing governments that intervention is 
worth the cost, this because it promotes non-social goals such as financial market 
development, higher aggregate savings or economic growth more generally (S. M. Brooks 
2009; Madrid 2003; Naczyk 2016; Naczyk and Palier 2015). While this thesis agrees that the 
financial sector plays an important role, it does not agree that interventions are mainly driven 
by non-social concerns; if only because it cannot explain why governments also intervene 
against the interests of financial interest groups. 
 
3.1.3 Institutional approach to welfare state development 
A final set of explanations argues that state intervention is not directly driven by either 
problem pressure or distributional conflicts, but focuses on how institutions shape the 
development of welfare states. One group of scholars focuses on how political institutions 
such as electoral systems or constitutional rules shape the politics of reform, this by 
empowering some groups and facilitating certain policies more than others (for a review, see 
Immergut 2010). Another institutionalist approach focuses on how existing structures of 
social welfare provision shape subsequent policy decisions (Pierson 2001b). A central thesis 
within this latter strand is the argument that the ‘old’ politics of welfare expansion is 
qualitatively different from the ‘new’ politics of welfare retrenchment (Pierson 1994, 2001b). 
Drawing on historical institutionalism, Pierson stresses the importance of ‘policy feedback’: 
earlier policy decisions change the political landscape in which future decisions will be made, 
for example by creating new groups of vested interests who oppose the dismantlement of the 
established social policies. This means that politicians who aim to retrench welfare systems 
face a different political context than those expanding social protection. Whereas the political 
logic of welfare expansion was characterised by credit claiming, the political feasibility of 
welfare retrenchment depends on the ability of politicians to avoid blame for unpopular 
decisions. Pierson highlights strategies to circumvent political resistance such as obfuscating 
	 38	
the effect of reforms, dividing opposition or compensating them (Pierson 2001b). Others have 
stressed the importance of layering and sequencing; the idea is that stepwise expansion of 
private provision undermines opposition against retrenchment by reducing reliance on public 
provision (Bonoli and Palier 2007; Thelen and Streeck 2005).  
 
While most scholars agree that radical change through frontal attacks on the welfare 
state is unlikely to happen, there is much debate regarding what change does take place. 
Against the initial expectation that institutional inertia would prevail, scholars argued that 
institutional change did happen despite the absence of outright cutbacks (Bonoli and Palier 
2007; S. M. Brooks 2005; Häusermann 2010; Hacker 2004; Thelen and Streeck 2005). Hence 
even in continental welfare states where radical change is difficult, the long-term effects of 
existing reforms will result in substantial reductions of public social insurance and increasing 
dependence on private welfare provision. 
 
This analytical framework provides an interesting alternative approach to explaining 
state intervention in private welfare provision. Similar to conflict-based approaches, efforts to 
expand private welfare provision are analysed as a way to substitute for public welfare 
provision. Yet the ‘new politics of the welfare state’ approach suggests a slightly different 
causal mechanism to understand the politics that shape state involvement in private welfare 
provision. Its core idea is that public retrenchment elicits resistance, creating a hurdle to 
public reform efforts. From this perspective, regulatory intervention in private welfare 
provision could be analysed as a strategy to facilitate public retreat by undermining this 
resistance. For example, Bonoli and Palier argue that resistance against public retrenchment is 
reduced by gradually expanding private provision as compensation for the lower level of 
public benefits (Bonoli and Palier 2007). Hence in contrast to the power-resource theory, the 
‘new politics’ approach suggests that state intervention in private provision reflect the 
sustained strength of supporters of public provision, rather than its demise. In other words, 
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costly interventions in private pension provision are driven by the need to appease those who 
have the capacity to block public reform efforts. Nevertheless, this thesis finds that several 
countries governments had a tough time convincing unions and voters of the need for private 
interventions; suggesting that these reforms are about more than simply dealing with 
resistance against reforms. 
 
3.2  A ‘state-centric’ perspective to explaining private welfare reform 
In order to explain dynamics of intensifying interventions in private pension provision, this 
thesis proposes to shift our theoretical perspective to a ‘state-centric approach’. In what 
follows I set out how a state-centric perspective allows us to highlight aspects of the reform 
dynamic that remain underdeveloped or obscured within the alternative theoretical 
approaches. This does not mean that this thesis disregards several important and intuitive 
insights derived from alternative explanations. For example, welfare economists make clear 
why voluntarism is so prone to result in low levels of coverage and adequacy; interest-driven 
approaches point at the importance of financial actors and social partners; whereas the ‘new 
politics of the welfare state’ stress the relationship with efforts to reduce public provision. Yet 
the main argument in this thesis proposes to engage with these elements through the 
theoretical lens of the state as a central actor in shaping reform dynamics.  
 
The ‘state-centric’ approach to explaining policy decisions goes back to a broader 
research agenda that aims at ‘bringing the state back’ in the analysis of social change (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 2008). This approach starts from recognising that 
states are “autonomous actors” who “formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflexive 
of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society” (Skocpol 1985, 9). Several 
major studies stressed how governments took initiatives that went well beyond the demands 
of social groups or electorates (e.g. Finegold and Skocpol 1995), or where states were the 
most prominent participants in the decision-making process (e.g. Heclo 1974); hereby 
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challenging then-dominant research traditions such as pluralism (which explains policy 
decisions as the outcome of competing interests) or neo-Marxism (which analyses states as 
structures serving the ruling class) (Skocpol 1985, 5). In line with this original approach, this 
thesis analyses government decision-making processes not just as “merely arenas of political 
conflict or passive administrative tools to be turned to the purposes of any social group that 
gains governmental power” (Skocpol and Amenta 1986, 147). Instead I focus more on the 
autonomous role of the “state, defined as a set of institutions with distinctive histories and 
capabilities and as political actor with its own interests.” (Weir 2002, 769).  
 
 This state-centric perspective diverts from approaches that explain interventions as a 
response to pressure by voters or organised interest groups. Such interest-driven explanations 
are very diverse in terms of which pressure matters most – be it that of organised labour, 
financial actors or different electoral constituencies. Yet they all share the underlying 
assumption that policymakers are essentially nothing more than a ‘transmission belt’ that 
translates this pressure into policy decisions. Instead this thesis shifts the analytical attention 
to how policymakers make autonomous decisions, pursuing their own objectives, when 
shaping the relationship with external interests. For example, the first and third paper 
recognise that financial actors aim to shape regulatory decision; yet they show that 
governments use their discretion to assess whether or not such interventions align with their 
own objective to promote social viability of private pensions – ready to go against financial 
interests when they considered this was not the case. With respect to electoral pressure, 
concerns regarding ‘contingent liabilities’ clearly indicate that policymakers do take into 
account (long-term) electoral feedback. Yet such electoral considerations do not translate 
directly into regulatory decisions; the three papers show how policymakers have quite some 
leeway in assessing whether further intervention is required or how to shape these 
interventions. In conclusion, rather than directly translating external pressure into regulatory 
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decisions, states play an important role in shaping those decisions in order to promote their 
own interests.  
 
Differentiating the state-centric approach from the neo-institutionalist explanation is 
less straightforward; this because they are very much related, with many scholars associated 
both with the state-centric and the neo-institutionalist school. While states play a role in both 
approaches, the key difference I would like to highlight is whether the role of the state in 
shaping policy-decisions is understood in a ‘passive’ or ‘active’ manner. Initially, both the 
role of the state as actor and state as institution were recognised. For example, Skocpol 
argued that states matter for two reasons: first because state officials shape policy outcomes 
through goal-oriented activities and initiatives; secondly because ‘polity affects politics’ (the 
organizational configurations of the state affect the formation of collective political action, as 
well as its interests and capacities) (Skocpol 1985). Similarly, March and Olson stressed both 
the importance of the ‘design of political institutions’ in shaping the arena of contending 
social forces, as well as the role of state institutions acting on basis of ‘collective intention 
(e.g., preferences, goals, purposes) and expectations’ (1984, 738–39). However, over time the 
autonomous role of the state disappeared in the background; this in favour of greater attention 
to how institutions enable or constrain social interactions (Schmidt 2009, 518–19). This focus 
on the state as ‘rigid’ institution rather than autonomous actor is reflected in attention to the 
role of political institutions (Immergut 1992), but also the role of ‘state capacities’ or ‘policy 
legacies’ in shaping subsequent policy choices (Pierson 1994; Weir and Skocpol 1983).  
 
Indeed, the explanation of increasing state intervention in private pension provision 
that builds on the insights from the ‘new politics of the welfare state’ focuses on how 
regulatory decisions are shaped by the ‘policy legacy’ of existing public provision state (see 
presentation in section 3.1.3). Regulatory interventions in the organisation of private pensions 
are analysed as a way to overcome ‘institutionalised’ resistance against privatisation, resulting 
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from the capacity of vested interests to impede such efforts. Accordingly, regulatory 
interventions can be traced back to the relative strength of those opposing pension 
privatisation. By recognising the state as an autonomous actor, this thesis is able to examine 
how states can take regulatory initiatives even without being driven by protest by unions or 
angry voters. For example, in the first paper I show how governments in both Germany and 
the UK took the lead in defending social interventions in private provision against union 
resistance. In sum, this thesis responds to new calls to ‘bring the state back in, yet again’: 
“The state is not just the political economic setting that structures the actions of private 
political economic actors, as posited by mainstream political economy. It also constructs the 
policies for reform, constitutes the political institutional setting that shapes the reform 
process, and can also be the political driver for reform” (Schmidt 2009, 517).  
 
In order to apply this broad state-centric theoretical framework to studying state 
intervention in private pension provision, there are two issues that require clarification. First, 
if states act autonomously on basis of their own interests, it is important to explain where 
those interests come from. Yet it is not fully clear whether the state-centric approach specifies 
in advance on what basis those ‘own’ state interests are derived. Earlier work by Skocpol 
seems to indicate that the state has two very clear tasks: “It maintains order, and it competes 
with other actual or potential states” (1979, 30); suggesting that state officials make decisions 
that allow them to best perform these tasks. Yet later work seems to suggest that state 
officials can have very diverse interests that cannot be predicted in advance (Skocpol 1992, 
42). In this thesis I do not start from a pre-specified conception of state objectives. Rather 
than making far-reaching ex ante assumptions as to what drives policymakers (as in recent 
efforts to revive the “public interest” approach to regulation; see for example Croley 2008; 
and Ginosar 2014), I argue that specifying those interests is ultimately an empirical matter. 
This means that I arrive at the present argument in a heuristic manner – using findings from 
open-ended empirical work to formulate hypotheses that can subsequently be tested. While 
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this implies that my argument regarding the role of fiscal concerns cannot put a claim on 
universality, this is not necessary a problem as it reflects the historical character of social 
science research. 
 
Secondly, there is at least some lack of clarity as to whether elected politicians should 
be considered as part of the ‘state-as-actor’. Including them would imply that elected 
politicians can pursue longer-term ‘state objectives’ in the same way as bureaucrats do 
(meaning that politicians should not be studied as merely responding to short-term electoral 
pressure). It is true that some of the most influential studies in this research tradition find that 
public administrators, experts and other career officials play a very important role in initiating 
and shaping policies (Heclo 1974; Skocpol 1985, 11). Yet Skocpol clearly recognises that 
“both appointed and elected officials have ideas and organizational and career interests of 
their own, and they devise and work for policies that will further those ideas and interests, or 
at least not harm them.” (Skocpol 1992, 42). As such I include elected state officials in the 
analysis of state intervention in private welfare provision.  
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Section 4 Analytical framework  
The purpose of this section is to develop an analytical approach to studying state interventions 
in welfare provision, with particular focus on regulatory interventions as these are the main 
focus of the thesis. Building on existing approaches to structure different forms of state 
intervention, I first address the conceptual questions that emerge when applying these 
frameworks in the context of this thesis. Subsequently I develop a taxonomy of state 
interventions and discuss how these interventions relate to different objectives of the pension 
system.  
 
4.1 State intervention in welfare provision: providing conceptual clarity  
By differentiating between statutory or public welfare, occupational welfare and fiscal 
welfare (here understood as the use of taxation to promote social objectives), Titmuss was 
one of the first scholars to stress that welfare provision was more than public provision – 
stressing that the latter two were regressive in benefiting the middle-class more than the poor 
(Titmuss 1958). This essay inspired researchers to focus on different sources of welfare 
provision – a literature often referred to as the “Mixed Economy of Welfare”. Scholars 
usually distinguished public or statutory welfare from market welfare (Marsland 1996; Seldon 
1996), voluntary welfare (Alcock and Scott 2007; Harris and Rochester 2000) and informal 
welfare (Howard 1997; Stalker 2002). This literature provided the basis for investigating 
shifts in the ‘welfare mix’. For example, research has focused on the question whether public 
and private provision develop in tandem, or crowd-out each other (see discussion in Pedersen 
2004). While this ‘welfare mix’ literature should be credited for looking beyond state 
provision, it is subject to relevant criticism. First, several scholars have stressed that one 
should not consider different sources of welfare as functional equivalents because they have 
very different distributional consequences  (which was Titmuss' original concern; see also 
Hacker 2002). Secondly, the debate on the changing welfare mix is limited in its one-
dimensional focus on welfare provision. It ignores important other dimensions of shaping 
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welfare provision – including financing and regulation. In response, scholars have developed 
two-dimensional frameworks (examining both production and finance; see for example 
Glennerster 2009) as well as three-dimensional frameworks (including regulation as third 
dimension; see for example Barr 2012b; Burchardt, Hills, and Propper 1999; Johnson 1999; 
or Powell 2007).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4    Three-dimensional approach of welfare systems; based on Barr 2012 and Powell 2007 
 
This thesis builds on the multi-dimensional approach to analyse the organisation or 
structuring of welfare provision (see Figure 4). Yet in order to apply this framework to the 
investigation of state intervention in private welfare provision, there are several conceptual 
issues that have to be clarified. First of all, a decision is needed on how to structure the 
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different dimensions. Secondly, more conceptual clarity is required regarding the difference 
between public and private in the context of providing and financing pensions. Thirdly, given 
the central role of regulation in this thesis, we need to develop a more specific approach to 
this dimension. Finally, there is the question as to how fiscal intervention fits in the overall 
framework.   
 
4.1.1 Structuring different dimensions 
Most three-dimensional frameworks for studying welfare provision focus on provision, 
finance and regulation (Barr 2012b; Burchardt, Hills, and Propper 1999; Johnson 1999; 
Powell 2007). Yet there are still important differences in how these dimensions are structured: 
whereas Powell (2007) and others differentiate between different categories 
(state/market/voluntary/informal), Barr (2012b) structures these dimensions in terms of their 
public or private character. Both approaches have their advantages, yet we have to decide on 
which one to use in the thesis. The main appeal of Powell’s approach is that it includes the 
role of charity and family as potential sources of welfare. Such non-monetary sources of 
protection matter because it relieves the need for old age income to some extent (this also 
applies to home ownership,  support in paying for energy bills, free public transport for 
seniors, etc.). If such sources of protection are more widely available, this could reduce the 
need to ensure adequate old age income in a narrow way (if only because it delays political 
mobilization due to inadequate protection). On the other hand, Barr’s approach is attractive 
precisely because it allows us to focus on the organisation of old age income provision in this 
narrow sense; given that the key question in this thesis is whether old age income security is 
arranged through the state or through non-state actors (and how the latter is organised). So in 
this thesis I opt for structuring the different dimension in terms of their public/private 
character (keeping in mind the potential important role of sources of protection other than old 
age income).  
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4.1.2 Distinguishing between public and private  
In order to differentiate between public and private provision, this thesis refers to the actor 
who organises and manages the collection and distribution of pension benefits. This can be 
the state (in case of basic state pensions or social insurance), social partners (in case of 
occupational pension funds that are internally managed) and financial actors (by managing 
their own schemes or providing services to occupational funds). Nonetheless, assessing who 
provides pensions can be ambiguous; for example when assets are managed by a private 
company, but the administration is done by public entity (e.g. NEST Corporation; sovereign 
wealth funds). Other complicated cases are those where social partners play an important role 
in administering social insurance. 
 
Determining who finances pensions is an even more thorny issue. Whether financing 
is public or private depends on how you define ‘financing’. According to Barr (2012b), public 
financing refers to financing based on general tax revenues rather than private charges. For 
some cases this is more or less clear: tax-financed basic state pensions are publicly financed, 
whereas occupational and personal pensions are privately financed (yet complicated by fiscal 
incentives and ‘government matching’ of private contributions). Yet the case of public social 
insurance through social contributions rather than tax-financing is arguably more ambiguous. 
While this would be ‘private financing’ according to Barr, this does not seem to capture the 
general observation that public provision presents a challenge to ‘public expenditure’. 
 
In order to address this challenge, I propose to use a different approach to 
differentiating public versus private financing of pension provision; broadly based on the 
classification used by the OECD to differentiate between public and private social spending 
(Adema and Einerhand 1998; Adema and Whiteford 2010). In this thesis I reserve ‘public 
financing’ for those pension schemes where the main financial flow (from contributions to 
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benefits) runs through the government’s central budget; conversely, private financing refers to 
pension funds where the main financial flow takes place independently from the central 
government budget. This definition has several advantages. It aligns better with our intuition 
of what is public (e.g. social insurance; basic state pensions; using tax-money for 
‘contribution matching’ in occupational schemes; but not collective insurance that is managed 
by social partners such as in the Netherlands). As a result, it is also better suited for the 
research question of this thesis; this because it recognises that governments face ‘financial’ 
pressure as result of fiscal commitments that result from public provision.  
 
4.1.3  Specifying the regulation dimension 
Given the focus of this thesis on shifts in regulatory interventions, it is necessary to discuss 
this dimension in a bit more detail. One of the problems with regulation is that structuring this 
dimension is less straightforward compared to provision or financing. Given that most 
regulation originates with the state, it is not helpful to characterise this dimension in the usual 
terms (i.e. public/private or state/market/informal/voluntary). Instead I propose to 
differentiate between different ways of intervention on basis of the idea that regulation aims 
at controlling behaviour. Both finance and regulation are a source of control – yet whereas 
finance is related to financial control, regulation is associated with political authority: 
“regulation is associated with some level of control or power in the form of shaping 
behaviour in desired ways.” (Powell 2007, 14). That is why some scholars focus on similar 
proxies such as ‘choice’ or ‘decision’ rather than regulation as such (Burchardt, Hills, and 
Propper 1999; Gingrich 2011; Hills 2004). 
 
Based on this understanding of regulation, this thesis analyses regulatory intervention on 
basis of the different ways in which they shape the decision by non-state actors. In order to 
allow for more precision and nuance, I propose to differentiate between two aspects of 
regulatory intervention: 
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1. The first aspect is the level of regulatory intensity – Increasing intensity corresponds 
to the shift away from voluntarism (when private actors enjoy full discretion) towards 
regulatory measures that increasingly restrict actions (e.g. prohibiting or mandating 
certain decisions).  
2. The second aspect looks at whose discretion is restricted – This thesis will 
particularly look at whether regulations restrict discretion of households, employers 
or financial welfare providers.   
 
4.1.4 Fiscal intervention 
Fiscal or tax welfare refers to the substantial redistribution that happens through tax relief; it 
has been identified by Titmuss (1958) and given its deserved attention since Howard’s study 
on the ‘hidden welfare state’ (Howard 1997). Fiscal incentives have certainly played a big 
role in promoting the expansion private pension provision; for example by exempting 
contributions during working life from income taxation (see Hacker 2002). Despite the 
importance of fiscal interventions, it is not clear how it should be integrated in the overall 
analytical framework. Should fiscal intervention be included in our analysis of state 
interference in the organisation of private provision? If so, should it be considered as a 
distinct dimension (alongside regulation, provision and financing) or analysed as part of these 
dimensions?  
  
This thesis includes fiscal interventions in the analysis, but as part of the existing 
dimensions rather than constituting a different one. More specifically, I argue that fiscal 
interventions can be explained as part of the financing and regulation dimension. A simple tax 
incentive that applies to all households (without further conditions) can be analysed as an 
increase in public financing; whereas provision remains private and there is no regulatory 
intervention as well (this because it largely preserves voluntarism in decision-making, apart 
from generating some opportunity costs). However, some tax incentives are conditional upon 
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fulfilling certain requirements. Such ‘conditional tax incentives’ represents financial 
intervention, combined with increasing regulatory intervention because it reduces the 
available choices of private actors. Whereas simple tax-incentives tend to reinforce income 
inequalities (because they tend to benefit those in higher income brackets), conditional tax 
incentives can have very different distributional consequences, depending on the specification 
of the conditions. For example, tax incentives can be made conditional upon having a low 
income or on guaranteeing a minimum return which improves security. This approach has the 
benefit that it does not require a distinct dimension; while it captures the regulatory shift 
towards intensifying intervention – whereas simple incentives have been around for long, 
governments increasingly use conditional tax incentives.  
 
4.2 Developing a taxonomy: state interventions and pension objectives  
On basis of this general framework, this thesis uses the following taxonomy to differentiate 
between government interventions in shaping private pension provision (see first column in 
Table 1). 
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State 
intervention 
in private pension provision1 
Actor involved or 
restricted2 
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FINANCE 
 
Tax deduction on contribution E, W, F x x  x x x 
Tax deduction on pay-out W x x    x 
Taxation of investment returns W, F x     x 
Tax-free lump sum of accrued 
benefits W x x x    
Flat-rate subsidies for contributions W, F x x  x  x 
Contribution matching E, W, F x x  x x x 
Financial support for fund 
administration E, W  x   x x 
 
REGULATION 
 
Scheme design rules (e.g. DC/CDC 
restrictions) E, F   x x   
Employer contribution requirements E x x  x x x 
Employee contribution requirements W     x x 
Non-discrimination requirements E  x  x x  
Funding requirements E, W, F   x   x 
Mandatory inflation proofing for DB E x   x   
Vesting requirements E  x x x x  
Transfer values E  x x x x  
Indexation requirements for deferred 
pensions E, F x   x  x 
Reporting requirements E, F   x x  x 
Governance requirements E, W, F  x x  x x 
De-accumulation requirements (e.g. 
mandatory annuitization) W, F x  x   x 
Investment regulations (e.g. prudent 
person principle) E, F   x   x 
Price controls (e.g. charge cap) F x     x 
 
Table 1  Taxonomy of state interventions in private pension provision; as well as the actors 
involved and related objectives  
 
Accompanying notes: (1) State interventions are formulated in a general manner, this in the sense that 
they can be organised differently (e.g. tax deductions can be increased or reduced). (2) This column 
indicates which actor is most likely to be involved by financial or regulatory interventions; this can be 
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both in a positive and negative manner (depending on the formulation of the intervention).  (3) This is 
a simplified list of the main objectives that can be pursued through the organisation of private pension 
provision; including both social objectives (adequacy, coverage and security) as well as non-social 
objectives (competitiveness of corporations; HR and other objectives related to collective negotiations; 
profitability of private pension provision for financial actors).  
  
A final step would be to link these different ways of state interventions to different 
objectives of the pension system. Barr identifies four main objectives of pensions: 
consumption smoothing, insurance, poverty relief and redistribution; as well as a secondary 
objectives which I will discuss below (Barr 2012b, 152–53). State intervention can be 
justified on the basis of equity concerns, but also to promote efficiency. The reason is that 
there are multiple predictable market-failures (ranging from behavioural problems to 
incomplete insurance) that would arise when organising consumption-smoothing and 
insurance within pension markets. In other words, financial and regulatory interventions in 
private provision of pensions can often be justified on basis that they address the predictable 
problems that arise – low coverage, inadequate benefits and low levels of security. For 
example, making private saving compulsory could be justified on the ground that most 
individuals are myopic, which results in suboptimal levels of coverage and adequacy.  
 
Apart from these primary objectives, private pension systems serve many other 
‘secondary’ objectives that go well beyond the traditional concerns regarding efficiency and 
equity. Depending on how pension systems are organised, they can have very different 
implications within several areas: 
• Related to the economy of a country: economic growth; domestic saving  and 
investment; labour market entry and exit; etc.   
• Related to the organisation of firms: firm financing and corporate governance; HR 
management; deferred wage; bargaining between social partners; etc. 
• Related to the organisation of the financial sector: size of the financial sector; 
pension fund investment strategies; intra-industry competition between insurers and 
asset managers; holding of government bonds; etc. 
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Despite using a simplified list of objectives, it is clear from Table 1 that connecting 
interventions in pension systems to this varied set of primary and secondary objectives is not 
a straightforward task; especially since a single intervention can have implications for several 
actors and relate to different objectives (this both in a positive and negative way). 
Nonetheless it is a useful ex ante exercise that helps us to navigate through the ‘causal 
labyrinth’ which often characterises pension system reforms (Esping-Andersen 1996a, 330). 
For example, it allows us to guide our empirical attention to those actors that are more likely 
to be promoting or obstructing certain interventions. However, there are two important 
caveats that have to be addressed. First of all, this framework should be continuously updated 
when new objectives or links are observed and it should not conceal causal complexity 
(similar interventions can be linked to multiple objectives; and a single objective can be 
promoted through different interventions). Secondly, one should equally be aware of the 
limitations of this framework to guide political-economic explanations of pension reforms. 
There are several good political-economic reasons why the link between interventions and 
objectives is not direct. For example, even if actors are aware which interventions serve 
particular objectives, this does not automatically mean that they will act upon this knowledge. 
One reason is that actors can pursue different goals at the same time, which may be mutually 
conflicting. Another reason is that actors generally need to generate broader support in their 
pursuit of interventions.  
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5. Presenting research design, methodology and the three papers 
In this section I present the overall methodological decisions that were made in this thesis to 
investigate the drivers of state intervention in the organisation of private pension provision, 
followed by a brief overview of the three papers.  
 
Studying interventions in private pension provision entails several methodological 
challenges. First, data regarding coverage and adequacy provided through occupational and 
personal pension schemes is limited and often not comparable across countries (for example, 
the OECD only reports comparable data for (quasi-)mandatory provision). This is 
complicated by the fact that data on current participation or contribution levels often tell us 
little about expected outcomes (funds are still maturing in several countries; but outcomes 
also depend to a significant extent on financial market returns). Second, quantifying or 
codifying variation in state intervention in private pension provision is even more difficult 
than it is for variation in public provision. Regulatory or financial approaches can take many 
forms (see taxonomy in previous section), while proxies such as expenditure levels are not 
readily available. Third, there is no established way to structure and compare differences in 
the organisation of private welfare provision. Often used classifications such as the ‘pillar’ or 
‘layer’ approach are not useful for the purposes of this thesis (since they assume separated 
responsibilities between states, social partners and individuals; whereas this thesis stresses 
overlap). Finally, there is the sheer complexity of private pension provision in terms of 
relevant actors and objectives. This complicates the specification of a limited set of dependent 
variables.  
 
These methodological challenges have consequences for the overall research design. 
The first major implication is that a large-N approach does not seem to be appropriate to 
study the drivers of state intervention in private pension provision. A large-N approach makes 
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significant demands regarding comparability between separate countries and time-frames, as 
well as ability to measure complex factors such as financial sector influence or state interests. 
This would result in very generalised specification of variables that excludes important 
nuances and historical information. Instead this thesis uses comparative case studies, which 
has several advantages: it takes into account the historical context of interventions, it permits 
for a qualitative approach to study the complexity of conflicts underpinning policy decisions, 
it allows making new unexpected observations and hence the exploration of new hypotheses. 
The second major implication is that this thesis opts for three papers with a separate research 
question and research design, rather than having a unified research design to evaluate the 
general argument across the same set of countries. The main advantage of separate case 
comparisons is that it allows for more appropriate research designs to focus on different 
aspects of the problem and argumentation. The first paper takes a broad approach, 
establishing key elements of the overall argumentation by examining the shift away from 
voluntarism in Germany and the UK. The second paper zooms in on the interaction between 
states and social partners in establishing social protection within private pensions. The third 
paper focuses on establishing the autonomy of the state, mainly with respect to financial 
actors.  
 
In terms of the rationale behind the case selection for each paper, it should be noted 
that these cases are not primarily intended to be representative of different welfare systems 
reflecting Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990), or different traditions to 
organise social security based on the Beveridge versus Bismarck model (Palier 2010). Instead 
the case comparisons represent three different research designs that are selected in order to 
maximise analytical leverage for examining the specific question in that paper. The first paper 
builds on a most-different research design, studying the UK and Germany as two very 
different welfare systems with a remarkably similar shift away from voluntarism. This most-
different research design shows the applicability of the proposed argument to very different 
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and important countries. The second paper uses a most-similar research design, comparing 
Denmark and the Netherlands because they have very similar ways of organising collective 
protection within occupational provision, yet still exhibit different experiences during crises. 
This most-similar research design allows me to show how states matter for explaining 
differences in two countries where social partners are considered to dominate private 
pensions. The final paper uses a least-likely research design in order to show how the British 
state used its autonomy to go against financial interests, even in a context where this is most 
unlikely.    
  
In order to conduct these case studies, I rely on several sources of data. Wherever 
possible I rely on primary sources that are publicly available. This includes minutes of 
parliamentary debates (for the UK these are online available; for Germany these are collected 
in the archives of the Bundestag in December 2016); statements and contributions to public 
consultations by industry associations and social partners (most are available online; some are 
collected directly from the associations); public surveys; etc. When primary sources are 
incomplete or unavailable (for example, many associations have deleted their online and 
paper archives for the late 1990s and early 2000s), this thesis relies on reporting by 
specialised media, more comprehensive surveys of mainstream media (using Nexis), as well 
as empirical findings from secondary literature. Finally, for the third paper I have conducted a 
set of semi-structured elite-interviews in August 2018 with main stakeholders that were 
involved in the negotiations; this mainly to complement statements by legislators. 
 
  
 
  
	 57	
5.1 Summary Paper 1:  The political economy of organising private welfare 
provision: what drives active state involvement in shaping private pensions within Germany 
and the UK? 
 
The first paper studies the shift away from voluntarism towards intensifying state intervention 
in private pension provision in Germany and the UK, this against the background of low or 
retreating levels of public provision. To do so it distinguishes between different ways in 
which scholars have related the political-economic drivers of reforms in the private sphere to 
those that drive reforms in the public provision. On one side of the analytical spectrum, these 
political-economic drivers have been studied as being independent from each other. On the 
other side, interventions in public and private pension provision are considered to be part of 
the same reform dynamic. Instead this paper proposes a more nuanced approach that 
recognises the difference between the political-economic struggles that shape public and 
private pension reforms, but at the same time specifies why they should not be studied in 
isolation from each other. 
 
More specifically, this paper argues that struggles regarding the organisation of 
private pensions involve non-social interests that are not traditionally associated with public 
pension reforms (e.g. competitiveness and financial market development). Yet because 
interventions in private pension provision have both social and non-social implications, 
conflicts regarding the organisation of public and private pension provision spill over into 
each other. In practise, this means that non-state actors such as unions of financial pension 
providers can promote or obstruct social interventions in private pension provision, depending 
on whether doing so aligns with their non-social objectives. 
 
In order to substantiate this argument empirically, this paper investigates reform 
developments within Germany and the UK. Despite having very different institutional 
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backgrounds, both countries exhibit a surprisingly similar reform dynamic with respect to 
state involvement in organising non-state welfare provision. While Germany and the UK both 
started off with a voluntarist approach to organising private welfare provision, both countries 
eventually shifted towards a more prescriptive organisation of private pensions. The paper 
finds that financial actors, rather than social partners, are important drivers of social 
interventions in the private sphere (this by aligning their commercial interests with broad 
social concerns). Yet the influence of financial actors is ultimately derived from the ability to 
convince governments that interventions are required to avoid social instability which could 
trigger new pressures on public provision.  
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5.2 Summary Paper 2: Organising private social protection: how to explain 
different experiences with collective risk-sharing during crises in Denmark and the 
Netherlands? 
 
The second paper aims at investigating the role of states in organising private social 
protection in cases where social partners are expected to be the most important actors. In 
order to do so, this paper focuses on a specific but important area of private social protection: 
namely the ability to share risks collectively in order to provide protection against financial 
volatility. Pension privatisation results in widespread concern that responsibility for these 
financial risks shifts to individual households. The financial crisis has further spurred political 
interest in promoting new forms of collective risk-sharing within private pension provision. 
However, in order to explain the political viability of private social protection, the literature 
stresses the importance of the organisational capacities of social partners and their initiatives 
to ‘fill the gap’ created by public retreat. In other words, social partner initiative and capacity 
are considered to account for different experiences with private social protection. 
 
This paper challenges the notion that collective actor initiative can explain the 
viability of collective risk-pooling within private welfare provision. It argues that the debate 
has to shift beyond its current focus on the agency of collective actors, towards greater 
attention to the structural context in which these agents make their decisions. In particular, 
this paper argues that regulatory frameworks play a crucial role in establishing and 
maintaining private social protection. Regulatory frameworks provide the necessary stability 
and trust that is required to manage the distributional struggles that emerge from organising 
collective protection against systemic risks (such as market volatility). Hence in contrast to 
the existing focus on the capacity of social partners to ‘fill the gap’ created by state retreat 
(e.g. Trampusch 2007), this paper suggests that states continue to play a crucial role in 
establishing and maintaining private social protection. 
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To substantiate my argument, I use the cases of Denmark and the Netherlands to 
construct a most-similar case study. Both countries have important collective risk-sharing 
arrangements that are both attributed to collective agreements between social partners. 
Despite their far-reaching similarities, both countries have had very different experiences with 
collective risk-sharing during the two crises in the 2000s. Both crises have had a very 
significant impact on the performance of Dutch pension schemes and subsequently on the 
benefits of scheme members. While Danish pension providers were certainly not immune to 
the impact of both crises, this did not translate into a detrimental impact on the security of 
benefit levels. Rather than resorting to the ad hoc explanation that Dutch actors simply made 
worse decisions, I show that diverging experiences can be better explained by the presence of 
different governance rules and regulatory frameworks. 
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5.3 Summary Paper 3: Countering financial interests for social purposes? 
Bringing the state back into regulatory politics.  
 
The third paper focuses on financialization and the conflicts it creates between the social 
objectives of households and the commercial interests of the providers of these financial 
products. A significant share of the returns of these new investments could be absorbed by 
financial providers in the form of high profit margins, rather than going to the households 
who depend on these returns for social purposes (pensions, health care, education, housing, 
etc.). Which interest will prevail when financial sector interests conflict with those of the 
public at large? The political-economy literature expects that industry will generally be 
successful in shaping regulations to serve its specific interests. However, in reality there is a 
wide variety in regulatory outcomes; suggesting that we should not automatically expect 
regulatory practices to always favour households or financial interests. The real challenge is 
therefore to find out under what conditions ‘social regulations’ that go against interests of the 
financial sector are more or less likely. 
 
This paper argues that existing theories have important theoretical shortcomings 
when accounting for such variation in regulatory outcomes. The prevailing literature explains 
regulatory policies mainly by analysing the relative influence of external pressures on policy 
decisions (e.g. structural power, capture, political salience). Instead, this paper proposes to 
shift analytical attention away from gauging the relative strength of organised interests, this 
towards a better understanding of how policymakers play an independent role in shaping 
regulatory decisions. Rather than acting as transmission belts for external influence, 
policymakers have their own objectives and make regulatory decisions based on the 
assessment of whether the decision promotes or hampers their objectives. 
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Empirically, this paper focuses on one central and puzzling case: the recent 
momentum in efforts within the UK to bring down the costs of private pension provision. 
During earlier reform attempts in the 2000s, the Labour-led government still backed down to 
industry demands. One decade later, however, a coalition of Conservatives and Liberal-
Democrats introduced a far-reaching legislative framework to reduce the cost of private 
pension provision. Neither shifts in political salience nor mobilisation of organised interests 
can account for the different decision. Instead the case study reveals that the intervention 
decisions of both parties depended on the assessment of whether it promotes their overarching 
objective of expanding private savings or not. They only achieved a different conclusion 
because the underlying policy context had changed. Whereas the first paper already revealed 
that financial actors often play an important role in convincing governments to engage in 
costly social interventions, this paper digs deeper in the politics of regulating private welfare 
provision by showing how it is characterised by a continuous negotiation between legislators 
and the pensions industry.  
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PAPER 1 
 
 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVATE WELFARE PROVISION: 
WHAT DRIVES ACTIVE STATE INVOLVEMENT IN SHAPING 
PRIVATE PENSIONS WITHIN GERMANY AND THE UK? 
 
 
 
1.  Changing state involvement in organising public and private pensions  
During the past decades, governments have been under increasing pressure to contain or 
diminish fiscal liabilities that follow from providing old age security (Ebbinghaus 2011a; 
Orenstein 2008; World Bank 1994). Despite expectations of institutional inertia, countries 
succeeded in significantly scaling back public pension promises (Häusermann 2010; OECD 
2013). This means that, in order to maintain living standards, people have to rely increasingly 
on non-state sources of pension provision (i.e. privatisation).3 While the growing importance 
of private sources of welfare is increasingly recognised within the welfare state literature, it is 
much less clear on basis of which principles these private benefits are distributed. 
Privatisation is generally analysed as ‘welfare state retrenchment’ or ‘welfare liberalisation’: 
reducing the role of public provision is understood as reducing the role of the state in 
allocating welfare benefits (see Figure 5). This means that, as provision of welfare shifts from 
the public to the private sphere, the allocation of welfare benefits depends increasingly on 
market forces or voluntary organisations (Esping-Andersen 1990, 80; Hacker 2002, 30; De 
Deken 2013). Accordingly, most studies link welfare privatisation to marketization and 
                                                            3 Note that I use ‘non-state’ and ‘private’ as interchangeable concepts. Non-state or private provision 
includes occupational pension as well as personal pension schemes. This differs from those who use 
‘private’ only to refer to personal schemes.   
	 64	
individualisation of responsibility (Bode 2008; Clark 2003; Gilbert and Van Voorhis 2003; 
Gilbert 2005; Hacker 2004; Meyer, Bridgen, and Riedmüller 2007; Orenstein 2008, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 5 Traditional representation of social policy approaches; simplified figure from 
Hacker 2002, p.30 
 
 
This analysis of pension privatisation as retreat of the welfare state is not without 
challenge. Several scholars have pointed out that focusing on public provision obscures the 
important role states can play in shaping the allocation of private welfare benefits, this by 
interfering actively in how private welfare provision is organised (see for example Gingrich 
2011; Leisering 2011; Mabbett 2012; Schelkle 2012; Whiteside 2006a). Accordingly, it has 
been argued that welfare states are not so much reducing their involvement in organising 
social protection, but shifting their activity from provision to regulation (Leisering 2011). 
Indeed, we observe that efforts to diminish or contain levels of public pension spending goes 
hand in hand with more active state interference in the allocation of private pensions. Many 
European governments maintained a ‘voluntarist approach’ to organising private welfare 
provision until well into the 1990s.4 This implies that the allocation of occupational and 
personal welfare benefits was left to ‘private initiative’ (see Esping-Andersen 1990, 80): be it 
employers deciding to provide occupational schemes, individuals taking the initiative to save 
into personal plans, or social partners agreeing to include welfare benefits in collective 
negotiations. Since the 1990s, however, governments increasingly use tax and regulatory 
policies to constrain the discretion of individual actors. These measures range from actively 
                                                            4  Notable exceptions include Switzerland and the Netherlands (Bonoli and Häusermann 2011; 
Anderson 2011); both countries experienced far-reaching state interventions in the organisation of 
private welfare provision since the 1970s and 1950s respectively.  
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encouraging certain decisions over others (e.g. targeting fiscal incentives) to directly steering 
outcomes by obliging actors to take certain decisions (e.g. compulsory contributions, 
prohibiting employers to differentiate between workers, but also ‘soft’ compulsion such as 
auto-enrolment). As a result of intensifying state intervention in private pension provision, 
workers and individual employers now have less discretion than two decades ago with respect 
to important decisions regarding saving, investments and scheme design.  
 
This paper starts from the observation that, even though both public retreat and 
intensifying regulatory intervention in private provision have been well-recognised, very little 
is understood as to how these two reform dynamics relate to each other. There is an extensive 
literature regarding the drivers of public pension reforms (Starke 2006; Häusermann 2010), as 
well as several interesting insights as to what drives interventions in private pension provision 
(see below). Yet generally these accounts only implicitly address the question whether and 
how interventions in private provision have to be understood in relation to efforts to contain 
public provision.  
 
To address this question, this paper examines the relationship between the political-
economic factors behind the shift away from voluntarism in private pension provision and 
those driving public retreat. It constructs a most-different research design, this by 
investigating reform developments within Germany and the UK. Despite having very 
different institutional backgrounds, both countries exhibit a surprisingly similar reform 
dynamic with respect to state involvement in organising non-state welfare provision. While 
Germany and the UK both started off with a voluntarist approach to organising private 
welfare provision, both countries eventually shifted towards a more prescriptive organisation 
of private pensions. 
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In order to guide this empirical analysis, the paper starts with a brief review of the 
literature that explains state interventions in private welfare. This review shows how existing 
explanations – broadly based on the ‘new politics of the welfare state’, partisan struggles and 
mobilisation of financial interests – can be differentiated in two broad approaches to analyse 
the relationship between public and private reforms. One approach studies the political-
economic drivers of public and private reforms independently – implying that we need 
separate explanations as to what shapes public and private provision. Another approach 
considers interventions in public and private pension provision as part of the same reform 
dynamic – hence arguing that they are essentially explained by the same set of political-
economic drivers. However, as the empirical analysis makes clear, examining the observed 
shift away from voluntarism reveals the limitations of analysing public and private reform 
dynamics that focus too much on either their differences or their similarities.  
 
This paper presents an alternative framework that recognises the difference between 
the political-economic struggles that shape public and private pension reforms, but at the 
same time specifies why they should not be studied in isolation from each other. In short, I 
argue that struggles regarding the organisation of private pensions involve non-social interests 
that are not traditionally associated with public pension reforms (e.g. competitiveness and 
financial market development). Yet because interventions in private pension provision have 
both social and non-social implications, conflicts regarding the organisation of public and 
private pension provision spill over into each other. In practise, this means that non-state 
actors such as unions of financial pension providers can promote or obstruct social 
interventions in private pension provision, depending on whether doing so aligns with their 
non-social objectives.  
 
The proposed framework reveals several aspects of the reform dynamics that would 
be hard to observe on basis of approaches that analyse public and private reforms as subject to 
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the same or very different conflict dimensions. First, it shows that the state has a stake in the 
organisation of private pensions; promoting social adequacy through private provision is 
aimed at avoiding re-emerging pressure on public welfare provision. Secondly, it reveals that 
it is often financial actors, rather than social partners, that play an important role in 
convincing governments to engage in social interventions – especially when governments are 
reluctant to intervene because the perceived costs and direct lack of electoral pressure. 
Financial actors do so by aligning their commercial objectives with the social concerns of 
governments.  
 
 In the next section I present the theoretical framework that will be used to analyse 
interventions aimed at shaping the organisation of private pension provision, this in the 
context of liberalisation and pension privatisation. To do so I start from a review of the main 
explanations of state intervention in private provision, focusing on how they (implicitly) 
analyse the relationship with reform dynamics within the public sphere. Subsequently I 
present how the proposed framework differs from these existing approaches. In the third 
section I analyse the shift away from voluntarism to more intensive regulatory approaches in 
both Germany and the UK. This empirical analysis is  followed by a discussion of the main 
findings in light of the different frameworks and a general conclusion.  
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2. Explaining the relationship between public and private pension reforms 
 
2.1 The relationship between public and private pension reforms: existing approaches  
The following discussion distinguishes between different ways in which scholars have related 
the political-economic drivers of reforms in the private sphere to those that drive reforms in 
the public provision. On one side of the analytical spectrum, interventions in public and 
private pension provision are considered to be part of the same reform dynamic. On the other 
side, these political-economic drivers are studied as being independent from each other.  
 
2.1.1  Identical reform dynamics 
In this section I discuss two explanations for intensifying state intervention in private pension 
provision which start from a very different theoretical backgrounds, namely neo-
institutionalism and partisan theory. Nonetheless, I argue that both approaches tend to analyse 
reforms within the public and private sphere as part of a single reform dimension.  
 
The starting point for the neo-institutionalist approach is the challenge to explain 
retrenchment of public provision, given the expectation that doing so is subject to significant 
political obstacles (Pierson 2001b; Starke 2006). This expectation is based on Pierson his 
argument that expanding welfare policies creates new constituencies that benefit from these 
policies and henceforth have a stake in defending what they have (Pierson 1994, 1996). The 
unpopularity of cutting back entitlements results in institutional inertia: significant and visible 
reductions in public pension provision are considered unlikely and conditional on the ability 
of governments to avoid or diffuse blame (Myles and Pierson 2001; Pierson 1994; Weaver 
1986). To explain how certain reforms are possible nonetheless, Pierson highlights several 
strategies to minimise political resistance – including obfuscation, sowing division and using 
compensation (Pierson 1994). Subsequent scholarship has further investigated how 
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incremental reforms could still result in transformative change (Thelen and Streeck 2005; 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010).   
 
  Accordingly, interventions in private pension provision are understood as part of the 
overall strategy to avoid political resistance against public welfare retrenchment. One 
particularly prevalent interpretation is that promoting private pensions is a strategy to 
facilitate public retrenchment by compensating those who would be able to block or hinder 
such public reforms. For example, Bonoli and Palier argue that path-departing reforms in 
countries such as Germany and France were possible because incremental increase in private 
provision reduced reliance on public provision; as such, introduction of funded provision is 
‘capable of replacing future income lost because pay-as-you-go retrenchment’ (Bonoli and 
Palier 2007, 557). Similarly, Hacker argues that incentives in the US to promote private 
welfare provision is part of a long-term political strategy to undercut support for public 
provision (Hacker 2002).  
 
 For the purpose of this paper, it is important to underline that increasing intervention 
in private pensions is analysed as a direct response to pressures from vested interests in public 
provision. Private interventions are designed to weaken resistance against privatisation in 
order to facilitate public reforms; hence public involvement in private provision ultimately 
depends on the relative strength of opponents against public retrenchment (e.g. unions or 
angry voters). Implicit is the understanding that welfare reforms are structured along a single 
conflict dimension. The main conflict develops around the question whether to organise 
earnings-related welfare provision within the public sphere or within the private sphere. This 
results in a political struggle that could be represented as a tug-of-war between proponents 
and opponents of welfare liberalisation (see Figure 6). On the one hand, you have those 
pulling for a greater role of voluntarism and markets as organising principle; on the other 
hand, you have those pulling for a greater role of collectivism and the state as main welfare 
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provider. Institutional change can go in the direction of more market or more state, depending 
on which camp grows relatively stronger than the other. This means that an institutional 
equilibrium is achieved where the relative strengths of opponents and proponents of welfare 
liberalisation balance each other out.  
 
 
Figure 6      Studying reform dynamics on basis of a 'tug-of-war' along a single conflict dimension  
 
Another approach to explain interventions in private pension provision refers to 
partisan calculations regarding the electoral benefits of such interventions (Gingrich 2011). 
Because achieving electoral objectives through public provision is increasingly difficult as 
result of ideological changes and fiscal constraints, so the argument goes, both the political 
Left and Right aim to serve their own constituencies by shaping welfare markets in different 
ways. In contrast to the neo-institutionalist explanation, Gingrich clearly recognises that the 
politics of private welfare involves different actors and interests than those associated with 
public provision (e.g. the role of private providers that have an interest in decision-
autonomy). Hence this approach is certainly not a ‘pure’ example of analysing public and 
private reform dynamics as identical. Nonetheless, Gingrich very much stresses the continuity 
of the distributional politics that dominate interventions both in the public and private sphere. 
Essentially, it is the same set of partisan objectives that can explain welfare reforms in both 
the public and private sphere. For this reason I argue that her overall approach is still much 
closer to side of the spectrum that sees reform dynamics as identical rather than independent.
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2.1.2 Distinct reform dynamics 
Another approach to studying interventions in private pension provision shifts attention to 
political-economic objectives that have little to do with social protection as such. Stressing 
the financial consequences of welfare arrangements in particular, it is argued that 
understanding private pension reforms requires us to investigate a very different set of actors 
and interests than those traditionally studied within public pension reforms. Accordingly, 
public and private reforms are characterised by different reform dynamics that have in 
essence very little to do with each other. 
 
 The starting point of scholarship focusing on the nexus between welfare and finance, 
is that struggles regarding public-private pension provision are driven “not only by concerns 
over the generosity and costs of pensions qua social policy, but also by concerns over the 
regulation of pensions qua financial institutions” (Naczyk 2018). Estévez-Abe showed how 
certain arrangements of occupational pension schemes can stabilize corporate finance over a 
longer time horizon by providing ‘patient capital’, whereas other arrangements encourage 
short-sightedness (Estévez-Abe 2001). In line with these insights, others have investigated 
how social partners try to shape the organisation of private pensions in order to influence the 
availability of capital to firms (Clark 2003; McCarthy, Sorsa, and van der Zwan 2016; 
Naczyk 2016). Apart from corporate financing, scholars have demonstrated that financial 
actors – such as insurance companies and stock exchanges – have encouraged mandatory 
private pensions in order to promote their commercial objectives (Kemmerling and Neugart 
2009; Leimgruber 2012; Naczyk 2013). More generally, international organisations such as 
the World Bank and financial institutions have encouraged governments around the world to 
shift towards mandatory private pensions in order to generate capital that would boost 
economic growth (S. M. Brooks 2009; Madrid 2003; Müller 2003; Naczyk and Domonkos 
2016; Naczyk and Palier 2015; Orenstein 2008).  
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 So according to these scholars, regulatory interventions in private pension provision 
are explained on basis of non-social interests; this in contrast to the previous approach which 
explained interventions as an integral part of the social conflict dimension. To be sure, this 
does not mean that the welfare-finance scholarship denies that there is a social dimension to 
pension reforms – yet the political-economic struggles that explain this social conflict 
dimension are studied and understood separately from those characterising non-social 
conflicts. In other words, the politics that shape public welfare provision are considered 
different from those that shape private welfare provision. A second important remark is that 
few scholars see public and private reforms as subject to completely distinct reform 
dynamics; this by recognising that pension privatisation is promoted in order to facilitate the 
pursuit of non-social objectives through private provision. But even if there are no ‘pure’ 
cases of analysing reform dynamics of public and private pensions as separate, the link 
remains quite shallow. Insofar as public reforms are interpreted only on basis of interests in 
organising private provision (such as growth or financial market developments), this approach 
does not integrate broader conflicts regarding the social dimension of public welfare reform 
into its explanation of private reform politics.  
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2.2 The proposed framework: distinct yet related reform dynamics  
In the following I present a framework that builds on insights presented earlier, but specifies a 
different way to explain the relationship between reform dynamics in public and private 
pensions. First I specify in what way they are different from each other; subsequently I 
explain why they should be studied in relation to each other rather than separately.   
 
 In line with the insights from the ‘welfare-finance nexus’ scholarship, this framework 
starts with differentiating between two different reform dimensions. Apart from conflicts 
about the extent of public provision, there are important struggles regarding the appropriate 
organisation of private welfare. This means that actors such as social partners or financial 
firms are not simply divided across the public–private cleavage, favouring either more or less 
public welfare spending; they also have a different set of interests as to how occupational and 
personal pension provision should be organised. Whereas welfare-finance scholars focus 
mainly on the financial interests of both governments and non-state actors (e.g. corporate 
governance; financial market expansion), this paper extends this to other non-social 
objectives regarding occupational or personal pensions. For example, companies use 
occupational pensions as a Human Resource tool for attracting and retaining a skilled and 
loyal workforce; unions on the other hand have used occupational pensions as a bargaining 
chip during collective negotiations, or even as an opportunity to have a say in the firm’s 
investment decisions (i.e. economic democracy) (Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 2006; 
Pavolini and Seeleib-Kaiser 2016; Shalev 1996). Recognising the importance of conflicts 
regarding the non-social aspects of organising private pensions sets this approach apart from 
those analysing interventions as integral part of reform politics regarding the extent of public 
provision. 
  
Even though the organisation of public and private pensions represent two distinct 
conflicts with different interests, they should not be studied in isolation from each other (see 
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Figure 7). The reason is that the political-economic struggles that drive reforms in public and 
private provision spill over into each other. This is a consequence of the non-controversial 
observation that different ways to organise private pensions have both non-social and social 
implications. In other words, regulatory interventions that aim at promoting social objectives 
within private pension provision will also have implications for non-social interests (e.g. 
setting minimum employer contributions increases adequacy, but also hampers 
competitiveness of that company while it promotes the commercial objectives of financial 
firms). Recognising this simple link allows us to reveal the political-economic dynamics that 
connect reforms in public and private welfare provision. Governments can pursue social 
objectives through regulating private pensions (rather than through public provision). Non-
state actors can promote such social interventions in the private sphere in order to pursue their 
own non-social goals; but they can also oppose social interventions insofar as this harms their 
own valid objectives.  
 
 
Figure 7  Proposed approach to studying reform dynamics by combining two conflict dimensions 
 
Public	
Private	–		Voluntarism	
Private	–		Social	Regulation	
Dimension	2:	Organising	Private	Provision	
Dimension	1:	Public	–	Private	Provision	
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Applying this simple framework to analyse the shift away from voluntarism in 
organising private pension provision in Germany and the UK reveals three reform dynamics 
that cannot be easily identified using the alternative approaches.   
 
 First of all,  the case study provide more insight as to how state interventions in 
private provision are linked to efforts to contain state involvement through public provision. 
Reform efforts to limit fiscal liabilities by reducing or containing public provision reduces the 
scope to achieve pension adequacy through public provision. Yet as long as households 
expect an overall level of adequacy that is higher than what is publicly provided, governments 
have a stake in promoting private provision instead; this in order to avoid re-emerging 
pressure on public welfare provision. In other words, the shift from provision to regulation is 
driven by the state’s long-term objective to contain fiscal liabilities resulting from public 
provision.  
 
 Secondly, it helps explaining why certain regulatory interventions are preferred over 
others; but also why there are limitations to achieving social protection through private 
provision. Improving social outcomes in private provision requires regulatory interventions, 
which restricts discretion of actors. This can hamper their ability to achieve their own non-
social objectives. Surprisingly, this paper finds that it is often social partners that make social 
interventions harder to implement. For example, employers are concerned that being forced to 
contribute to occupational schemes further reduces their competitiveness. But also unions are 
often reluctant, this because they see it as an unwelcome replacement of public provision 
(their preference); or even because they are reluctant to convey to their members that they 
have to divert a higher share of their wages into pension schemes.  
 
 Thirdly, it provides insight as to why governments are compelled to intervene, even 
when they are reluctant to do so as result of resistance against such interventions. Quite 
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surprisingly, this paper finds that it is often financial actors that promote ‘social interventions’ 
when governments are reluctant to engage in more intensive regulatory intervention. The 
underlying reason is that these financial actors align their commercial interests with the 
state’s concern regarding social inadequacy and resulting political instability.  
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3. Case Study: Pension reforms in Germany and the UK 
In order to substantiate the theoretical argument presented in the previous section, I explore 
pension reform dynamics in Germany and the UK since the 1990s. Within the comparative 
political economy literature, Germany and the UK represent very different ways of organising 
welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Clasen 2005, 2011). Germany has 
traditionally organised earnings-related welfare security within the public welfare system 
(Jochem and Schulze 2007). In contrast, the UK has done much effort since the early 1980s to 
keep public welfare provision at a minimum, leaving the task to achieve adequate pensions to 
voluntary initiative within markets (Esping-Andersen 1990; Moran and Schulze 2007). 
Furthermore, while the UK is expected to respond to pressures by further de-liberalisation and 
facilitating market-relations, Germany is expected to reinforce coordinated forms of 
organising social insurance (Hall and Soskice 2001; Mares 2001).  
 
Despite these different political economies of welfare provision, both countries 
exhibit surprisingly similar reform dynamics with respect to state involvement in organising 
non-state pension provision. While Germany and the UK both started off with a voluntarist 
approach to organising private pension provision, both countries eventually went well beyond 
merely encouraging higher participation. Initial reforms during the late 1990s introduced 
heavily regulated and subsidised financial products within the personal pension market, 
specifically designed to be attractive for lower earners (respectively the Riester Rente and 
Stakeholder Pensions). These reform efforts did not yet involve coercion and were therefore 
still broadly developed within the voluntarist tradition; nevertheless they actively shaped 
markets in order to provide more attractive options to choose from. Faced with disappointing 
results, both countries subsequently shifted their approach to expanding occupational welfare 
in order to achieve higher coverage and saving levels. These new initiatives depart more 
clearly from voluntarism by introducing elements of mandatory enrolment regarding both 
workers and employers. In 2007, the UK introduced quasi-compulsion in the form of auto-
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enrolment with obligatory employer contributions. While Germany already restricted 
employers’ discretion to some extent in the early 2000s, policy initiatives have shifted since 
then even more openly towards introducing coercive elements (be it in the form of sector-
wide schemes that would oblige both individual workers and firms, auto-enrolment or even 
straightforward compulsion). Given their very different institutional backgrounds, how can 
we explain these strikingly similar reform developments in Germany and the UK, away from 
voluntarism towards progressively intrusive state intervention in the organisation of private 
welfare provision? For both case studies, I first explore how efforts to redefine the role of 
public pensions translate in reform efforts regarding private provision. Subsequently I 
investigate how, following those initial reforms, both governments were drawn even more 
into interfering into private welfare provision; shifting the organisation of private provision 
further away from voluntarism.  
  
3.1 Reform dynamics in Germany 
 
3.1.1 Public and private pension reforms in Germany 
Public, statutory pension provision has been the dominant source of old age income in 
Germany until well into the 1990s, securing income-maintenance at a replacement level of 
70% for a standard pensioner (Ebbinghaus, Gronwald, and Wiß 2011, 119; Jochem and 
Schulze 2007, 683). Yet pressures to stabilize the required social contribution rates intensified 
throughout the 1990s; this in a context of high unemployment, costs of unification and fiscal 
discipline required by the Maastricht criteria (Jochem and Schulze 2007, 682–84; 
Häusermann 2010, 126–35; Hering 2004). The first cutbacks in public expenditure were 
attempted in 1997 by the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. They introduced a demographic factor 
that would slow down pension-benefit adjustment and reduce the replacement rate from 70 
percent to 64 percent by 2030 (Häusermann 2010, 128; Jochem and Schulze 2007, 683). 
Pursuing unpopular retrenchment in a unilateral fashion resulted in electoral defeat during the 
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federal elections of 1998. After fifteen years of centre-right government, the SPD defeated the 
Christian Democrats largely on basis of a campaign against welfare cuts (Jochem and Schulze 
2007, 686; Jacobs 2011, 227; The Guardian 1998). After fulfilling its electoral pledge to 
revert the measures, the Red-Green government still had to find its own solution to stabilise 
social contribution rates. The reform measures introduced by the Red-Green coalition over 
the next few years would ironically result in an even more drastic retrenchment of public 
provision than initially intended by the centre-right government in 1997. By significantly 
reducing public replacement rates – from 70% to 64% and subsequently to 46% of former 
gross wage – the government abandoned the long-standing principle of achieving income 
maintenance by means of the statutory pension insurance alone (Berner 2011, 134; Jochem 
and Schulze 2007, 678; 695; Häusermann 2010, 134).  
 
These path-departing public reforms went hand in hand with a drastic policy shift 
regarding the organisation of private pensions. Until well into the 1990s, a voluntarist 
regulatory approach to private pensions facilitated the corporate use of supplementary 
benefits as a way to retain skilled and relatively well-earning employees (Jackson and Vitols 
2001; Ebbinghaus, Gronwald, and Wiß 2011, 125).5 This changed dramatically when the 
Schröder administration presented its intention to replace and substitute the reduction in 
public pension benefits by expanding private pensions  (Berner 2006, 506; Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 1999a, 1999b). This commitment to maintain income maintenance at existing levels 
through the combination of public and private benefits6, effectively rebrands private pensions 
into an instrument of social policy (Blank 2016).  
 
                                                            5 Interference was limited to measures to protect employee rights: the 1974 regulation of occupational 
pensions regulated occupational pension vehicles, introduced insolvency protection and secured 
vesting rights; yet maintained the voluntarist basis (Ebbinghaus, Gronwald, and Wiß 2011, 125).    6 In 2001, the government introduced the concept of a ‘total provision level’ in the policy debate 
(Gesamtversorgungsniveau); set equal or even higher than the 70 percent offered through the old 
system (Berner 2006, 506). Following difficulties in the 2000s to achieve this overall replacement rate, 
the government tried to bury these very specific objectives (Mabbett 2011). Yet as I will show below, 
whether reluctant or eager, the government still tries to expand private provision in order to fill the gap 
left by public retreat. 
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Why was the expansion of private pension provision such an important element of the 
overall reform efforts by the Schröder administration? To explain regulatory interventions in 
private provision, prevailing accounts stress their political importance in terms of facilitating 
public reforms: the purpose of expanding private provision is to soften resistance against 
proposed cuts in public provision (see for example Jacobs 2011, 229; Schludi 2005). This 
approach implies that the extent and shape of private interventions are shaped by the interests 
of those most vocally opposed to public retreat – particularly unions and the left wing of the 
SPD. The problem with this explanation is that private reform proposals were not at all 
designed to please those who resisted public retrenchment. Rather than nurturing goodwill, 
the proposed interventions elicited strong criticism and vigorous protests from almost all 
political corners.  
 
A brief overview of the subsequent reform proposals demonstrates the point. It 
reveals that both Schröder and Riester (his pension minister) went through quite some trouble 
to convince unions to accept the private pension reforms. The first proposal to expand private 
provision, presented by Riester in June 1999, was to introduce a mandatory personal pension 
scheme. Anticipating significant public protest, these proposals were developed in secret and 
without intra-party negotiations (Riester 2004, 138–41).7 The Greens, part of the SPD and 
popular press strongly dismissed the compulsory element (‘Zwangssparen’) as paternalistic 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1999a, 1999b, 5176; Süddeutsche Zeitung 1999b, 1999c). The unions 
were furthermore outraged because Riester’s proposal abolished the long-standing principle 
of parity financing between employers and employees (Parität)8, which would result in 
putting the full burden of expansion on the shoulders of workers (Jacobs 2011, 232; Jochem 
and Schulze 2007, 687–88). The fact that only employer associations welcomed Riester’s 
                                                            7 In his auto-biography (“Mut zur Wirklichkeit”), Riester explains that they did not plan to present the 
proposals until the autumn of 1999, but leaks from within the ministry created pressure to make them 
public much earlier (Riester 2004, 138–41).  8 In the trade union federation’s position paper, it was stated that “the DGB rejects an obligatory 
private pension pillar, especially since this would mean departing from the principle of parity 
financing”. (Hering 2004, 318) 
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ideas underscores the argument that this proposal was not designed to please the unions (BDA 
1999). Even though Schröder privately endorsed mandatory private saving, overwhelming 
pressure forced the government to abandon the idea and to look for alternatives (Riester 2004, 
141).  
 
Riester’s second major proposal, presented in January 2000, was based on voluntary 
savings but supported by generous tax incentives (Jochem and Schulze 2007, 688). Riester 
initially tried to avoid dependence on unions and the SPD’s left wing by making concessions 
to the opposition parties (CDU/CSU and FDP). But political competition prevented such 
broad coalition, requiring Riester to negotiate within his own party. Following several 
concessions (in particular a much more restrained public cut), Riester achieved sufficient 
parliamentary support during the summer of 2000 to move forward with his pension reforms. 
Unions remained strongly opposed to the creation of a multi-pillar system, resulting in public 
conflicts with the government. Union opposition to these plans is exemplified by Schröder’s 
abrupt ending of a debate during the ÖTV-conference in November 2000: “The introduction 
of a private pension pillar is a necessity, and we will do it! Basta!” (recounted by Riester in 
his auto-biography; Riester 2004, 155).9   
 
Despite sustained resistance against expanding private provision, unions started to 
realise that they would be unable to prevent this dynamic and decided to shift focus to their 
second-best outcome: prioritising occupational over personal pension schemes (Schludi 2005, 
160). Interestingly, unions only agreed with Riester’s plans for private expansion after getting 
concessions that had more to do with strengthening their negotiation position in collective 
negotiations than with preventing privatisation. First, Schröder agreed with the DGB that 
unions would be able to secure a large proportion of the €10bn in indirect subsidies that were 
earmarked for expanding private provision (Hering 2004, 338). Secondly, the government 
                                                            9 “Es ist notwendig und wir werden es machen. Basta.” Riester notes how this would provide the basis 
for Schröders’ nick-name (Chancellor Basta) and the future relations with the unions (Riester 2004, 
155). 
	 82	
agreed that collective bargaining agreements on occupational pensions would take precedence 
over individual agreements between employees and workers (Hering 2004, 341). Interesting 
in this respect is Schludi’s observation that the overall shift in unions’ position regarding 
private pensions coincides with an internal power shift within several trade unions, whereby 
collective bargaining experts gained the upper hand over the social policy departments on this 
issue (Schludi 2005, 161). In short, trade unions considered the shift of occupational 
retirement provision into the collective bargaining area as a strategy to reinvigorate the 
dwindling impact of collective bargaining agreements in Germany (Schludi 2005, 160).   
 
These developments show clearly that neither unions nor left-wing parliamentarians 
were in the driving seat to initiate and design private reform measures. Also the argument that 
private intervention was required to create a parliamentary majority does not work. During 
the passage of the 2001 reform proposal through the Bundestag and Bundesrat, it was the part 
regulating the promotion of private pensions that proved to be controversial. The proposal to 
adjust public pension provision (Altersvermögensergänzungsgesetz) passed both chambers 
without difficulties; yet the proposal to regulate private provision (Altersvermögensgesetz) 
only managed to pass the Bundesrat after calling in a Mediation Committee and with the 
smallest majority possible (Jochem and Schulze 2007, 691–92). This adds to the argument 
that private reforms were not designed as a ‘political lubricant’ for public reforms. 
 
If private reforms were not designed to appease those protesting against public 
retreat, what then drove and shaped these interventions? This paper argues that the German 
government was eager to expand private provision because it was an integral element of its 
wider reform efforts, aimed at achieving a politically attractive solution to the pension 
problem that would be stable in the long run. Earlier studies revealed how the SPD was 
internally divided over the question on how to deal with escalating pension costs, with 
Schröder playing a crucial role in tilting the balance in favour of the so-called modernizers 
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within the party (Jacobs 2011, 227; Hering 2003, 103). These modernizers not only aimed at 
improving the fiscal credibility of the party, they also displayed a genuine optimism regarding 
the potential of private pensions to offer full compensation for public retreat. Their 
confidence is reflected by the public commitment to achieve a ‘total provision level’ 
(Gesamtversorgungsniveau) set equal or even higher than the 70 percent offered through the 
old system (Riester 2004, 152; Berner 2006, 506). Expanding private welfare provision was 
considered a politically attractive option that combined social objectives with fiscal 
responsibility. In order to understand the eagerness and enthusiasm of the government for this 
‘private solution’, it is good to keep in mind that the financial sector played an important role 
in convincing the government about the benefits of funded plans (Naczyk and Palier 2015, 
27; Wehlau 2009). Already during the Köhl administration, industry associations representing 
pension funds (aba) and the insurance sector (GDV) were actively promoting a ‘private 
solution’ (“privatwirtschaftliche Lösung”) to the problem of increasing fiscal pressure; for 
example through expert hearings in the Committee for Labour and Social Affairs (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1997, 11–26). However, in a thorough study of the influence of financial sector 
lobbying on pension reforms in Germany, Wehlau concludes that the ‘change in pension 
policy paradigm cannot be attributed solely to lobbying by the financial services industry’; 
instead the financial sector ‘could only begin to develop a comprehensive effect when 
institutional and personal changes became apparent in the pension policy network’10 (Wehlau 
2009, 316; translated from German by author, see footnote for original quote). Finally, plans 
were designed on basis of the idea that funded pension schemes would deliver higher returns 
than PAYG schemes (Hering 2004, 324–25).  
 
                                                            10 Full quote in German: “Der rentenpolitische Paradigmenwechsel ist damit nicht ursächlich auf das 
Lobbying der Finanzdienstleistungsbranche zurückzuführen. Vielmehr konnten die vielfältigen 
lobbyistischen Aktivitäten und Beziehungsstrukturen der Branche erst in umfassender Waise Wirkung 
entfalten, als sich im rentenpolitischen Policy-Netzwerk institutionelle wie auch personelle 
Veränderungen abzeichneten und sich dieses für entrprechende Konzepte öffnete.” (Wehlau 2009, 
316). 
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This argument provides for a better explanation of the observed events than the 
argument that expanding private provision was designed to convince those mobilising against 
privatisation; keeping in mind that Riester’s first proposals were aimed at expanding personal 
rather than occupational pensions – something that is obviously not in the interest of unions. 
Moreover, his initial attempt to introduce personal pensions on mandatory basis is less costly 
than using tax incentives to promote voluntary pensions. Nevertheless, political feasibility 
required him to shift towards a diluted solution that is able to get social partners on board. 
Initially it appeared that the government managed in finding a stable outcome. Even the 
unions and left wing of the SPD supported the paradigmatic reform and tried to claim credit 
for some elements (Hering 2004, 318). However, encouraging voluntary provision turned out 
to be all but self-evident; resulting in further pressures for intervention even after initial 
enthusiasm faded.  
 
3.1.2 The limits of voluntarism in Germany – drawing the state further in  
The Riester Reform in 2001 was met with widespread optimism shared among government 
and potential providers alike. The Deutsche Bank expected that up to three quarters of the 
26.5 million individuals entitled to the subsidy would take up a personal pension, resulting in 
18-20 million new contracts (Deutsche Bank 2001). Also with respect to occupational welfare 
expansion, as Rürup recalled in an interview, the governments’ original expectation was that 
nearly all German employees would quickly sign up for it (IPE 2005a). Yet these high 
expectations were rather short-lived, resulting in new pressures for intervention even after 
public reforms had been implemented. Rather than mobilisation by unions or voters, it was 
the organisation representing the pension industry that was among the most vocal actors 
driving sustained intervention. 
 
With respect to personal Riester pensions, take-up was much slower than anticipated. 
While the insurance industry was expecting eight million new contracts in 2002, only two 
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million insurance contracts were signed according to the Deutsche Bank (IPE 2002). The 
pension insurance industry believed that the failure was the result of restrictive product 
design, an overly-complex infrastructure and complicated incentives rules (IPE 2002). 
Accordingly, it lobbied the government to simplify and liberalise regulation by abandoning 
several of the ‘social’ restrictions. Certain adjustments to the regulation in order to facilitate 
take-up were implemented in 2004 (Alterseinskünftegesetz); yet against opposition by the 
financial industry, the government decided to reinforce important other social restrictions, 
including gender-equality and compulsory annuitization (Jochem and Schulze 2007, 695; 
Berner 2006, 516). Also the expansion of occupational pension coverage was much slower 
than initially expected (Ebbinghaus, Gronwald, and Wiß 2011, 133; IPE 2005a). This 
sluggish development triggered much debate. While the social affairs ministry hailed these 
developments as a success, pension experts and the lobby group for occupational pensions 
claimed that the government was not doing enough to compensate for the shrinking first pillar 
(IPE 2005c, 2005b, 2007b). The occupational pension lobby, in rare accordance with both 
unions and employer organisations, lobbied hard to convince the governments not to abolish 
the tax exemption for employee contributions, which was due to expire in 2008 (IPE 2007c). 
The main argument used by the association representing the German pension fund industry 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft für betriebliche Altersversorgung) was that abolishing tax exemptions 
would result in increased strains on the first pillar: “while around 60% of the workforce 
currently enjoy the benefits of occupational pension provision, this [abolishing tax 
exemption] could reduce and would in turn lead to more people relying on the state pension 
provision”; Boy-Jürgen Andresen, chairman of aba's board, concluded that "In our view, there 
is only one follow-up solution [after the abolition] and that is for the government to pay more 
into the social insurance" (IPE 2007c).  
 
Despite the substantial costs for the state resulting from foregone tax income and 
Riester subsidy, the government decided to maintain fiscal support for supplementary 
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pensions in 2008 (Ebbinghaus, Gronwald, and Wiß 2011, 138). This, however, did not put the 
discussions regarding the need to expand occupational provision to rest. The associations 
representing the occupational sector (aba) repeatedly urged government and trade unions to 
work together to increase participation in Germany’s occupational pension system, this if 
Germany wishes to achieve adequate levels of old age benefits in the future and avoid social 
tensions (aba 2013, 2015). While resisting calls by the industry for further de-regulation and 
more tax-incentives, the government did start to explore the idea to encourage social partners 
to provide comprehensive coverage through collective agreements (IPE 2015b, 2015a). In 
2017, after two years of debate, the new pension reform law made its way through both 
chambers of the parliament (“Betriebsrentenstärkungsgesetz”) (IPE 2017). This law provides 
a legal framework that makes it possible to set up occupational pension plans without 
guarantees as part of collective bargaining agreements – the idea is that employers are 
encouraged by limited liabilities, while the framework of collective agreements ensures 
widespread coverage and sufficient protection of workers’ interests. This new legal 
framework is another important step towards limiting individual discretion by introducing the 
possibility of using auto-enrolment as a way to expand occupational coverage. Nonetheless, 
this shift towards mandatory participation in industry-wide schemes did not go unchallenged; 
for example, unions resisted the idea that workers not covered by collective labour 
agreements (Tarifverträge) would also benefit from the reform (IPE 2015c).   
 
 
3.2 Reform dynamics in the UK 
 
3.2.1 Public and private pension reforms in the UK 
In contrast to Germany, the United Kingdom never fully developed a publicly organised 
earnings-related pension system. Early initiatives to expand public provision (known as 
SERPS) were put on hold and hollowed-out as soon as Thatcher formed a new government in 
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1979 (Bridgen and Meyer 2011, 272). Unable to abandon the state supplementary pension 
altogether, Thatcher focused on curtailing the level of public provision as much as possible 
(e.g. by linking benefits to prices rather than wages) and encouraging occupational provision 
by making it more attractive for employers (e.g. by allowing opting out into DC schemes and 
offering additional rebate in National Insurance contributions) (Moran and Schulze 2007, 73; 
Lynes 1997, 338). This voluntarist strategy to expanding private provision resulted in unequal 
coverage and deteriorating adequacy levels. Yet this was initially not considered to be a 
concern for the government. During the mid-1990s, when most continental countries 
struggled with adjusting to demographic change, the British political establishment 
congratulated itself on the robustness and integrity of the British pension system (Clark 2006, 
145). Throughout the 1990s, this assessment of the British pension system as ‘the envy of the 
world’ would shift towards a growing awareness that the pension system is in crisis 
(Pemberton, Thane, and Whiteside 2006). More specifically, it became increasingly clear that 
a different and more active approach regarding the organisation of non-state provision was 
required.  
 
Over the course of a few years, the government would shift from its voluntarist to a 
more active approach regarding organising private pension provision. The first set of active 
interventions was triggered by a series of scandals in the early 1990s and the public outrage 
they created (e.g. Maxwell scandal, mis-selling scandals). In 1995 the government was forced 
to introduce several costly measures to safeguard pension entitlements; revealing that the 
government could not disregard all responsibility for non-state pension outcomes (Moran and 
Schulze 2007, 74; Bridgen and Meyer 2011, 273). A few years later, it would become clear 
that the role of the state within private provision extends well beyond protecting the value of 
existing pension entitlements. After returning to power in 1997, Labour assessed that low and 
even middle-income earners who do not have access to occupational pensions will not have 
pension benefits above the minimum income level, leaving up to a third of future pensioners 
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facing poverty (Secretary of State for Social Security 1998, 1). At the same time, Labour 
refused to increase the Basic State Pension or to provide a universal basic old age income. 
Doing so was considered to be unaffordable (Secretary of State for Social Security 1998, 30). 
In contrast to Labour in the 1970s, New Labour under Blair rejected responsibility for 
providing earnings-related benefits, claiming that it is the responsibility to save for one’s own 
pension for those who can. To this end, the Government envisioned a new “partnership” with 
the private sector to provide benefits beyond this minimum level: “We are building a new 
contract for pensions between the State, the private sector, and the individual. We believe that 
those who can save for their retirement have the responsibility to do so, and that the State 
must provide effective security for those who cannot.” (Secretary of State for Social Security 
1998, iii). To achieve this, New Labour proposed reforms to both public and private pension 
provision. The SERPS was replaced by the State Second Pension (SSP), which provides a 
flatter rate of benefits focused on lower incomes (Secretary of State for Social Security 1998; 
CASE 1999). Encouraging the development of private funded pensions is also an integral part 
of the reform effort; it was required to offset policies which will make the state system less 
generous for average earners (Pensions Commission 2004, 74).  
 
In order to turn around the long-term deterioration of private pensions, the 
government introduced Stakeholder Pensions: a regulated and tax-incentivised personal 
pension scheme designed to persuade households to save privately, especially low and 
middle-income earners (for example by virtue of capped management fees) (Secretary of 
State for Social Security 1998, 5). While the National Association of Pension Funds was 
calling for the government to make private savings compulsory, unions remained highly 
critical of personal pension plans and later mobilised to beef up state pensions by restoring 
the link with earnings (Eurofound 1997; The Telegraph 2000a, 2000b). Yet the government 
refused to expand public provision, being optimistic about the prospect of delivering an 
overall pension outcome that was both fiscally responsible and socially attractive. Similar to 
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the German case, however, this optimism was short-lived. In the next section I show how the 
government is drawn further into regulating private welfare provision in light of the limits of 
voluntarism and the need for stabilising the pension system.  
 
3.2.2 The limits of voluntarism in the UK – drawing the state further in 
By the early 2000s it had become evident that the steps taken to increase private sector 
engagement had not achieved their aims (Bridgen and Meyer 2011, 273; Pemberton, Thane, 
and Whiteside 2006). The take-up of Stakeholder Pensions was low and companies were 
massively closing DB schemes for new entrants (Bridgen and Meyer 2011, 273; Munnell 
2006). Throughout this period, the government was increasingly criticised for failing to fix 
inadequate private pension, resulting in mounting pressures to act. Part of this pressure was 
initiated by public outcry, following new scandals where occupational schemes turned out to 
be underfunded when the employer became insolvent (Moran and Schulze 2007, 81; The 
Guardian 2002a, 2004a). On top of this, a significant part of the pressure was aimed at 
improving overall private pension saving levels in order to close the ‘savings gap’ between 
actual savings and what people expect to receive as old age income. In contrast to demands 
for safer pensions, such pressures to intervene in non-state provision in order to expand 
coverage and saving levels are to an important extent the result of deliberate efforts by the 
financial pension industry. 
 
During the early 2000s, several studies were published expressing the concern that 
private pension savings are falling significantly short of expectations; partly because 
occupational provision is in decline and underfunded, while Stakeholder Pensions are not 
filling the gap. Many of these studies find their origin with actuaries – e.g. the survey by the 
Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA 2001) or Bacon & Woodrow and William M 
Mercer in 2001 (Daily Mail 2001; The Telegraph 2001b, 2001a). One of the most influential 
reports, however, was commissioned in 2001 by the Association of British Insurers (ABI), 
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entitled ‘The future regulation of UK savings and investment: targeting the savings gap’ 
(report commissioned by ABI and conducted by Oliver Wyman and Co 2001). The main 
message of this report is that there is a growing gap between what people are actually saving 
and what they should be saving to ensure a comfortable old age (i.e. incomes sufficient to 
maintain pre-retirement standards of living). The report finds that every worker needs to save 
an extra £1000 a year on average to ensure they can enjoy their old age, creating an annual 
savings gap between target and projected retirement incomes estimated at £27bn (Financial 
Times 2004a). The ABI used these statistics as ammunition to persuade the government of the 
need for further action to encourage private saving; stressing that “the savings gap is one of 
the biggest social policy issues facing the nation today, fully meriting the term "pensions 
crisis".” (House of Commons Library 2003). In particular, the ABI was quite critical about 
the Stakeholder Pension, arguing that the scheme doesn’t make “a significant dent in Britain's 
£27bn annual savings gap” (ABI 2002b; EveningStandard 2002). The two main reasons 
identified by ABI for the low pick-up of Stakeholder Pensions are first the costly regulations, 
including the cap on fees which make it uneconomic to provide to lower incomes, and second 
the lack of incentives for employers to make contributions (Investment Week, n.d.).  
 
Policymakers responded to the concerns raised by the pension industry. The 
Pickering Report “was commissioned by the former work and pensions secretary, Alistair, 
Darling, to simplify the horrifyingly complex system to persuade Britons to close the £27bn 
gap between what they should be saving to ensure a comfortable old age and what they are.” 
(The Guardian 2002b). This report was published alongside two other reports, the Sandler 
Report and a report prepared by Inland Revenue on pension taxation (HM Treasury 2002a, 
2002b). The three reports were still largely developed within the tradition of voluntarism, 
with proposals mainly focussing on simplification and reducing complexity as the key 
element in solving the pension savings gap. Critics, however, were increasingly articulate 
about their scepticism as to whether this voluntarist approach can succeed in bridging the 
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savings gap (The Guardian 2002a, 2002c, 2002b; The Telegraph 2002). Among these critics, 
the pension industry is again very present (critics include Prudential UK, AMP UK - owner of 
Pearl, London Life and NPI, Norwich Union Life, Virgin Money, etc.). Rather than regulating 
products, these firms demand active encouragement such as further tax incentives and even 
compulsion (The Guardian 2002b; The Telegraph 2002).  
 
Once again, the government picked up the concerns aired by the financial industry on 
whether voluntarism is capable to close the pension gap. The Green Paper, presented later in 
2002, acknowledged demands for compulsion, yet re-affirmed the Government’s belief in the 
potential of the voluntarist approach (DWP 2002, 12; 25); “people who want to live on more 
than their income from the State in retirement will want to choose how much to work and 
save to secure their preferred income.” (DWP 2002, 34). However, it also decided to establish 
a pensions commission “to advise whether there is a case for moving beyond the current 
voluntarist approach.” (DWP 2002, v). This provided the mandate for the Pensions 
Commission, led by Adair Turner, which produced two influential reports in 2004 and 2005. 
These reports would be the basis for the two Pension Acts in 2007 and 2008 that ended 
voluntarism and expanded public provision.  
 
The impact of these reports is not accidental; instead the sequencing and structuring 
of both reports were consciously designed to change the political landscape by generating 
broad political support for reforms that were hitherto unthinkable (the following interpretation 
is based on the results from a workshop at the Institute for Government; IfG 2010). In the first 
report, Turner refrained from making any policy recommendations (it is most likely that the 
eventual recommendations would have triggered an immediate backlash). Instead the 
Commission focused on depoliticizing the debate by establishing a shared understanding of 
the challenges regarding the current pension system, as well as making clear “that the nation 
faced an unavoidable choice between four possible options: stick with the business as usual 
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option and allow pensioners to become poorer relative to the rest of society; increase the 
amount of tax revenue devoted to pensions; increase private savings; or raise the average 
retirement age” (IfG 2010, 92). After spending a lot of time and effort on convincing 
stakeholders of the need for policy reform, the second report made recommendations that 
went well beyond its initially limited merit – including auto-enrolment and increasing the 
state pension age.  
  
The first report by the Pensions Commission showed that private pension provision is 
in significant decline, rather than offsetting the state’s retreating role (Pensions Commission 
2004, x). Without action, current trends result in widespread inadequacy that will concentrate 
on middle income earners working in the private sector (only the very lowest and highest 
income earners aren’t expected to experience a very significant drop in old age income) 
(Pensions Commission 2004, xi; 166). While the Commission acknowledges that doing 
nothing is a policy option, it remarks that it is politically not an attractive one: “The 
increasing inequality of pension provision will create major social stress; and those who lose 
out are likely to lobby and vote for ad hoc rather than intelligently planned changes to the 
state system, and will be a powerful political force given the increasing proportion of elderly 
people in the population.” (Pensions Commission 2004, 170).  
 
On the basis of this shared understanding that current trends “will deliver increasingly 
inadequate and unequal results”, the Commission presented policy proposals in the second 
report (Pensions Commission 2005). The Commission argued that measures to encourage 
voluntary provision are not sufficient to solve the problem, yet recognized that attitudes to 
compulsion are ambivalent (Pensions Commission 2005, 2). 11  Accordingly, the key 
recommendation was to introduce auto-enrolment as a ‘soft’ version of compulsion; steering 
                                                            11 “While many people say they want to “have to save”, many respond adversely to the idea of 
compulsory savings. And there is a danger that compulsory savings contributions may be seen as 
equivalent to taxation, reducing people’s willingness to support an adequate system of flat-rate state 
pension provision.”  (Pensions Commission 2005, 3). 
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contributions into a newly created low cost, national funded savings scheme and 
complemented with a modest level of employer contributions. Ignoring the instruction to 
focus exclusively on private pensions, the report also recommended that the state pension 
should become less means-tested and more universal in order to prevent saving dis-incentives 
(which of course results in more expensive state pensions) (Pensions Commission 2005, 6). 
 
Both recommendations were largely implemented through the Pensions Acts in 2007 
and 2008; resulting in the departure from voluntarism, as well as a step towards more 
generous public provision. These are interesting developments, given the earlier government 
commitment to voluntarism and strong resistance against raising basic pensions. Both 
measures relied on a complex set of compromises between all actors involved. The new 
system has been promoted by unions, businesses and the government as a compromise to 
share the burden of private welfare expansion (IfG 2010, 97). All major parties stood to lose 
something from the process. Businesses are obliged to enrol all employees and make 
compulsory contributions. Unions had to overcome a big taboo by accepting an increase in 
retirement age in order to help paying for higher state pensions. The government had to 
accept the fiscal cost following from restoring the earnings link; which was refused until then, 
despite strong union pressure as discussed earlier in the paper (p.88). As could be expected, 
the pension industry broadly welcomed these initiatives (insurers have long demanded higher 
basic pensions). Yet also their preferences were not completely fulfilled. Most importantly, 
the pension industry opposed the proposal to direct automatic savings into a publicly 
organised savings vehicle, arguing that this creates unfair competition. All in all, these 
adjustments to the organisation of private pension provision represent a significant departure 
from the existing voluntarist approach.  
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3.3 Discussion  
Both in Germany and the UK, active interventions in non-state welfare provision represent 
attempts to achieve widespread adequacy within the private sphere; this in order to avoid 
creating pressures to use public provision to achieve the same result. This need to establish a 
politically stable pension settlement means that states continue to be involved in organising 
welfare security, despite privatisation and long after public retrenchment has been approved. 
In fact, both governments are drawn into ever more invasive interventions, each time it 
becomes clear that the previous attempt did not work out as expected. The framework 
developed earlier in this paper helps to make sense of why both countries went through 
broadly similar reform developments. In what follows I briefly present three main elements 
that emerge as significant within both cases; this to illustrate the main argument and highlight 
the limitations of the alternative approaches discussed in section two.  
 
First, in both cases interventions in private welfare provision were directly related to 
reform objectives with respect to public welfare provision. Yet increasing government 
involvement was not a response to pressure by organised labour or other vested interests in 
public welfare provision. In Germany, Schröder not only had to convince unions that public 
provision had to be rolled back, but also that interventions in private provision were 
necessary. Furthermore, his first proposals were aimed at expanding personal rather than 
occupational pensions – something that is obviously not in the interest of unions. Similarly, 
British unions preferred increasing public expenditure over interventions in private provision, 
resulting in heated conflicts with Gordon Brown regarding linking basic state pensions again 
to earnings. This finding challenges the approach based on the ‘new politics of the welfare 
state’ (section 2.1), which explain interventions in private pension provision as a way to 
appease those who resist public retrenchment. In any case, it is not clear how this approach 
would explain intensifying interventions in the UK – which did not engage in privatisation.  
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But also the ‘partisan conflict’ approach, proposed by Gingrich (2011), does not help 
to explain regulatory shifts in Germany and the UK. Apart from the radical break by Schröder 
with the Köhl administration, there has been a clear continuity in regulatory initiatives across 
different governments (e.g. auto-enrolment was initiated by Labour but implemented without 
noteworthy alterations by the Coalition government). This strongly suggests that private 
reform politics cannot be explained on basis of partisan considerations (even if partisan 
conflicts matter to explain public pension reforms; see for example Green-Pedersen 2002; and 
Häusermann, Picot, and Geering 2013). In contrast to those who explain private interventions 
on basis of public reform politics, this paper argues that explanations of private intervention 
should also take into account conflicts regarding the non-social objectives related to 
organising private pension provision.  
 
This brings us to the second finding: it was the pension industry, rather than unions, 
that played an important role in pushing for social interventions in both countries. This is 
quite unexpected given that financial interests generally represent the opposite of social 
interests (e.g. Hacker 2002). This surprising interest coalition emerges when social reforms 
happen to run in the same direction as the market-creating reforms preferred by the pension 
industry (for instance, mandating occupational provision or providing generous tax incentives 
not only expands coverage but also creates new markets). Hence the pension industry played 
an important role in promoting the ‘private solution’ to an eager Social-Democratic reformer. 
The attractiveness of this ‘private solution’ for the Social-Democratic reformers (Third Way / 
Neue Mitte) reflects the political appeal of combining a continued commitment to social 
policy objectives, with highly sought-after economic credentials such as fiscal responsibility. 
Yet also when governments were no longer eager to intervene, the financial sector continued 
to play a key role in chasing up governments to introduce further social interventions, 
pointing at the growing ‘pension gap’ that could result in increasing demands on public 
provision. In other words, the influence of financial actors has to be understood in relation to 
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efforts to contain public provision of pensions; challenging those who argue that financial 
actors exert influence on basis of arguments regarding the non-social implications of 
organising private provision.    
 
Finally, both cases illustrate the difficulties involved in achieving a politically stable 
equilibrium on basis of this ‘private solution’. States are drawn into ever more invasive 
interventions – involving substantial fiscal and political costs – each time it becomes clear 
that earlier attempts to expand private provision did not work. Furthermore, it is not always 
the case that reforms aimed at improving social outcomes run in the same direction as non-
social objectives. Because social interventions require constraining discretion, tensions can 
arise when they hamper other valid uses of private welfare. This is particularly important with 
respect to the traditional role of occupational welfare as an instrument to organise labour 
markets – be it as a human resource tool to attract and retain high-valued workers or as a 
bargaining chip within industrial negotiations. Social objectives such as increasing coverage 
or adequacy might require limiting the discretion employers used to enjoy regarding offering 
occupational welfare benefits or differentiating between workers. Intensified regulatory 
pressure creates both compliance costs and decreases the benefits of offering occupational 
provision (Meyer and Bridgen 2012). Improving the social viability of private welfare also 
results in conflicts with the commercial objectives of private welfare providers (see third 
paper). So while linking social and non-social issues creates new reform opportunities, 
tensions between social and non-social reform objectives also create limitations to public 
intervention efforts to achieve better social outcomes within private provision. 
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4. Conclusions 
Welfare privatisation is often analysed as liberalisation or retrenchment of the welfare state; 
reducing public provision results in reducing the role of the state in allocating welfare benefits 
in favour of market dynamics. This paper examines why the role of welfare states does not 
seem to diminish in a straightforward way, but instead shifts from providing welfare benefits 
publicly towards shaping the organisation of private welfare provision. It argues that these 
interventions should not be explained as efforts to facilitate public retreat by softening 
resistance against privatisation. Governments continue to be drawn into shaping private 
welfare provision, long after public reforms were passed and despite the substantial costs 
involved. In order to explain what drives such sustained interventions against the background 
of welfare privatisation, this paper proposes a framework that does not only take into account 
conflicts on whether welfare should be provided publicly or privately, it also includes 
conflicts regarding the appropriate organisation of the provision of private welfare. This 
framework reveals that actors can have interests both in privatisation and in increased state 
intervention in private provision (e.g. financial welfare providers); or that actors may 
reluctantly accept privatisation in return for interventions in the organisation of private 
welfare that serve their non-social objectives (e.g. unions). These new interest constellations 
open up new reform possibilities for states. Despite the costs involved, promoting private 
pensions can be a politically attractive alternative to both public provision (resulting in fiscal 
problems) and ‘passive’ privatisation (which risks being socially unstable). Governments 
were initially attracted by the prospect of high financial returns. But after this initial 
enthusiasm receded and governments grew wary of the costs involved, this paper shows that 
it were financial welfare providers – rather than unions and voters – who played a crucial role 
in convincing states of the merits of such ‘private solution’. In order to pressure governments 
into costly interventions, financial actors strategically aligned their own commercial interests 
with broader social concerns regarding the social stability of private welfare outcomes (more 
so than relying on economic arguments, as argued by Naczyk 2013; Naczyk and Palier 2015). 
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Hence to explain the political dynamics that drive welfare state reform, this paper moves 
away from established explanations based on union mobilisation or electoral pressure; instead 
it focuses on the interaction between states as independent actors with a stake in stabilising 
the welfare system, and financial welfare providers with a commercial interest in public 
support for private welfare. 
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PAPER 2 
 
 
 
ORGANISING PRIVATE SOCIAL PROTECTION: 
HOW TO EXPLAIN DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES WITH 
COLLECTIVE RISK-SHARING DURING CRISES IN DENMARK  
AND THE NETHERLANDS? 
 
 
 
1. Recreating social protection within private welfare provision  
Against the background of welfare privatisation, risk individualisation is a growing concern 
(Bode 2008; Clark 2003; Gilbert and Van Voorhis 2003; Gilbert 2005; Hacker 2004, 249, 
2008; Meyer, Bridgen, and Riedmüller 2007; Orenstein 2008, 2009). This is particularly 
salient in the area of pension security, where the ‘great risk shift’ has been amplified by the 
widespread retreat of employers from making explicit promises regarding pension benefits 
(Munnell 2006; Hacker 2008). Without the security traditionally provided by state or 
employer promises, individual households are increasingly dependent on financial markets; 
hence increasingly exposed to the risk of financial market volatility. The financial crisis in 
2008 made clear that these financial risks are very substantial, with asset values dropping by 
20% on average in OECD countries between January and October 2008 (OECD 2009). The 
impact of these financial shocks is especially severe for those households close to retirement; 
a problem known as the ‘retirement date risk’ (Whitehouse, D’Addio, and Reillly 2009; 
OECD 2009). Unlike younger households they have fewer opportunities to hold on to their 
assets to participate in market recovery, hereby ‘locking in’ the severe reductions in 
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retirement income. Financial fluctuations can have a very significant impact on replacement 
rates, as illustrated by the OECD simulation in Figure 8.  
 
The financial crisis has triggered new political interest in exploring strategies to better 
protect individuals from financial risks (OECD 2009; Whitehouse 2009; Antolín and Stewart 
2009). Some proposals simply focus on ‘mitigating risks’ – this by restricting or steering 
investment decisions towards safer strategies (e.g. life cycle asset allocation). The problem is 
that curtailing risks in this way also limits returns, which are necessary for an adequate 
pension. More ambitious proposals instead explore new ways of sharing or pooling risks 
within private schemes, hereby recreating elements of social protection within private welfare 
provision. Collective risk-sharing allows scheme members to benefit from high-return 
investments while limiting their exposure to market volatility. Responsibility can be shared 
between employers and employees; but workers can also share risks among themselves in 
collective schemes (Blommestein et al. 2009; Pitt-Watson and Mann 2012; Turner 2014). 
These different risk-sharing arrangements reflect a variety of ways to organise private welfare 
provision; offering attractive political alternatives that keep the middle between the extremes 
of allocating all responsibility either with employers or with individual workers. 
Nevertheless, proposals to share risks collectively tend to be controversial in practice because 
they introduce mutual obligations while still requiring individuals to accept a degree of 
flexibility (Blommestein et al. 2009). This is illustrated by recent debates in the UK regarding 
the introduction of collective risk-sharing schemes that are promoted as ‘Defined Ambition’ 
(UK Parliament 2012; Financial Times 2014a; IPE 2015d). This paper proposes an analytical 
framework that helps to understand the political struggles that shape social risk-sharing 
arrangements within private welfare provision. 
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Figure 8  Hypothetical replacement rates for selected OECD countries  
Source: (Antolín and Stewart 2009, 20; based on OECD calculations) 
 
Notes: The impact of the timing of retirement on retirement income is measured by the ratio of 
retirement income to the last salary (i.e. replacement rate). This simulation exercise is based on a set of 
assumptions regarding saving and investment profile (identical for each country), as well as regarding 
return on investment for equity and bonds (separate for each country) (For more specific details, see 
Antolín and Stewart 2009, 21). 
 
The literature on welfare state reforms does not agree on the political viability of 
recreating social protection through risk-pooling in private schemes. Even though political 
interest in collective risk-sharing arrangements suggests that there is no straightforward trend 
towards risk individualisation, some scholars argue that the political viability of these efforts 
is still very limited. The very characteristics of private pension provision make sustained 
public scrutiny unlikely, which means that efforts to strip social features of private provision 
tend to go unchallenged (Hacker 2002, 349; Streeck 2009). Attempts at preserving some level 
of security by shifting to ‘soft promises’ thus represent nothing more than a further step down 
towards withdrawing promises and increasing insecurity. Other scholars, however, suggest 
that the link between pension privatisation and risk individualization is not immediate and 
automatic (see for example Hyde and Dixon 2008; Leisering 2011; Trampusch 2006). New 
levels of social protection are also considered possible within non-state pension provision. 
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The main idea is that social partners – who are collective by nature – have the capacity to “fill 
the gap” that public retreat has created in social protection (Trampusch 2008; Johnston, 
Kornelakis, and d’Acri 2011). In other word, the viability of private social protection depends 
on the capacity and willingness of social partners to negotiate new levels of risk-pooling 
through collective agreements. So in order to explain variation across countries, this argument 
refers to differences in the initiatives and capacity of social partners.  
 
This paper agrees that welfare privatisation does not necessarily result in risk 
individualisation. Yet it challenges the notion that collective actor initiative can explain the 
viability of collective risk-pooling within private welfare provision.  It is true that social 
partners have played a prominent role in organising the most important collective risk-sharing 
schemes. But referring to social partner activism is not very helpful in explaining why 
different countries have had very different experiences with collective risk-sharing. This can 
be best illustrated by comparing countries where occupational pensions are organised through 
nation-wide collective agreements. Sweden did not introduce collective risk-sharing 
mechanisms within occupational pensions, even after most pension schemes shifted to DC in 
the late 1990s (Barr 2013, 107; IPE 1999). While Denmark and the Netherlands do organise 
collective risk-sharing, both displayed substantial differences in terms of their ability to 
weather major crises (see below). Such differences are difficult to explain on the basis of 
social partner activism; at least not without resorting to the ad hoc explanation that social 
actors simply made different decisions. Relying too much on collective actor discretion and 
initiatives to explain different outcomes constitutes a theoretical weakness that I address here.  
 
Keeping in mind the challenge to the prevailing argument, this paper proposes a 
different analytical approach to understand the political viability of recreating social 
protection within private welfare provision. It argues that the debate has to shift beyond its 
current focus on the agency of collective actors, towards greater attention to the structural 
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context in which these agents make their decisions. In particular, this paper argues that 
regulatory frameworks play a crucial role in establishing and maintaining private social 
protection. Regulatory frameworks provide the necessary stability and trust that is required to 
manage the distributional struggles that emerge from organising collective protection against 
systemic risks (such as market volatility). In a nutshell, collective protection against market 
risks works by accumulating a financial buffer during good times that can be used at a later 
point to mitigate the consequences of bad times. Yet when should you build up this buffer and 
when should you start using it? These decisions have important distributional consequences. 
Hence in order to sustain risk-sharing arrangements over time, it is crucial to establish 
widespread acceptance of these decisions and trust in those who make them. Governance 
rules, embedded in regulatory frameworks, play a necessary role in underpinning that trust. In 
contrast to the existing focus on the capacity of social partners to ‘fill the gap’ created by state 
retreat, this paper suggests that states continue to play a crucial role in establishing and 
maintaining private social protection. In terms of policy implications, it proposes to focus 
more on efforts to design and maintain a stable regulatory framework that binds participants, 
rather than to rely on the discretion of social partners to establish private social protection. 
 
To substantiate my argument, I use the cases of Denmark and the Netherlands to 
construct a most-similar case study. Both countries have important collective risk-sharing 
arrangements that are both attributed to collective agreements between social partners (in 
other words, these are cases where we would least expect the state to play a decisive role). 
Despite their far-reaching similarities, both countries have had very different experiences with 
collective risk-sharing during the two crises in the 2000s – this in terms of crisis performance 
as well as accompanying conflicts. First, several conflict lines regarding occupational pension 
provision have surfaced in the Netherlands during the past two decades, while in Denmark 
none of these conflicts have emerged. Secondly, the two main crises in the 2000s have had a 
very significant impact on the performance of Dutch pension schemes and subsequently on 
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the benefits of scheme members. While Danish pension providers were certainly not immune 
to the impact of both crises, this did not translate into a detrimental impact on the security of 
benefit levels. These diverging outcomes are all the more surprising given that DB schemes 
were still dominant in the Netherlands in the early 2000s, while Danish schemes were already 
based on DC. Rather than resorting to the ad hoc explanation that Dutch actors simply made 
worse decisions, I show that diverging experiences can be better explained by the presence of 
different governance rules and regulatory frameworks.  
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next section presents the analytical 
framework in more detail by critically discussing the literature and developing the argument. 
Section three applies this argument in order to explain the puzzle of diverging experiences 
between Denmark and the Netherlands. The conclusion discusses how this conceptual 
framework can help to explain the difficulties of organising private pensions in other mature 
welfare states. 
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2. Analytical framework: Explaining the viability of collective risk-sharing 
arrangements 
 
2.1  Existing approaches: Can social partners fill the gap of social protection? 
Scholarly interest in occupational and personal welfare has surged over the past few years 
(Greve 2007; Ebbinghaus 2011b; Seeleib-Kaiser, Saunders, and Naczyk 2012; Pavolini and 
Seeleib-Kaiser 2016). It is well-recognised that private benefits constitute a significant part of 
overall welfare benefits in several countries (Hacker 2002, 8; Rein and Rainwater 1986; 
Shalev 1996; Adema and Whiteford 2010). Yet low or retreating levels of public welfare 
provision have raised new questions as to whether private welfare provision can serve as an 
alternative source of social protection. Hacker has argued that the organisation of private 
welfare provision is too technical and obscure to attract critical electoral scrutiny; so even in 
those cases where private arrangements still exhibit social characteristics, these are expected 
to break down gradually (Hacker 2002, 2004). Indeed, many scholars fear that the outcome of 
welfare state retreat will resemble market liberalisation rather than social security via non-
state provision (Bode 2008; Clark 2003; Gilbert and Van Voorhis 2003; Gilbert 2005; Hacker 
2004, 249; Meyer, Bridgen, and Riedmüller 2007; Orenstein 2008, 2009).  
 
Against this widespread expectation of inevitable risk individualisation, several 
scholars argue that socialised protection within non-state provision remains possible. The 
most developed argument focuses on the importance of industrial relations and social partners 
(Marier 2012; Trampusch 2006, 2007; Yerkes and Tijdens 2010, 2012; Johnston, Kornelakis, 
and d’Acri 2011). While agreeing that welfare privatisation results in a retreat of the state, 
they argue that social partners can “fill the gap” that public retreat has created in social 
protection. According to this argument, the organisation of welfare benefits can be 
‘transferred’ from retreating states to collective bargaining; thus creating an alternative to 
both public social security and outright market liberalisation (Trampusch 2006, 123–24, 2009, 
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99). Even though collective bargaining is not organised on the level of a whole nation (unlike 
public social insurance), it still provides a reasonably good proxy in terms of creating an 
encompassing risk-pool. This way, the self-regulative role of collective welfare development 
can compensate for losses of solidarity that result from the retrenchment of public welfare 
benefits (Trampusch 2009, 105–6). The role of the government is considered important, but 
ultimately restricted to supporting collective agreements – for example by legal expansion of 
coverage, or providing tax incentives (Trampusch 2006, 122). 
 
One of the major implications of the existing framework is that, if one wants to 
understand why collective arrangements emerge or perform in a particular way, you have to 
look at the initiatives and capacity of social partners. As mentioned in the introduction, this 
framework cannot account for important variation across countries where such collective 
actor capacity is present – at least not without resorting to ad hoc references to discretionary 
decisions by social partners. It cannot be denied that the most successful examples of 
collective risk-sharing within private provision involve social partners. Nevertheless, this 
paper argues that this analytical reliance on the agency and discretion of collective actors 
hides as much as it reveals. Focusing too much on collective actor initiatives risks eclipsing 
the importance of the regulatory context in which these actors make their decisions. More 
specifically, it obscures the sustained importance of state intervention in organising social 
protection. Governments play an important role by shaping the regulatory frameworks that 
create the trust and stability that is required to manage the distributional struggles that emerge 
from organising collective protection.  
 
2.2 The role of regulations in structuring distributional conflicts 
To explain different experiences with collective risk-sharing arrangements, this paper focuses 
on the importance of pension fund governance and the regulatory system that underpins it. 
Collective risk-sharing always involves distributional struggles. Regulatory frameworks play 
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a very important role in establishing, supporting and maintaining stable organisation of these 
distributional conflicts. In what follows I present an analytical framework that shows how 
collective risk-sharing can be organised very differently, depending on how the underlying 
distributional struggles are shaped.  
 
In order to understand why collective risk-sharing always involves distributional 
struggles, it is first necessary to take a closer look at how such arrangements provide 
protection against risks. There are many problems involved in securing adequate pensions; 
including risks related to longevity, retirement date, market volatility, inflation, etc. (Barr 
2012a). While some of these risks are idiosyncratic, this paper focuses on efforts to share 
systemic risks that are inherent to the entire market. These risks, such as a financial crisis or 
an unexpected change in life expectancy, affect all individuals within a risk-pool at the same 
time. Unlike idiosyncratic risks, systemic risks cannot be shared within the current risk pool 
because a systemic risk affects all individuals at a certain moment. Collective protection is 
still possible, yet it cannot be done without redistributing risks between different groups. For 
example, risks could be shared with an external actor such as employers or the state. In 
absence of an external risk absorber, risks can also be shared among scheme members over 
time. In practice this means that high returns are collected during periods with good economic 
performance to create a financial buffer to dampen return shortfalls during economic 
downturns. This, however, requires making important decisions on how surpluses and 
funding shortages will be distributed across stakeholders (Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, and Nijman 
2014). For example, when should a fund require a higher level of contributions than strictly 
needed for matching liabilities given a certain return (i.e. creating a buffer)? Or when should 
a fund pay out a higher level of benefits than is justified by the current level of investment 
returns (i.e. using the financial buffer to reduce financial downfalls)? These decisions 
determine how responsibility is shared within the risk-pool. Because sharing systemic risks 
requires allocating the burden between different groups, important decisions on how to 
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distribute these risks within the collective become unavoidable. Given the distributional 
consequences of decisions on how to share risks within the collective, the organisation of 
decision-making is crucial (i.e. the governance of the fund). In order to accept the outcomes 
of these distributional decisions, participants have to trust that decision-making is organised 
in a fair manner (for the importance of trust, see Vickerstaff et al. 2012; Whiteside 2002, 
2010).    
 
This paper proposes a conceptual framework that distinguishes between two 
dimensions of pension fund governance. First, one needs to agree on the extent to which each 
participant is entitled to a specified outcome (e.g. a specific benefit level). Secondly, one 
needs to agree on how this outcome will be achieved (e.g. when to build up financial buffers 
and when to use these buffers). As represented in Table 2, this conceptual framework thus 
distinguishes between the ‘pension promise’ (how the outcome is specified) and the ‘pension 
process’ (how the outcome should be achieved). Depending on how these decisions regarding 
pension promises and pension processes are made, one arrives at different organisations of 
collective risk-sharing. Both dimensions can be organised either more strictly (with pre-set 
and transparent rules), or more flexible (leaving room for discretion and negotiation).  
 
 
 Pension Promise Pension Process 
Governance mode Strict ßà Flexible Strict ßà Flexible 
 
Table 2  Organisational characteristics of collective risk-sharing  
 
 
Traditionally, most attention goes to the aspect of ‘pension promises’ to explain 
stability: security is considered to follow from explicit agreements on pension promises. The 
framework proposed in this paper instead stresses the importance of the generally ignored 
second dimension of pension fund governance: agreements on how to manage the collective 
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funds in order to achieve certain outcomes. It can be agreed to leave the responsibility to 
build up a financial buffer to the discretion of the governing body of the pension fund. Yet 
this requires voluntary self-constraint in order not to consume too much of the investment 
surpluses during periods of economic expansion. On the other hand, funds with explicit 
agreements on when to build up and use financial buffers do not rely on such discretion. This 
way one can achieve security without having to depend on promised outcomes. In any case 
governance matters, because without a stable agreement on how to distribute risks there is no 
basis for collective risk-sharing.  
 
Finally, this paper argues that, while social partners play an important role in 
negotiating these agreements, such voluntary agreements are not sufficient for stable 
agreements. State intervention is crucial in establishing, shaping and maintaining these 
agreements; this by establishing clear regulatory frameworks. 
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3. Case Study: Private social protection in Denmark and the Netherlands 
This section applies the analytical framework developed in the previous section to analyse 
and explain diverging experiences with collective risk-sharing within Denmark and the 
Netherlands – the two most prominent cases of social risk-sharing within private provision. 
Despite important similarities between both pension systems, the political economy of 
collective risk-sharing played out very differently over the past two decades - both in terms of 
crisis performance and emerging conflicts. Using the framework developed in the previous 
section, I show that Denmark and the Netherlands have very different ways to organise the 
distributional conflicts that underlie collective risk-sharing. Rather than resorting to the ad 
hoc explanation that Dutch actors simply made worse decisions, I show that diverging 
experiences can be better explained by the presence of different governance rules. 
 
3.1 Similar systems, diverging experiences  
According to most approaches to classifying welfare systems, Denmark and the Netherlands 
are very similar (Palier 2010; Esping-Andersen 1990, 74). These similarities stand out clearly 
when comparing their pension systems. Both feature an articulated three-pillar structure that 
comprises a basic citizenship-based public pension that provides an effective safety net 
against poverty in old age, complemented by occupational and personal pensions that aim at 
income replacement (Anderson 2007, 713; Gisler 2010; Green-Pedersen 2007, 454; Sørensen 
and Dengsøe 2011). Occupational pensions are organised through collective agreements 
between social partners, generally on the level of a sector or professional group rather than 
the individual firm. In the Netherlands, such collective agreements are reinforced by 
legislation dating from 1949 that allows the Minister of Social Affairs to declare a sectoral 
pension scheme binding on all employers in that sector (Anderson 2011, 299). Their quasi-
mandatory character results in very high participation rates (see Table 3). Replacement rates 
for occupational schemes are currently still higher in the Netherlands (see Table 3); yet as 
Danish occupational schemes mature, their share in the replacement rate will grow 
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significantly (see Table 4). As these collective funds create opportunities for risk-sharing, 
they play a crucial role in preventing risk individualisation in both countries. Equally 
important for the purpose of this paper is the fact that Denmark and the Netherlands are 
practically identical in terms of the ‘structural characteristics’ used by Trampusch to explain 
how collectively negotiated benefits create social protection within private provision 
(Trampusch 2009, 102–3). Despite all these far-reaching similarities in the organisation of 
pension provision, the Netherlands and Denmark have had quite diverging experiences 
regarding private social protection: this in terms of their ability to weather the past two crises 
and in the accompanying materialisation of several conflicts regarding occupational 
provision.  
 
 Coverage Rate Replacement Rate 
 
Quasi-Mandatory 
Schemes 
Voluntary 
Personal Schemes 
Public Pension 
Occupational 
Pension 
Denmark 62.3 22.4 21.5 46.3 
The Netherlands 88.0 28.3 27.1 63.4 
 
Table 3   Coverage of private pension schemes as percentage of working age population 
(15-64years) in 2013 (Source: OECD 2015)   
& Gross pension replacement rates from public and occupational pension schemes in 2013 
(percentage of earnings for average salary) (Source: OECD 2015) 
 
 
Table 4   Gross total replacement rates in Denmark for average income, 2005-2050. 
Source:  (Ministry of Social Affairs 2005, 13). 
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  Both the 2001-2002 stock market downturn and the financial crisis since 2008 have 
created severe challenges for the pension industry. Collapsing stock markets reduced the 
value of the assets of pension funds: in 2008, total assets fell in real terms by 24% on average 
in OECD countries (D’Addio and Whitehouse 2010, 127). At the same time, decreasing long-
term interest rates increased the value of the liabilities held by pension funds.  The 
combination of these developments - decreasing assets and increasing liabilities - resulted in 
many funds having severe difficulties to comply with both national and European solvency 
regulation requiring that assets and liabilities are balanced. In the Netherlands, the average 
funding ratio decreased from 151% in 1999 to 120% by the end of 2001; and in 2002 the 
reserves of many pension funds fell below the required 100% coverage rate for the first time 
(Anderson 2007, 746–47). Faced with this drastic deterioration of the financial position of 
pension funds, the pension regulator issued even tougher solvency rules such as an increase of 
the required coverage ratio to 105% (Anderson 2007, 747). In 2002, about one-third of 
pension funds were in the danger zone and had to report plans to the pension regulator to 
restore solvency (Anderson 2007, 747). Most funds had to increase their premiums, suspend 
indexation of pension rights, or both (Anderson 2007, 746). This scenario was repeated in 
2008: premiums were raised even more, despite the fact that earlier increases had already 
reached the acceptable limits; most pension funds were forced to refrain from indexing 
pensions and accruing pension rights; and for the first time several pension funds applied the 
more extreme option of lowering pension pay-outs (Eurofound 2011; IPE 2010a). On average 
retirees have experienced a decline of around 10% of their replacement rates as a 
consequence of inadequate indexation, with further decline expected (Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, 
and Nijman 2014, 7). Because many pension funds were unable to recover from their funding 
shortage within the required five years, cuts in nominal pension rights were made in 
subsequent years as well. The biggest wave of cuts in pension payments occurred in 2013, 
affecting around 5.5 million workers as well as 1.1 million retirees (Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, 
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and Nijman 2014, 6–7). About 2 million participants faced relatively large cuts of 6-7% 
(2014, 7). The actual impact is probably higher as the government allowed funds to cap cuts 
at 7% and leave the remainder for 2014. These persistent difficulties have generated both 
national and international concerns about the ability of the Dutch model to ensure secure and 
adequate pensions (European Commission 2011; IPE 2012b; Financial Times 2013; The 
Telegraph 2013).  
 
The two crises also affected Danish pension funds for the same reasons, yet in 
general “pension funds have proved able to absorb quite substantial shocks in the 
international financial markets” which suggests that “the system is quite recession-proof” (J. 
G. Andersen 2011, 205–6). While pension funds suffered substantial investment losses, up to 
10% in 2008, these were less severe than in other countries because Danish funds generally 
invest less in equities (see Figure 9). This difference in investment patterns will be accounted 
for when discussing the regulatory differences between both countries in the next section. A 
large number of institutions ended up in the warning zone with respect to their funding rate; a 
few encountered real problems and were placed under special supervision by the authorities 
(C. Andersen and Skjodt 2007, 52; Brunner, Hinz, and Rocha 2008, 25). Yet eventually all 
Danish pension funds came out of the crisis with their solvency intact, and no direct losses to 
policyholders or owners were observed (IMF 2006, 18; Sørensen and Dengsøe 2011, 3). Most 
importantly, the effects of the crisis did not translate into the same painful consequences for 
scheme members as in the Netherlands. In contrast to the Netherlands, Danish pension 
providers entered the crisis with considerable financial reserves which they used as a buffer to 
compensate for the lower investment returns (Anderson 2008, 29; J. G. Andersen 2011, 197; 
205). Using these buffers, most funds were able to provide relatively generous benefits to 
their members without having to increase contributions (Anderson 2008; IPE 2007a, 2008c, 
2008b, 2008a, 2009, 2010b, 2011). Accordingly, Danish occupational schemes have done a 
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significantly better job in providing secure and adequate pensions than the Dutch schemes 
(Sørensen and Dengsøe 2011).   
 
The seriousness of these experiences is reflected by the emergence of several 
conflicts in the Netherlands during the past decades. First, conflicts emerged between 
pensioner organisations and social partners. During the 1990s, pension funds had huge 
surpluses which have been offered to employers and workers as ‘premium holidays’ during 
which no contributions needed to be paid. Pensioners organisations initiated legal action, 
claiming a share of these profits (Anderson 2011, 746–47). This conflict only grew deeper 
during the two crises in the 2000s. Contributions aimed at reducing shortages in the funding 
ratio reached such a high level that governing boards decided to stabilise contributions, 
instead capping indexation of pension accrual as well as cutting existing pension rights 
(Anderson 2007, 746; Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, and Nijman 2014, 5). This means that 
pensioners share in the costs of adjustment (Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, and Nijman 2014, 7; 
Anderson 2008, 24). In order to defend their interests, pensioners demanded representation on 
the governing boards of pension funds - an issue that has been subject of much controversy 
given the traditional bipartite control of those boards (Anderson 2011, 310).12 Secondly, 
intense intergenerational conflicts emerged between young and old workers. Part of this 
struggle concerns the investment policy that should be followed by pension funds - while 
riskier investments are in the interest of younger generations, older generations prefer better 
protection of nominal benefits (Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, and Nijman 2014, 9). Yet the most 
publicized and contentious debate concerns the desired extent of intergenerational solidarity 
within Dutch collective pension schemes (De Telegraaf 2010a; CPB 2013, 2014; NRC 
Handelsblad 2013; Steenbeek and Lecq 2007; Trouw 2014). Currently, the use of a single 
premium and accrual rate, regardless of age, results in a one-way redistribution from younger 
to older workers. Reform is examined by several political parties who accelerated their effort 
                                                            12 In 2007, the Pension Law created clarity by requiring pension funds with at least 1000 pensioners to 
either include a pensioner representative in the administrative board, or to establish a participants 
council with advisory power (Anderson 2011, 310).  
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after an ‘explosive’ study was issued by the Central Planning Bureau in 2013 (CPB 2013; 
NRC Handelsblad 2013). Thirdly, conflicts emerged between unions and employers. The 
heavy losses in 2001 and 2002 led to collective bargaining conflicts in 2003 as employers 
tried to cut costs by adapting pension schemes (Anderson 2007, 747). More generally, 
occupational pension schemes are a particularly hot topic in collective bargaining in the 
Netherlands compared to other European countries (van het Kaar 2004). Finally, conflicts 
emerged between social partners and pension funds on the one hand, and the pension 
regulator and government on the other. Social partners and pension funds argued extensively 
for more flexibility in restoring the coverage rate during the crisis, yet the pension regulator 
didn’t budge, instead issuing tougher rules for pension scheme solvency (Anderson 2007, 
747–48). Unable to get concessions from the pension regulator, social partners turned to the 
government by speeding up the revision of the law that governs occupational pensions 
(Anderson 2007, 746–49). This politicised the regulatory conflict heavily, yet eventually the 
government decided to adopt the stance of the pension regulator. In Denmark none of these 
conflict lines materialised, at least not since the establishment of the current occupational 
pension system in 1991 (C. Andersen and Skjodt 2007; Sørensen and Dengsøe 2011; 
Trampusch et al. 2010, 14; Green-Pedersen 2007, 491). 
 
To conclude, Denmark and the Netherlands have had quite diverging experiences 
regarding private social protection during the two main crises in the 2000s. Despite providing 
more secure pension promises on paper, scheme members of Dutch funds were much less 
protected against the effects of the crisis than Danish scheme members. None of the conflicts 
that emerged in the Netherlands seem to have surfaced in Denmark. These differences cannot 
be explained by current accounts that focus on voluntary collective bargaining as source of 
private social protection; at least not without resorting to the ad hoc explanation that Dutch 
social partners happened to make worse decisions than their Danish colleagues. In the 
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following analysis, I argue that understanding these diverging experiences requires a better 
understanding of the distributional struggles that underlie collective bargaining.  
 
 
Figure 9 Pension funds' asset allocation for selected investment categories in selected 
OECD countries - 2011. Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics  
 
 
3.2 Analysis: Differences in organising collective risk-sharing  
Throughout the following analysis, I will show how Denmark and the Netherlands organise 
the distributional struggles that underlie collective risk-sharing very differently - both 
regarding pension promises and pension processes. These different organisations are to an 
important extent supported and shaped by regulatory intervention. These differences allow us 
to account for the diverging experiences with private social protection.   
 
3.2.1 Differences in organising collective risk-sharing 
First of all, Danish and Dutch occupational pension schemes differ in their dependence on 
explicit pension promises to organise pension security (see Table 5). Until recently, the 
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majority of Dutch occupational schemes specified a fixed level of promised pension benefits. 
The level of benefits is calculated as a share of the worker’s salary; generally set at a level of 
75% replacement wage after 40 years of service (including the income from the public AOW 
scheme) (Anderson 2007, 729; Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, and Nijman 2014, 3). However, in 
contrast to traditional Defined Benefit schemes, this fixed promise does not fully shield 
scheme members from market volatility. When bad financial performance threatens the 
ability to meet promised benefits, contribution levels are adjusted for all sponsors – including 
both employers and active scheme members. Repeated rises in contribution-levels have 
created pressure during the 2000s to shift away from fixed benefit levels. Benefit promises 
are still made, but are now conditional on fund solvency and hence on the pension fund’s 
performance (Anderson 2011, 307). Danish schemes, in contrast, offer very few explicit 
promises regarding the outcome in terms of benefit levels. Benefits depend on the amount of 
contributions made and investment returns, as well as on the average life expectancy for 
scheme participants (Green-Pedersen 2007, 470; J. G. Andersen 2011, 200). 13 One could thus 
state that Dutch and Danish schemes are mirroring opposites in terms of how they structure 
pension promises. Dutch schemes provide explicit and relatively high promises regarding the 
level of pension benefits, yet with the possibility of downward revisions. Danish schemes on 
the other hand provide few or no promises regarding the level of benefits, yet benefits are not 
confined to the guaranteed part. 
 
Secondly, there are important differences in how Dutch and Danish pension funds 
make decisions on when to build up financial buffers and when to use these buffers (see 
‘Pension Process’ in Table 4) How these decisions are made is agreed upon in an explicit or 
implicit pension contract (Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, and Nijman 2014). As already explained, 
                                                            13 Note that the architecture of Danish DC schemes is a bit different compared to traditional DC 
schemes (E. B. Andersen and van Dam 2008, 6; C. Andersen and Skjodt 2007, 33; Skipevag and 
Haugseng 2013, 7). Occupational schemes are organised as profit-sharing policies with a guaranteed 
minimum investment return. Apart from these guaranteed pension benefits, the remainder of payments 
is conditional on performance. However, the guaranteed benefit is relatively low and most schemes are 
reducing and even eliminating this level since the 1990s (Brunner, Hinz, and Rocha 2008, 6–7; IPE 
2012a; Skipevag and Haugseng 2013, 25–26). 
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Dutch schemes have an explicit pension promise. Yet when investment returns are more than 
required for outstanding liabilities, it is not specified how exactly the ownership of these 
surpluses is organised. Governing boards of pension funds traditionally possessed substantial 
discretion in redistributing resources across stakeholders (Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, and Nijman 
2014, 8; Anderson 2008, 22, 2011, 309–10). Not only do they decide what to do with the 
surpluses that arise when investment returns exceed the amount needed to cover liabilities, 
they also make the decisions on how to raise contributions to bridge mismatches between 
assets and liabilities during investment shortfalls (Turner 2014, 11). Where pension contracts 
in the Netherlands lack ex ante transparency regarding the ownership of surpluses and deficits 
(Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, and Nijman 2014, 8; Anderson 2008),  pension contracts in Denmark 
are considered ‘complete’ (E. B. Andersen and van Dam 2008; Anderson 2008). As 
explained, Danish schemes only guarantee a low level of benefits, with the remainder of 
payments conditional on investment performance. Yet different from the Netherlands, the 
rules for the distribution of these bonuses are explicitly formulated and play a central part in 
the functioning of the system (E. B. Andersen and van Dam 2008, 15). Both the distribution 
between different contributors (such as companies and workers) is specified (‘calculated 
contribution principle’), as well as the distribution among policyholders over time 
(‘distributed contribution principle’) (E. B. Andersen and van Dam 2008, 15–16). These rules 
not only allocate bonuses to policyholders, but also ensure that a financial buffer is built up 
that can be used to help weather financial turbulence (Anderson 2008, 29).   
 
 Pension Promise Pension Process 
Denmark Flexible (towards DC) Strict (Pre-set rules) 
The Netherlands Strict (towards DB) Flexible (Discretion) 
 
Table 5   Organisational characteristics of collective risk-sharing in Denmark and the 
Netherlands 
 
We can conclude that Denmark and the Netherlands have opposing characteristics as 
to how they organise the distribution of risks within collective schemes (see Table 5; based on 
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the general framework in Table 4). Dutch funds have clear and explicit pension promises, 
even though they can be revised downwards. As there are no complete contracts regarding 
risk-sharing, governing boards of Dutch pension schemes have significant discretion over 
these decisions. In contrast, Danish pension funds make little or no promises, yet decisions 
regarding surpluses and benefits are governed by clear and transparent rules. 
 
3.2.2 Organisational differences can account for diverging experiences 
So why did Dutch and Danish pension schemes have very different experiences in terms of 
their ability to weather out the crises of the 2000s? Did Dutch social partners simply make 
worse decisions than their Danish colleagues? In what follows I argue that different 
experiences are better explained by the presence of different governance rules; in particular 
the absence of clear and pre-determined agreement in the Netherlands on how to deal with 
distributional conflicts. 
 
First, during the 1990s the lack of clarity over who owned the surpluses created 
incentives to pocket the profits rather than holding them as reserves (Anderson 2008). While 
this benefited contributors at that time (both employers and unions received ‘premium 
holidays’ during which they had to pay no contributions), it sparked the upsurge in pensioner 
organisations who demanded a share in the profits (Anderson 2007, 747). During the crisis, 
this conflict extended to the question whether retirees should also share responsibility in 
shouldering risk by providing capital (in the form of skipping indexation and even cuts in 
nominal benefits) (Bovenberg, Mehlkopf, and Nijman 2014, 5). The importance of the 
governing board in making these decisions explains why representation is such an important 
demand for pensioner organisations.  
 
At this point, it is also clear why Dutch scheme members suffered more during the 
crisis than Danish scheme members. While Denmark entered the crisis with significant 
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reserves and more flexible promises, in the Netherlands financial buffers turned out to be 
insufficient to match investment losses in order to pay for the promised annuities. In order to 
restore solvency, Dutch schemes were required to strongly increase contributions. These 
contribution hikes soon reached their acceptable limits, both for workers and companies as 
sponsors. As companies were no longer willing to underwrite risks, they renegotiated pension 
schemes in a way that allowed them to reduce their exposure (for example by making 
indexation conditional on fund solvency) (Bovenberg 2007, 447). This prompted severe 
industrial conflicts as unions protested against this retreat of employers as external risk 
sponsors. Similar conflicts are avoided in Denmark because the responsibility of employers in 
terms of sharing in burden and benefits is well-defined. 
 
Finally, the lack of transparent agreements creates ambiguity about how much 
solidarity is desirable across generations. The current organisation of Dutch pension funds is 
built on an implicit agreement between generations wherein younger generations help to 
support older generations (CPB 2013, 2; Steenbeek and Lecq 2007).14 In practice this works 
via the legal requirement that each worker, regardless of age or other personal characteristics, 
pays the same premium and accrual rate (‘doorsneepremie’). While this feature helped with 
speeding up the accumulation of pension schemes during the 1950s, it is now accused of 
resulting in a one-way redistribution from young to old (NRC Handelsblad 2013; CPB 2014). 
One reason is demographic change (fewer workers have to support more pensioners); the 
other reason is a changing labour market characterised by increasing probability of 
interrupted contribution periods (young workers are more likely to go through spells of 
unemployment or periods where they are self-employed). This has resulted in a wide public 
debate on how much intergenerational solidarity is desirable (CPB 2014; NRC Handelsblad 
2013; Steenbeek and Lecq 2007; De Telegraaf 2010a). Such solidarity between generations is 
                                                            14 Concretely, this works via the legal requirement that each worker, regardless of age or other 
personal characteristics, pays the same premium and accrual rate (‘doorsneepremie’). Redistribution 
results from the fact that this doesn’t take into account the individual differences in investment 
horizons. (CPB 2013).  
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“simply not part of the bargain” in Denmark (Sørensen and Dengsøe 2011, 4). The 
contribution principle clearly stipulates that “any client should be rewarded proportional to 
his contribution”, with the implication that “all generations are treated the same in terms of 
the distribution of returns to investments, indexation of benefits, etc.” (Sørensen and Dengsøe 
2011, 4).    
 
3.2.3 Regulatory underpinnings of organisational differences 
Regulatory frameworks play a crucial role in creating and underpinning the very rules that 
govern collective risk-sharing arrangements. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
fully investigate the origins of organisational differences between Denmark and the 
Netherlands, the following shows how regulatory frameworks shape and embed distributional 
conflicts.  
 
First it should be noted that the Dutch and Danish occupational pension systems 
developed in a very different time and context. Whereas the Dutch occupational pension 
system has developed over a very long period, the expansion of Danish occupational schemes 
was introduced more recently and through a deliberate process. Occupational pensions in the 
Netherlands already covered around two out of three Dutch workers by 1953 (Anderson 2007, 
725; Whiteside 2006, 47). Coverage further expanded to more than 90 percent of the working 
population by the 1990s, supported by a law that permits the Ministry of Social Affairs to 
require all firms within an entire sector to participate in the same pension fund – even if they 
do not participate in the collective agreement (Anderson 2007, 728). Throughout this whole 
process, social partners had considerable freedom to negotiate the details of these collective 
agreements and jealously guarded this prerogative (Anderson 2007, 728). Such discretion 
matters because occupational pensions are explicitly considered as an instrument of wage 
policy, requiring freedom over setting benefits and contributions (Anderson 2007, 725). Apart 
from wage negotiations, sectoral pension funds traditionally played an important role in 
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providing finance to promoting investment in infrastructure (Whiteside 2006, 47). In contrast 
to the deeply rooted occupational system in the Netherlands, Danish funded occupational 
pensions covered only about one-fifth of the labour force by the early 1980s (Green-Pedersen 
2007, 479). Low coverage was considered to constitute a ‘pensions problem’, as the state 
“considered the large number of people living on only the national pension and the ATP as a 
social problem, and as a factor that could force the government into raising the national 
pension” (Green-Pedersen 2007, 480). Hence occupational expansion was pursued because 
both unions and governments had a stake in broader coverage (which would also bring 
macro-economic benefits for the government), “not because the groups with insufficient 
coverage put pressure on the government or the [trade unions] to find a solution” (Green-
Pedersen 2007, 480). Following several years of negotiations – during which the government 
insisted that expansion should be organised through collective agreements rather than 
legislation – social partners yielded during the 1991 collective bargaining round (Green-
Pedersen 2007, 480–84). So in contrast to the extensive historical ‘baggage’ of Dutch 
occupational pensions, the Danish system is quite purposefully designed in a more recent 
context.    
 
Keeping this historical background in mind, the following presents the main 
regulatory differences that play a role in underpinning the organizational differences 
discussed earlier. The explicit pension promise in the Netherlands follows from a long-
standing coupling between public and occupational pensions around the official target 
replacement rate of 70% (Schols-van Oppen 2009, 56). When public AOW pensions were 
reduced in the 1990s, occupational pensions had to bridge this gap (Anderson 2007, 743). In 
Denmark, such explicit demands regarding occupational provision adequacy levels never 
developed, resulting in low need for explicit promises (Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 2006; 
Green-Pedersen 2007). It can be argued that providing guaranteed pensions in the 
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Netherlands requires substantial discretion of governing boards.15 Conversely, it can be 
suggested that Danish flexibility in promises had to be compensated by stricter agreements on 
how to manage pension accumulation and its related risks. Using the language from the 
general framework presented in Table 4: a strict pension promise requires flexibility in the 
pension process, whereas flexible promises require a more strict process. There are strong 
indications that in both countries the state plays an important role in supporting these 
respective pension contracts with accompanying regulation.  
 
While Dutch funds have to achieve pre-specified promises, investment regulation 
gives pension funds much flexibility with respect to their investment strategy in order to 
achieve the required returns. Danish pension institutions, in contrast, are subject to strict 
investment regulation and strict surveillance (J. G. Andersen 2011, 206; Ministry of Social 
Affairs 2002). 16  Regarding the explicit rules in Denmark for building and distributing 
financial buffers mentioned earlier, pension funds are “subject to a legal requirement to 
respect the overall objective of fairness in relation to policyholders” (C. Andersen and Skjodt 
2007, 33).17 Pension institutions are required to notify their policy for allocation between 
owners and policyholders to the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanstilsynet), 
which has the power to review and disallow them if it finds them unfair or imprudent (E. B. 
Andersen and van Dam 2008, 9; C. Andersen and Skjodt 2007, 32; Helles 2012, 13). Also the 
accounting rules support the transparency of these agreements as it ‘prevents gains and losses 
from being hidden and reveals the underlying risk profile of the different contracts’ (C. 
Andersen and Skjodt 2007, 66). The Danish legal system thus plays an important role in 
                                                            15 This trade-off was visible during the crisis when pension funds required more flexibility in restoring 
solvency requirements in order to prevent painful benefit adjustments.  16 Among countries that build heavily on pre-funded supplementary provision (Ireland, UK, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark), Denmark is the only country that applies quantitative 
restrictions rather than the more flexible ‘prudent person’ principle (Haverland 2007, 889).   17 This was achieved by modifying the existing Insurance Act from 1959 (Helles 2012, 12). During a 
review in 1989, a provision was introduced (§30) that obliges companies to set rules for calculating and 
allocating profits to the policyholder and others entitled to the insurance contract. During the 
subsequent years, this requirement was repeatedly specified with the aim to improve clarity and 
fairness (Helles 2012, 12–14).  
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supporting the explicit pension contracts; whereas the Dutch system leaves the pension 
contract to the discretion of pension boards, while embedding the explicit pension promise. 
 
Regulatory frameworks do not only play a historic role by embedding existing 
governance rules, they continue to shape the decisions made by social partners. This is most 
clearly visible in the current revisions initiated by the Dutch government in light of the 
disappointed promises and painful experiences of the recent years. Confronted with the 
failure of pension funds to stick to the capital requirements necessary to uphold promises 
without ever-increasing contribution levels, the government initiated a large-scale review of 
‘pension fund troubles’ (Rijksoverheid 2009). Initially, the government proposed a “new 
pension contract” that aimed to replace the current strict ‘nominal’ pension promises with a 
variable ‘real’ promise (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2010, 2013b, 
2013c; Kapelle and Bovenberg 2012). At the same time, this new contract would be based on 
explicit and pre-set mechanisms that specify how risks should be distributed (this by adjusting 
the relevant financial regulatory framework to meet these requirements) (Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013a). However, the government softened its proposal to 
shift away from fixed promises following critical feedback during a public consultation; 
unions in particular resisted a shift towards abandoning fixed promises. Subsequently the 
government has proposed several possible models (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid 2015, 2016). While a final decision is not yet taken at the time of writing, 
social partners are moving towards a compromise based on mandatory ‘personal pensions’ 
with clear property rights, combined with substantial risk-sharing through a collective 
financial buffer with explicit rules on how to deal with surpluses and deficits (NRC 
Handelsblad 2017). While unions remain reluctant to move forward without explicit support 
from their base, the minister of social affairs is pushing them by threatening to enforce reform 
if they do not decide (Financieel Dagblad 2017). These developments show the difficulties of 
shifting the organisation of collective risk-sharing arrangements towards a system based on 
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well-defined governance of the process, rather than on well-defined promises: it requires 
social partners to accept restrictions in their discretion with regard to the management of 
occupational schemes, while at the same time they have to accept more flexibility in terms of 
both contributions and benefit levels. It also illustrates how governments continue to play an 
important role in organising collective risk-sharing by adjusting the wider regulatory 
framework.  
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4. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper focused on collective risk-sharing arrangements as a strategy to provide security 
against financial risks within private pension systems. An analytical framework was 
developed in order to explain which factors are important for the viability of collective risk-
sharing. In contrast to earlier accounts focusing on social partner voluntarism, this paper 
stresses the role of the governance framework of pension funds in managing the distributional 
struggles that underlie collective risk-sharing. Such governance framework specifies the way 
pension funds make decisions on how to share risks between one group and another. A 
distinction is made between two important elements of pension fund governance: the 
organisation of decisions regarding the promised pension outcome on the one hand, and of 
decisions regarding the process of achieving a certain outcome on the other hand. 
Furthermore, this paper showed how states continue to play a crucial role by designing and 
readjusting regulatory frameworks that enforce those governance rules. To support this 
argument, this paper used the proposed analytical framework to explain diverging experiences 
in Denmark and the Netherlands during the two crises in the 2000s. Dutch schemes arguably 
made explicit pension promises, but left distributional decisions to the discretion of governing 
boards. This created incentives to pocket investment surpluses, left them badly prepared for 
the crisis and sparked distributional conflicts. Danish schemes made few pension promises 
but had clear rules on how to deal with surpluses and deficits. This prevented a similar 
scenario. 
 
To come back to the original question, what does the proposed analytical framework 
imply for the prospects of political ambitions to use collective risk-sharing as a way to 
provide more security within private pension provision? Rather than fixing benefits (as in 
pure DB) or fixing contributions (as in pure DC), the proposed hybrid forms of scheme design 
share characteristics of both DB and DC schemes (Blommestein et al. 2009). This political 
interest in hybrid forms of private pension schemes follows from the growing disappointment 
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with both pure DB and pure DC schemes (Turner 2014). The problem with both scheme 
designs is that they allocate responsibility for financial volatility exclusively with one actor – 
respectively the employer or the individual worker – while neither is prepared or capable to 
take on full responsibility. Accordingly, the success of hybrid schemes depends on the 
acceptance of these new risk-sharing arrangements between workers and employers, as well 
as those between workers collectively.  
 
Traditional approaches argue that social partners are the key actors in sorting out 
these arrangements; suggesting that states can do relatively little to promote private social 
protection in countries that cannot rely on well-organised and willing social partners. In 
contrast, this paper stresses the crucial role of states: governments have to design and 
maintain a regulatory framework that constrains decisions (be it to honour promises or 
process rules) in order to create the necessary trust to overcome distributional conflicts. In 
fact, leaving social partners with too much discretion is likely to result in breakdown of 
collective risk-sharing (exemplified by the prevalence of ‘contribution holidays’ in many 
countries, not just the Netherlands).  
 
This analytical framework helps us to explain the difficulties of organising private 
provision in other mature welfare states. In what follows I briefly contrast two recent efforts 
to introduce collective risk-sharing schemes, in the UK and in New Brunswick (CA) 
respectively with only the latter being successful. In 2012 the British government initiated an 
investigation into “Defined Ambition” schemes in an effort to create “greater certainty for 
members than a DC pension about the final value of their pension pot and less cost volatility 
for employers than a DB pension” (Thurley 2014, 5; Department for Work and Pensions 
2012). This resulted in the introduction of a legal framework (the 2015 Pensions Schemes 
Act), which provides for schemes organised on basis of ‘collective benefits’ where risks are 
shared among group members and a flexible ‘target’ benefit level. However, plans to promote 
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such CDC plans are currently put on hold; this given concerns that people in the UK are not 
ready to accept more flexibility in terms of both contributions and benefits (Financial Times 
2014b). The case of the province of New Brunswick in Canada is very interesting in this 
respect; this because it is the first jurisdiction in North America that managed to introduce a 
‘target benefit’ plan that includes comprehensive risk-sharing arrangements (Munnell and 
Sass 2013; Government of New Brunswick 2013). Interestingly, the New Brunswick plan 
combines flexible promises with a fixed process as to how outcomes should be achieved (to 
use the framework introduced in this paper). The plan guarantees base benefits, but additional 
benefits only when allowed by the plans financial condition. Yet risks are shared according to 
a well-specified sequence of actions that should be taken in response to changes in the 
financial condition of the scheme. However, this reform did not go uncontested, with unions 
resisting the shift towards a target benefit model as it would abolish fixed promises (CBC 
News 2013; Financial Post 2014). The main reason why unions eventually conceded, is that 
they accepted that this scheme would provide a more transparent way of reducing benefits 
during crises than the current system (CBC News 2013; Munnell and Sass 2013, 4). This brief 
comparison between both cases confirms the importance of creating trust for the success of 
collective risk-sharing; trust that is itself based on the introduction of a set of “protocols for 
responding to changes in the plan’s financial condition: how to increase contributions, change 
asset allocations, and reduce benefits in response to funding deficits; and how to reduce 
contributions, change asset allocations, and restore benefits, including restoring previous 
benefit reductions, and grant ancillary benefits when the plan’s financial condition improves.” 
(Munnell and Sass 2013, 2).  
 
This paper has focused on issues regarding the maintenance of collective risk-sharing 
arrangements, rather than on explaining their origin. Social partners have played an 
undeniably important role in initiating risk-sharing arrangements in Denmark and the 
Netherlands. Not only are unions very effective in creating the necessary scale for these 
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arrangements; they also play an important role in cultivating legitimacy and trust in these new 
schemes among their members. Nevertheless, this paper has shown that the ability of social 
partners to organise sustainable risk-sharing arrangements on their own capacity is very 
limited in the context of systemic crises. The argument that limiting social partner discretion 
is a necessary condition for viable collective risk-sharing clarifies why this is such a political 
challenge in many countries: convincing stakeholders to accept more flexibility while giving 
up discretion over contributions and benefits is no easy task.      
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PAPER 3 
 
 
COUNTERING FINANCIAL INTERESTS FOR SOCIAL PURPOSES: 
WHAT DRIVES STATE INTERVENTION IN PENSION MARKETS 
IN THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIALIZATION? 
 
 
1. Regulatory politics when financial and social interests are in conflict 
Welfare privatization generally increases the dependence of households on investment in 
financial welfare products to protect themselves against the uncertainties of life  (Martin 
2002; van der Zwan 2014). Private providers of these products have played an important role 
in promoting financialization of welfare provision, with pension policy as a prominent 
example (Hacker 2002; Naczyk 2013). However, welfare financialization creates new 
conflicts between the social objectives of households and the commercial interests of the 
financial sector. Returns on financial investments need to be shared between households and 
commercial providers: higher profit margins for the latter mean fewer resources dedicated to 
social objectives such as old age income security. While some scholars are optimistic about 
the ability of financialization to ‘emancipate’ individuals that were previously excluded from 
participating in financial markets  (see discussion in Erturk et al. 2007), others anticipate a 
less benign outcome where private providers manage to reap much of the return on 
investment at the expense of beneficiaries (e.g. Blake, Harrison, and Dowd 2014).  
Shaping and correcting financial welfare markets can play an important role in 
tipping these distributional struggles in favour of households (Schelkle 2012). Especially in 
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the past few years, there has been a tendency towards stricter regulatory interventions in 
private pension markets (Sier 2016). Yet governments do not seem to come down clearly on 
either side of the fence: while policymakers do not give free rein to financial actors, efforts to 
constrain financial firms in order to promote social objectives are often hesitant and limited in 
scope. Such interventions to improve social outcomes in the private welfare sphere are indeed 
not self-evident when they are resisted by well-organised private pension providers, often 
without clear electoral reward due to the complexity of these measures (Hacker 2002). Hence 
in order to develop a better understanding of the dynamics that shape the outcome of welfare 
financialization, we need to ask what drives these regulatory interventions that go against the 
interests of the financial sector.  
 
 This paper argues that we have to pay more attention to the state as an autonomous 
actor, playing an independent role in shaping financialization on basis of its own interests. In 
doing so, it proposes to shift our analytical attention away from more traditional approaches 
that understand policy interventions as a response to electoral pressure or the waning 
influence of financial actors. Rather than analysing states as ‘transmission belts’ that translate 
pressure into decision, this paper argues that fiscally constrained governments have their own 
stake in the outcome of welfare financialization: the long-term viability of private pension 
provision prevents re-emerging pressure on public provision. This means that decisions to 
intervene in pension markets are not so much steered by demands of voters or organised 
interests, but rather by policymakers’ assessment of whether intervention promotes their own 
objective or not. More specifically, this paper argues that interventions actively aim at 
balancing both the social and commercial viability of private pension provision. Existing 
efforts to explore the welfare-finance nexus tend to focus predominantly on the financial 
consequences of social policies (Estévez-Abe 2001; Ebbinghaus and Manow 2001; more 
recently revived by Naczyk 2013); whereas this paper explores more explicitly the interaction 
between social and financial considerations. By providing a more nuanced understanding of 
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how governments shape financialization, this paper addresses the broader concern that “the 
role of the state remains underdeveloped in this body of scholarly work” (van der Zwan 2014, 
113). 
 
In order to support the argument that interventions that counter interests of financial 
welfare providers are driven by the independent objectives of policymakers, rather than 
pressure from voters or organized interests, this paper investigates a least-likely case of such 
interventions: namely the puzzling shift in the UK over the past two decades towards stricter 
regulation of private pension providers. The Pensions Act 2014 introduced a far-reaching 
legislative framework that imposes new constraints on pension providers, including stricter 
reporting requirements and an unprecedented charge cap limiting the annual management 
charges on a large number of private schemes. This is a significant achievement given the 
well-organised financial sector in the UK; certainly when compared to the failure of similar 
efforts to bring down charges only one decade earlier. The introduction of a charge cap on 
regulated products in the early 2000s was eventually watered down following intense industry 
lobbying. Even more remarkable is the fact that it was a Labour-led government that backed 
down to industry pressure in 2004, whereas the recent regulatory push is preceded by a 
coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. This paper argues that this regulatory shift 
cannot be accounted for by an increase in political salience or reduced influence of the 
financial sector in the wake of the financial crisis. Instead it shows how the shift reflects a 
different assessment by policymakers in both governments as to whether stricter intervention 
promotes their shared objective of expanding private pension savings. The analysis is based 
on qualitative text analysis of the relevant parliamentary debates (identified using Hansard18), 
as well as secondary sources such as press articles (identified using Nexus19), surveys and 
other publicly available sources. Additional interviews have been conducted with 
                                                            18 Hansard search query: “pension” AND “charges”; complemented with targeted reading of the 
relevant Special Reports by the Treasury Committee as well as the Work and Pensions Committee 
(analysed all results since 2010; targeted analysis for earlier years). 19 Nexus search query: “pensions” AND “charges” – In headline & lead paragraphs – UK National 
Newspapers (analysed all results since 1999). 
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stakeholders who were directly involved in the negotiation process and representative of both 
the pensions industry and transparency advocates.20 
 
 This state-centric approach to studying intervention in private pension markets has 
several implications for how we understand the dynamics of shaping welfare financialization. 
First, this approach suggests that we should pay more attention to how policymakers try to 
steer the actions of private actors in order to promote their own objectives. Secondly, it shows 
that the financial crisis did not create problems but merely intensified existing challenges. 
Finally, it suggests that the politics of regulating private welfare provision are characterised 
by a continuous negotiation between legislators and industry. Overall, this paper expects that 
all regulatory outcomes will eventually reflect a negotiated balance between commercial 
viability on the one hand, and social-political viability on the other.  
 
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The first two sections focus on 
reviewing the relevant literature and presenting the proposed argument to explain state 
interventions in the context of welfare financialization. The subsequent section explains the 
puzzling shift in the UK towards stricter regulation on basis of the proposed state-centric 
argument. The fourth section evaluates alternative explanations based on shifts in political 
salience and organised interest mobilisation, showing that these alternatives do not withstand 
closer scrutiny. In the conclusions, I discuss how this state-centric approach to studying 
intervention in private pension markets applies to countries other than the UK, as well as the 
wider implications for how we understand the dynamics of shaping welfare financialization.  
 
                                                            20  Selection of relevant stakeholders is based on the names that featured most prominently in 
parliamentary debates and oral evidence sessions by the Work and Pensions Committee: (1) 
Representing transparency-advocates: Andy Agathangelou (Director Transparency Task Force; 15-08-
2018); David Pitt-Watson (Tomorrow’s Investor project leader; 21-08-2018); Christopher Sier 
(Financial Services Consumer Panel; 24-08-2018); Dominic Lindley (Which?; email correspondence). 
(2) Representing pensions industry associations: Daniel Godfrey (Investment Management 
Association; 30-08-2018).  (3) Exploratory interviews: Chris Curry (Direction Pensions Policy 
Institute; 23-03-2017); Gregg McClymont MP (Shadow Pensions Minister; 04-07-2017). 
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2. Established explanations for state intervention in financial welfare markets 
Market failures feature prominently in explanations for state intervention in financial markets 
(for an overview see Moloney 2010). Markets for financial welfare services are indeed 
characterised by several important market-failures, in particular information asymmetries 
(Barr 2012b, 209). Most people do not understand the basic financial concepts that are 
required to make good decisions (Mitchell and Lusardi 2011). Complexity in financial 
products means that “some people end up with high-cost options because they lack the 
necessary information or capacity to make good choices.” (Barr 2012b, 210). Furthermore, 
most people do not shop around to find the best deal, which hinders competition on which 
markets depend to drive prices down (Pitt-Watson and Mann 2012b). Nonetheless, keeping in 
mind that the main problems of private pension costs were well understood since the 1990s 
(see for example Orszag and Stiglitz 2001; Whitehouse 2001), market failure as such cannot 
account for variation in the timing and scope of interventions.  
 
 A widespread political-economy explanation for variation in state intervention refers 
to the ability of industry to shape regulations to serve its special interests. The theoretical 
argument that policymakers will prioritise narrow, specific interests over those of the public 
at large has been made under several monikers, including the “logic of collective action” 
(Olson 1965), the “privileged position of business” (Lindblom 1977), and “regulatory capture 
(Stigler 1971; Posner 1974; Peltzman 1976). The basic argument is that it is easier and less 
costly for a smaller group with high stakes in the outcome to mobilise and influence 
regulatory decisions, than it is for larger groups with smaller stakes. Business groups in 
particular are well-positioned to ensure that their preferences are reflected in regulatory 
decisions. Not only does business possess structural and instrumental power over elected 
politicians (Lindblom 1977; Hacker and Pierson 2002; Culpepper 2015); special interests can 
also ‘capture’ regulators and administrators on basis of their industrial expertise or by 
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offering the prospect of attractive career opportunities (for recent reviews, see Bó 2006; 
Etzioni 2009). 
  
Nevertheless, the ability of welfare providers to influence policy-decisions is 
restricted by the responsiveness of policymakers to electoral pressure (Gingrich 2011; 
Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). Culpepper has argued that capture by special interest 
groups is more likely when the ‘political salience’ of the issue at stake is lower – meaning 
that decisions are not likely to affect voters’ behaviour (Culpepper 2010). When voters do 
care about decisions, decision-makers also take public opinion into account; reducing the 
scope for business to exert their influence on basis of their expertise or strategic 
communication of structural importance.  
  
In conclusion, to explain state interventions in financial welfare markets, past 
scholarship suggests that we have to look at the relative strength of organised interest groups, 
as well as the level of political salience. Accordingly, the puzzling shift in the UK should be 
explained by higher willingness of voters to punish and reward the government on basis of 
introducing stricter intervention; or by changes in the relative influence of organised interests 
(such as declining influence of the financial sector). However, as I will show in the empirical 
section, these hypotheses do not seem to be supported by observation.  
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3. Towards a better explanation: bringing the state back in 
This paper argues that established frameworks have important limitations when trying to 
account for what drives governments to intervene in financial welfare markets. As discussed, 
most prevalent accounts share a focus on how policymakers respond to ‘external pressure’ – 
be it electoral pressure or that of organised interest groups. By reducing the role of 
policymakers to that of a transmission belt – translating pressure into decisions – prevailing 
approaches fail to detect the importance of the state as an independent actor. In contrast, this 
paper claims that governments play a key role in shaping the distributional conflict between 
households and financial providers.  
 
This critique is not new; it goes back to the broader research agenda aimed at 
‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 2008). This 
approach starts from recognising that states are “autonomous actors” who “formulate and 
pursue goals that are not simply reflexive of the demands or interests of social groups, 
classes, or society” (Skocpol 1985, 9). Also recent studies of welfare reforms have recognised 
a more prominent role for policymakers, stressing their capacity to steer reforms in their 
preferred direction (for example through “electoral engineering”, see Häusermann 2010). 
Other scholars focus on how governments are actively involved in creating and shaping 
welfare markets through regulations, in contrast to their traditional role of correcting markets 
(Gingrich 2011; Schelkle 2012; Mabbett 2012; Whiteside 2006).  
 
This paper builds on these efforts to argue that governments play an autonomous role 
in shaping welfare financialization in order to promote their independent interests. Rather 
than making far-reaching ex ante assumptions as to what drives policymakers, I argue that 
specifying those interests is ultimately an empirical matter. In the context of welfare 
financialization, this paper suggests that governments are interested in promoting the success 
of private welfare provision as a viable alternative to public provision (see also Mabbett 2012; 
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Leisering 2011; Ebbinghaus and Whiteside 2012; Trampusch 2018). Failure to deliver a 
politically stable distribution of pension benefits creates the threat that public provision will 
have to step back in at some point. This concern is clearly formulated by Adair Turner: “The 
increasing inequality of pension provision will create major social stress; and those who lose 
out are likely to lobby and vote for ad hoc rather than intelligently planned changes to the 
state system, and will be a powerful political force given the increasing proportion of elderly 
people in the population.” (Pensions Commission 2004, 170). Hence governments have a 
clear stake in the long-term success and stability of private welfare provision. This objective 
cannot be reduced to the interests of voters (Labour in particular had to resist strong calls to 
increase the state pension instead), or to those of financial welfare providers (whose support 
for expanding private welfare is conditional upon commercial viability). Whereas the 
traditional policymakers in state-centric approaches are administrators and experts (see for 
example Heclo 1974), this paper claims that also elected politicians can share these long-term 
government goals.  
 
Arguing that policymakers’ decisions are guided by their own objective to promote 
the long-term viability of private welfare provision does not mean that policymakers act in 
isolation from electoral feedback or industry pressure. While policymakers take re-election 
prospects and cooperation by financial actors into account, this still leaves them with 
considerable discretion in terms of whether and how to intervene. Interventions in financial 
welfare markets depends on the assessment of policymakers as to whether such intervention 
promotes or hinders the achievement of long-term stability of private provision; rather than 
on their responsiveness to electoral feedback or pressure by mobilised interest groups. In the 
UK case, both governments shared the same objective to expand private savings, yet the 
policy strategy to achieve this had changed. It was this different policy approach that 
prompted a different assessment as to whether stricter intervention is necessary; not an 
increase in willingness to go against industry interests or to promote private savings. In 
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conclusion, this paper argues that governments play a key role in shaping welfare 
financialization and accompanying distributional struggles. 
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4. A state-centric approach to explaining the puzzling shift towards stricter 
regulations of pension costs in the UK 
Private pension costs is an old issue that has concerned observers and policymakers since the 
1990s (see for example Barr 2002; Freeman and Brown 2006; Orszag 1999; Orszag and 
Stiglitz 2001; Whitehouse 2001). While the provision of financial vehicles and related 
services is never without costs, it is crucial for beneficiaries to keep those costs as low as 
necessary. A small increase in fees compounds into substantial reductions in overall savings 
over the years. A Dutch regulator has calculated that reducing costs with 0.25 percentage 
points results in a 7.5% increase in pension asset value over a 40 year term (AFM 2011, 4). 
Others have shown that, as a rough rule of thumb, each percentage point increase in the total 
expense ratio leads to a fall in the expected replacement ratio at retirement of about 20% 
(Blake, Harrison, and Dowd 2014, 48). They point out that while “the investment strategy has 
an important impact on member outcomes, it is much less important than the impact of 
charges.” (Blake, Harrison, and Dowd 2014, 48). 
 
Regulatory intervention could significantly reduce the cost of private welfare 
provision, yet tends to be strongly resisted by financial actors. These firms generally oppose 
far-reaching intervention; not just because complying and reporting is costly, but also because 
the lack of transparency allows them to inflate charges and sneak in ‘hidden’ costs (see for 
example Financial Times 2016a, 2016b). While we expect significant resistance against 
regulatory interventions, such interventions do not necessarily translate into clear electoral 
rewards. First of all, envisaged reforms are hardly spectacular. Yearly costs of 1.5% do not 
sound upsettingly high, and reducing costs by 0.25% isn’t likely to get many people excited. 
Secondly, rewards can be high but are located in the future and not clearly visible. Even if 
cost-reduction results in extra savings, people will not receive a big cheque at a certain point 
in time. Instead these extra savings will incrementally accrue over a very long period of time 
(most will not even realise). Thirdly, as with most private pension reforms, proposals are 
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technical, boring and difficult to explain. Especially because policy-makers have to be careful 
not to propagate that lower costs are always better (to some extent extra costs can mean extra 
value; plus it risks making people angry about the millions of pounds unavoidably going to 
financial firms). 
 
In line with these expectations, efforts to bring down costs of private pensions have 
been rather unsuccessful until recently. Earlier efforts by Labour to bring down charges for 
asset management – for example by introducing a 1% charge cap for Stakeholder Pensions in 
the early 2000s – were eventually watered down following intense industry lobbying; 
resulting in a much more generous cap of 1.5% (IPE 2006; Harrison, Blake, and Dowd 2012, 
18). Yet one decade later, the Conservative-led coalition government managed to introduce a 
new legislative framework that includes, among other measures, a charge cap of 0.75% for 
the new regulated schemes – limiting fees even more than the cap that was initially defeated 
by the industry. How can we explain the puzzling shift in the UK towards stricter regulatory 
intervention that actively goes against industry interests in order to improve social outcomes, 
given the unsuccessful attempts less than a decade earlier?  
  
4.1 Why did Labour relax regulations in 2004? 
Since the early 1980s, subsequent governments in the UK did much effort to keep public 
pension provision at a minimum; leaving the task to achieve adequate pensions to voluntary 
initiative within markets (Esping-Andersen 1990; Moran and Schulze 2007). However, 
persistently low levels of private savings were increasingly perceived to be problematic. After 
returning to power in 1997, Labour assessed that low and even middle-income earners who 
do not have access to occupational pensions will not have pension benefits above the 
minimum income level, leaving up to a third of future pensioners facing poverty (Secretary of 
State for Social Security 1998, 1). At the same time, Labour refused to increase public 
provision as doing so was considered to be unaffordable (Secretary of State for Social 
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Security 1998, 30). This established the background for new reform initiatives aimed at 
promoting private pension savings. At that point, analysts were convinced that people did not 
save because there was no attractive savings product available (interview with Chris Curry – 
director of the Pensions Policy Institute – who then worked on this problem at the Department 
for Work and Pensions). The solution was to introduce a regulated low-cost product that is 
sufficiently appealing to buy on a voluntary basis: the Stakeholder Pension. A key 
characteristic of this product was the 1% charge cap to keep costs low. However, this 
initiative failed to achieve its objective to expand coverage of lower income households 
(Pensions Commission 2005, 48). The government initiated a review of the retail savings 
industry – led by Ron Sandler – in order to investigate why Britons were not saving enough 
and to propose solutions (HM Treasury 2002). This review resulted in a revision of the 
regulatory framework for the existing Stakeholder products (HM Treasury and DWP 2003). 
 
The revision of the initial Stakeholder Product opened up a window of opportunity 
for the pension industry to get rid of the charge cap on regulated products. The industry had 
been strongly critical of these constraints, judging them too stringent to make selling the 
product worthwhile (House of Commons Library 2001, 15; ABI 2002a). At that point, the 
industry was not in a comfortable position to convince the government. Not only did Sandler 
unambiguously advise the government to stick to the 1% price cap (HM Treasury 2002, 23), 
the Treasury itself strongly insisted on maintaining the price cap – stating that “the 
Government has a high threshold for persuasion for moving from a flat 1% charge” (HM 
Treasury and DWP 2003, 19). Nevertheless, following two years of intense lobbying, the 
Treasury dropped its insistence on the charge cap and decided to relax the cap to 1.5% 
(Financial Times 2004b). While consumer representatives decried the decision, 
representatives of the life insurance industry welcomed the news – saying they were 
encouraged that the Treasury had listened to their concerns during the consultations (The 
Independent 2004; The Guardian 2004b).   
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 Why did the Treasury eventually give in to pressure from the life insurance industry? 
All evidence strongly indicates that the government caved in because it feared that sticking to 
the cap would result in certain failure of its strategy to expand private savings; this for the 
simple reason that the pension industry would not sell the regulated products. The Association 
of British Insurers made very clear to the government that doing so would be “unprofitable” 
(Work and Pensions Committee 2003, 57), while big insurers were already reported to have 
gone on a "seller's strike" (The Guardian 2002d). In the words of Francis McGee, the 
Association of British Insurers' head of regulation and strategy: "The impact of 1 per cent 
charging on the pensions market is already clear in terms of deteriorating sales. If the 
Government is committed to closing the savings gap, it needs to move away from 1 per cent." 
(The Independent 2004a). Confronted with this threat to boycott the new product, the 
Treasury financial secretary admitted that “the government had to strike a balance between 
the interests of consumers and the economics of the market.” (statement by Ruth Kelly in The 
Guardian 2004). When pressed about this in the Commons, she explained why the 
government conceded to the financial sector: “What we want them to do is open their doors to 
low to moderate income consumers—that is the ultimate goal of this—and to encourage 
people to save who have previously not saved. If that is the ultimate result, then I think this 
policy will have been successful.” (Select Committee on Treasury 2004b, Q2134).  
   
In conclusion, the government relaxed the price cap in 2004 because it was convinced 
that doing so was necessary to achieve its core objective – namely expanding private saving 
levels. The government was inclined to stick to a strict price cap; but assessed that doing so 
was likely to result in failure of the stakeholder strategy. On the other hand, abandoning such 
strict regulations would give the stakeholder regime at least a shot at success.  
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4.2 Why did the coalition government introduce stricter regulations in 2014? 
Disappointed with the earlier efforts to promote private savings on a purely voluntary basis, 
both Labour and the Conservatives became convinced that some level of compulsion was 
necessary (House of Commons 2008; Bridgen and Meyer 2011). This resulted in a cross-party 
agreement in 2008 to introduce a new strategy to expand private savings that was based on 
the idea of “auto-enrolment”. This requires employers to subscribe their workers to a private 
scheme and to contribute to it, unless the employee decides to opt out. The insight behind 
auto-enrolment is that people tend to stick to default options (Thaler and Sunstein 2008); 
hence most people are expected to refrain from leaving a scheme in which they have been 
automatically enrolled, whereas it is less likely that they join that scheme voluntarily. For 
those employers who do not actively select a scheme for their workers, the government 
designed NEST; a semi-private default scheme, executed by private associations but heavily 
regulated by the state to control investment risks and achieve low costs. While the pension 
industry welcomed NEST as a solution for commercially less attractive low-income 
households, they lobbied intensively to prevent competition with their existing pension 
provision (achieved through a cap on contributions to NEST). The industry also managed to 
get a relatively free hand in organising the private pension schemes that operate alongside 
NEST. Whereas NEST is subject to strict price regulations, no new requirements were 
introduced for the other schemes (although the government included “reserve powers” in the 
2008 Pensions Act to impose additional quality requirements to private schemes should it not 
achieve its objectives). Hence the new situation was characterised by a heavily regulated 
semi-public scheme for low-income households, combined with relatively unregulated private 
pension provision for higher incomes. 
 
From early onwards these unregulated private schemes have been accused of 
sustaining high and hidden charges. Both experts and media tried to raise public awareness of 
this problem (see for example the reports by the RSA 2009, 2010; as well as a series of 
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articles - published by the Daily Mail between 2009 and 2010 - declaring a “war on hidden 
charges”). To deal with such criticism and to encourage savings, pension industry 
associations took several initiatives aimed at “dispelling fears of hidden costs” (quote by 
Saunders, chief executive of the Investment Management Association; Financial Times 
2012a). The main strategy of the industry was to focus on ‘improving transparency’ – this of 
course on the basis of its own terms in the form of voluntary codes and guidelines. Following 
a special summit in 2011 on “Making Pension Charges Clearer”, NAPF and ABI (the 
associations representing pension funds and insurers) prepared a “Joint Industry Code of 
Conduct” on improving transparency that was published in November 2012 (NAPF 2011; 
NAPF and ABI 2012). Around the same time, the Investment Management Association 
published a document titled “Enhanced disclosure of fund charges and costs” (IMA 2012b). 
While these industry efforts could seem surprising given their earlier combative stance, they 
should not be mistaken for a straightforward confession. Both ABI and IMA repeatedly 
argued that schemes charging excessive fees are increasingly rare (The Independent 2011; 
IMA 2012a; Financial Times 2012b). According to the industry, the real problem is that “a 
growing perception of high charges, hidden fees and complex charging structures is leading to 
a "loss of trust" and is deterring individuals from saving for retirement” (quote by Otto 
Thoresen, director-general of the ABI; Financial Times 2011, 2012a). 
 
By taking the lead in ‘clearing out its own house’ through self-regulation, the pension 
industry explicitly aimed at pre-empting concrete regulatory interventions. As Joanne Segars, 
head of NAPF, puts it: “We know we have to get our own house in order; otherwise, 
Government and the regulators will do it for us. We recognise that and we recognise the need 
to move quickly.” (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee 2012, ev34).  The pre-
emptive strategy of the industry seemed to work very well. The government explicitly 
welcomed industry efforts to “sort its own house out” as being far better “than the 
Government trying to be over-prescriptive” (Steve Webb, then Pensions Minister; House of 
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Commons 2011, Column 126WH). By the end of 2011, both government and industry 
seemed to settle on self-regulation as the preferred approach to deal with the issue of high 
charges. Steve Webb declined requests for intervention as late as early 2013 (Work and 
Pensions Committee 2013, 91).  
 
So why did the coalition government eventually decide to employ ‘hard regulations’ 
to intervene in the pensions sector? This is not self-evident, given its reluctance and keeping 
in mind that, only a few years earlier, even a left-of-centre government that was predisposed 
to stick to its regulatory guns eventually backed down to industry demands. To explain this 
regulatory shift, I argue that government officials were driven by the concern that taking no 
action against high charges would undermine its renewed strategy to promote private savings.  
 
The lack of public trust in private pensions has long been considered a key element of 
the problem of low savings as it is “holding back a wider retirement savings culture” 
(Brandon Lewis (Conservatives); House of Commons 2011, Column 108WH). While auto-
enrolment is designed as a way around this problem, legislators from all sides of the political 
spectrum feared that the possibility of people being steered into bad schemes would further 
deteriorate trust in private pensions and result in wide-scale opt-outs. Gregg McClymont 
(Labour) argued that: “If we permit confidence to be damaged, because auto-enrolment does 
not succeed, many people could opt out, which would jeopardise auto-enrolment.” (House of 
Commons 2011, Column 122WH). Or in the words of Lord Freud (Conservatives): “we must 
restore public faith in the concept of pension saving and, behind this, pension charges are 
key” (House of Lords 2012, Column 1641). Even if people remain in bad-value schemes, 
both Labour and Conservative legislators feared this could lay the basis for a future mis-
selling scandal: “No members of the Committee, and especially the Minister, would want a 
situation in which pensions are mis-sold. Often, however, mis-selling takes many years to 
come to light. Bearing in mind the resistance that business has to further regulation, will the 
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Minister assure the Committee that there will be sufficient regulation to ensure that 
inappropriate pensions are not sold in the first place, rather than regulations being introduced 
after the event?” (Teresa Pearce (Labour); House of Lords 2011, Column 254); or David 
Mowat (Conservatives): “I fear that unless those measures are adopted, auto-enrolment will 
compound a failure that could easily become our next mis-selling scandal.” (House of 
Commons 2012, Column 847). In conclusion, legislators from both sides of the aisle were 
concerned about the prospect of auto-enrolment being derailed by the possibility that people 
are pushed in bad-value schemes.  
 
In order to support the argument that concerns regarding the consequences of high 
charges for the viability of auto-enrolment are shared across parties, rather than driven by 
partisan competition, I examined the ‘partisan origin’ of such expressed concerns. To do so I 
used the Hansard search module to identify all debates in the House of Commons and House 
of Lords during which pension charges were discussed; this for the 18 months between 
publishing the 2011 Pensions Act and the first debates on the next Pensions Bill.21 Within this 
long list, there were 13 separate debates where such parliamentary requests for additional 
government action were expressed (see Table 6). These requests ranged from enquiring into 
how the government plans to deal with the issue of high charges, to outright urging the 
government to ‘not wait and see’ and exercise its regulatory power to cap charges. I find that 
almost half of the requests during those 13 debates were proposed by MPs or Lords from 
governing parties (Conservatives or Liberal Democrats). Within a total of 29 separate 
requests (i.e. excluding multiple requests of one person in one debate), 14 requests were made 
by Conservatives or Lib Dems, and only 11 requests by a member of Labour.22 While some 
legislators made several requests during different meetings, the results are not driven by a 
small set of persons (for example by one or two Conservatives making all 10 requests).  
                                                            21 To identify a long list of results I used the following query within the Hansard search module: 
(“charges” AND “pensions” – between 3/11/2011 and 9 May 2013). Included are debates as well as 
oral and written questions within both the House of Commons and the House of Lords.  22 The other 4 requests were from DUP (2), an independent Lord and a cross-bencher. 
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 Con Lib Dem Lab Other 
Nr of separate requests  
(one count per session) 23 10 4 11 4
24 
Nr of different persons 5 3 9 4 
 
Table 6   Breakdown of requests for intervention to address charges per party (total of 13 
oral or written debates in the period between 3 November 2011 and 9 May 2013)  
 
  Despite its long-standing reluctance to use regulatory intervention, the Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP) came to acknowledge over the course of 2013 that these are 
not abstract concerns. In the spring of 2013, the DWP was finalising its proposals on how to 
deal with the surge of ‘small pension pots’. Every time workers move between jobs, they 
leave behind a relatively small amount of savings with their old employer – an unintended but 
very expensive consequence of auto-enrolment. The government sought to solve this problem 
by automatically transferring peoples’ older funds into their most recent scheme (unless the 
worker decides differently). Yet the widespread occurrence of bad-value schemes meant that 
in many occasions the government would be actively moving peoples’ lifetime savings from a 
good scheme into a bad value scheme. So when the Office for Fair Trading published a 
damning report in the summer of 2013, arguing that “competition alone cannot be relied upon 
to drive value for money for all savers in the DC workplace pension market” (OFT 2013, 14), 
Steve Webb eventually conceded and proposed a series of strict regulations aimed at 
preventing the worst outcomes for savers – including the charge cap on default schemes (i.e. 
higher charges are allowed as long as the saver makes an active decision to join a more 
expensive scheme). This rationale can be illustrated by this extended quote by Steve Webb 
while defending his policy decision in the House of Commons:  
 
“There is an issue of what happens if money is automatically transferred from a 
“good” scheme to a “bad” scheme, and I accept that point. That is why we are 
                                                            23 I have counted one question per person per session. This means, for example, that three questions 
from different persons of one party are all included; but three questions of one person in one session 
gets counted as one. 24 Two MPs from DUP; 1 Cross-bencher; 1 Independent 
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regulating for scheme quality. It should not just be a worry that someone’s small 
pension pot gets auto-transferred to a bad scheme; it should be a worry that an entire 
work force have been auto-enrolled into a bad scheme. We should not have bad 
schemes and must deal with that. That is why we are tackling pension scheme quality, 
which includes a range of issues such as governance, investment, costs and charges.” 
(Steve Webb (Liberal-Democrats); House of Commons 2013, Column 772) 
 
In other words, the main driver behind regulatory intervention was the concern that bad-value 
schemes would be detrimental for establishing trust in auto-enrolment and thereby undermine 
the long-term success of their strategy to expand private savings.  
 
One could object that this focus on auto-enrolment for explaining intensifying state 
intervention reflects a selection bias, resulting from relying only on public legislators’ 
statements. For example, they could use auto-enrolment to publicly justify their decisions, 
even if it is not an actual concern. Based on information derived from interviews with non-
state stakeholders who were closely involved with these negotiations, I argue that this is not 
the case. When asked for their account of the regulatory shift, all stakeholders stressed the 
complexity of this development25 but included a clear reference to auto-enrolment; this in 
formulations that are compatible with the proposed explanation. For example, Andy 
Agathangelou (Transparency Task Force) mentioned that auto-enrolment “acted as a catalyst; 
it made it necessary for providers to deliver value for money. If they won’t going to deliver 
value for money, then there was no basis for the government for actually make people join the 
auto-enrolment process”; so the government “effectively becomes a proxy consumer and 
therefore suddenly has a focus on costs and charges which requires a drive for value for 
money.”. Another example would be the response of David Pitt-Watson (‘Tomorrow’s 
Investor’ project leader) when asked whether he thinks electoral considerations played a role 
                                                            25 Stakeholders argued that the regulatory shift should be seen as part of a complex dynamic that 
involves a wide range of factors; including enlightened thinking by some politicians and people in the 
field and an atmosphere of cross-party agreement on these issues, to persistent campaigning by both 
experts and activists and the broader background debate on the merits of active versus passive asset 
management. 
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in driving the reform measures: “Of course politicians think about getting re-elected, but the 
reason why they want to be politicians is because they want to do good in the world. And I 
think Webb in particular but the House more generally was convinced that if you were going 
to use auto-enrolment then you don’t want it to be possible for you to do that without losing 
more than 20% of your pension in fees.”. These quotes confirm rather than challenge the 
argument that concerns regarding auto-enrolment played a key role in shaping the 2014 
decision. 
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5. Alternative explanations and why they do not hold up 
In the previous section I argued that the regulatory shift in the UK resulted from a different 
assessment by policymakers on how to best promote their own interests. But why accept this 
argument, rather than more readily available explanations? The most obvious alternative is 
that the financial crisis triggered public outcry and electoral pressure on politicians to act 
more forcefully against the financial sector. This pressure on legislators eventually convinced 
the DWP to intervene, with the pension industry in a weakened position to object to these 
new rules. This section investigates whether the regulatory shift can be explained respectively 
by shifts in political salience, or by shifts in organised interest mobilisation. I conclude that 
none of these shifts was sufficiently significant to explain the difference in regulatory 
outcome. 
 
5.1 The role of electoral considerations 
The first alternative explanation for the shift in regulatory decisions is an increase in political 
salience. Voters who did not care about hidden and excessive pension charges in the past 
might care nowadays, this in response to the financial crisis or given the higher prominence of 
private pensions following auto-enrolment. This implies at the very least that voters are aware 
of the issue of high pension cost (let alone that they are mobilised). However, all evidence 
strongly suggests that political salience was low and remains so today. Several surveys show 
that most people are simply not aware of pension costs or their size; this applies to individual 
scheme members (OFT 2013; YouGov and B&CE 2015) as well as the employers who have 
to select schemes for their workers (Wood, Wintersgill, and Baker 2012; DWP 2014). In fact, 
a widely shared analysis of the problem is precisely that high charges persist because there is 
a serious lack of public awareness of these charges (Harrison, Blake, and Dowd 2012; Pitt-
Watson and Mann 2012; OFT 2013; FSCP 2014).  
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One could object that even if people are not aware of this specific issue, there certainly is a 
less articulated anger against the financial sector. Regulatory interventions in this area could 
be a political initiative to show voters that the government is taking tough action against the 
financial sector, this with the intention to reap electoral benefits. If that is the case, we should 
at the very least find indications that parties showcase their efforts during the subsequent 
general election. Nonetheless, this expectation is not supported by empirical analysis of party 
manifestos and press coverage in the run-up to the general election in May 2015. A review of 
written press coverage26 for the 6 months preceding the election reveals that the issue of 
regulating private pensions was barely mentioned in the run-up to the election (in fact, the 
rare explicit reference was not made by a government party but by Labour – promising to 
protect savers against rip-off charges and potential mis-selling; see MailOnline 2015). Also 
during the main televised debates, nobody came close to claiming credit for standing up 
against the pension industry (or even touching on this topic).27 A review of the party 
manifestos confirms this result – both Labour and Lib Dem included just a short reference on 
the need to ensure that private pensions are good value, while the Conservatives did not 
mention it at all (The Labour Party 2015, 49; Liberal Democrats 2015, 49; The Conservative 
Party 2015). This review confirms the argument that private pension regulation is not 
politically salient throughout the whole period under consideration. So in conclusion, there is 
no evidence that either Labour or the governing parties sought to politicise this issue for 
reasons of electoral gain. 
 
5.2 The role of organised interest groups 
Another possible reason why regulatory intervention succeeded in 2014, is that the pension 
industry was no longer able to resist mounting pressure by those advocating for more 
transparency. We could indeed expect that the financial crisis has harmed the legitimacy of 
                                                            26 This review is based on the 1910 results rendered by NEXIS search within UK publications (query: 
Private AND Pensions AND Charges; period between 1 Nov 2014 and 7 May 2015).   27 Based on transcripts of the British Party Leaders’ Election Debate (ITV, 2 April 2015), the 
Opposition Parties Election Debate (BBC1, 16 April 2015) and press reportings of debates. 
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the financial service sector, reducing its ability to block regulations.  However, this 
explanation cannot account for the timing of the reform shift towards ‘hard’ regulatory 
intervention. If the financial crisis deteriorated the legitimacy of the financial sector, this 
reduced influence must have been apparent well before 2013. Yet as indicated in the previous 
section, the regulatory preferences of the DWP and the pensions industry were well-aligned 
until early 2013. Until that point, the government made clear that it fully supports the softer 
approach based on ‘self-regulation’ that was actively promoted by the industry (see for 
example the joint effort by IMA, ABI, SPC and NAPF that resulted in a “Joint Industry Code 
of Conduct”; NAPF 2012). Daniel Godfrey – who was leading the IMA at that point – 
confirmed that the approach by the government at that time was well-aligned with the IMA 
strategy (Interview with Daniel Godfrey). At the same time, transparency advocates recall 
that their demands were more or less ignored for several years (Interviews with Andy 
Agathangelou and David Pitt-Watson). In order to account for declining industry influence 
during the period preceding the 2013 regulatory U-turn, one could argue that mounting intra-
industry differences made it increasingly difficult for the sector to speak with a single voice to 
combat the price cap. For example, some firms that pursue low-cost business strategies (such 
as passive asset management) welcomed the price cap because it could give them a 
competitive edge relative to more expensive firms. While fascinating, such intra-industry 
conflicts did not seem to affect the resolve of industry associations to combat the price cap. 
Daniel Godfrey stressed that he opposed the price cap, and that members that favoured the 
cap did not influence this overall industry position (interview with Daniel Godfrey). This 
strong opposition is reflected in the responses by the IMA and ABI to the 2013 consultation 
by the DWP (IMA 2013; ABI 2013). Given that there are no further indications for a sudden 
demise in the organisational strength of the pension industry in the first half of 2013, we need 
to look beyond industry influence to account for the regulatory shift.  
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Increasing pressure by pro-regulation groups could be a better explanation for the 
shift towards ‘hard’ regulations in 2013. However, if it is correct that state interventions were 
designed as a concession to mounting pressure by pro-transparency interest groups, then we 
should expect that the content of reforms reflects the content of their demands. The problem 
for this hypothesis is that this expectation does not apply to the central and most contentious 
part of the reform package, namely the price cap. Given that the price cap is the element that 
was most forcefully opposed, it is the intervention where we would least expect the 
government to introduce it without strong external pressure. Yet in that period there was no 
consensus regarding the appropriateness of the price cap among experts and consumer 
associations, let alone a concerted push to force the government to adopt this measure against 
strong resistance by the pensions industry. For example, only one of the consumer advocates 
invited to the Work and Pensions Committee evidence session in January 2013 univocally 
defended the introduction of the charge cap; all others were reluctant to recommend this 
measure to the Committee members (personal communication with Dominic Lindley; 
confirmed in official minutes - see Work and Pensions Committee 2013, 64). Also the 
influential report by the Office for Fair Trading did not recommend the introduction of a price 
cap (OFT 2013). Much of their reluctance can be explained by the worry that the imposition 
of a cap could encourage some providers to raise their charges towards that figure, resulting 
in higher charges overall. In order to understand why the DWP still introduced the price cap, 
despite the lack of strong pressure, it is worth including a longer quote by Daniel Godfrey, 
who headed the Investment Management Association at that time. He recalls a personal 
meeting with Steve Webb, justifying his decision:   
 
“[Steve Webb] said: ‘I understand in a theoretical world, that obviously that [i.e. the 
industry-led governance code] would be preferable. But I’m responsible for 40.000 
schemes and no matter how good your governance code is, that doesn’t give me 
comfort that all 40.000 schemes will become well-governed. And so the easiest way I 
can make sure that they at least don’t do too much harm is to bring in the charge cap.’ 
So I think that was the reason; the killer argument for the government, was I suppose 
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the difficulty of policing the governance which in theory would have been a better 
solution.” (Interview with Daniel Godfrey). 
 
The key point here is that the reform package was not simply a concession to external 
pressure. Organised interest groups certainly facilitated reforms by providing evidence 
regarding the prominence and impact of bad value schemes. Yet the timing and content of 
reform proposals strongly suggest that such influence got traction because it aligned with the 
governments’ broader concerns regarding the viability of auto-enrolment. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper focused on conflicts between the commercial interests of private pension providers 
and the social interests of households who increasingly depend on such financial products for 
old age income security. How can we explain the prevalence of regulatory interventions that 
go against concentrated, financial interests in order to promote broader, social objectives? 
Whereas traditional accounts explain such interventions as a response to electoral pressure or 
mobilisation by organised interest groups, this paper argues that governments play an 
autonomous role in shaping private pension markets. Policymakers have their own stake in 
promoting the long-term viability of private welfare, this in order to avoid re-emerging 
pressure on public provision. Hence in order to explain variation in state intervention in 
financial welfare markets, we have to focus more on policymakers and how they assess such 
interventions in the light of their own objectives. Studying the recent shift towards stricter 
regulations in the UK as a least-likely case of regulatory interventions that go against 
financial interests to promote social objectives provided empirical support to this argument.  
 
While the shift towards stricter regulation in the UK was selected as a hard case, it 
reflects a much wider trend of government initiatives aimed at reducing the cost of private 
pension provision (for an overview, see Sier 2016). In line with the expectation of this paper, 
this broader shift does not seem to be driven by angry voters, but by the growing concern that 
private pensions will end up in trouble in the longer run if unadjusted. Interestingly, this also 
applies to countries where social partners and non-profit pension funds dominate private 
pension provision. The Netherlands provides a telling example. Responding to pressure by the 
Dutch financial markets regulator (Autoriteit Financiële Markten), legislators threatened 
social partners in 2011 with legal intervention if their collective pension funds failed to take 
action to reduce costs and improve transparency regarding their members (AFM 2011; De 
Telegraaf 2010b; Het Financieele Dagblad 2011). Despite initial resistance, funds managed to 
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reduce costs significantly through restructuring and renegotiating contracts with commercial 
providers (AFM 2015; Sier 2016).  
 
 The proposed state-centric approach has at least three wider implications for 
analysing the dynamics of government intervention in financial welfare markets. First of all, 
it suggests that policymakers currently fear dispirited voters more than angry voters. While 
angry voters care about improving private pensions, most households who do not trust 
financial welfare simply do not participate in private schemes. Non-participation in private 
pensions when public provision is curtailed creates a huge problem for policymakers; failure 
to prevent sharp drops in living standards is most likely to result in uncontrolled demands on 
the public system in the long run (Pensions Commission 2004, 170). To avoid ever greater 
compulsion (which carries its own political risk; Mabbett 2012), policymakers have to build 
up public trust in the value of private pensions (Taylor-Gooby 2005; Vickerstaff et al. 2012). 
Secondly, the argument requires us to think more nuanced about the role of the crisis in 
explaining the recent surge in state intervention in private pension markets. Rather than 
triggering a public outcry that elicits response from policymakers, the financial crisis and 
subsequent low-interest environment push policymakers into action because lower returns 
intensifies the already existing challenge to make private pensions viable. Finally, the 
proposed analytical approach suggests that more attention should go to the on-going 
negotiations between legislators and the pension industry. While there is the need to improve 
the social viability of private welfare provision, this certainly does not mean that legislators 
will consistently go against industry interests. Because governments rely on the cooperation 
of financial welfare providers, there are clear limits to its ability to enforce regulations on 
these firms. Private providers, on the other hand, also tend to depend on the state for their 
commercial success; mainly because they generally benefit handsomely from state measures 
aimed at encouraging participation in private schemes (e.g. fiscal incentives). Therefore this 
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paper expects that all regulatory outcomes will eventually reflect a negotiated balance 
between commercial viability on the one hand, and social-political viability on the other. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
THE ‘PRIVATE SOLUTION’  
AS A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME 
 
 
This thesis has analysed the shift towards intensifying state intervention in the 
organisation of private pension provision, this against the background of attempts to contain 
levels of public provision. Explaining this dual reform dynamic is important to understand the 
broader developments of state involvement in the organisation of social protection. It 
challenges those who argue that the welfare state is shifting away from its traditional role in 
promoting social protection, or even disengaging from social responsibilities altogether. 
Building on existing work that shows how states remain involved in the organisation of social 
protection, this thesis aims to explain what drives governments to engage in – or abstain from 
– interventions that restrict the discretion of non-state actors in the private sphere. 
 
 Each of the three papers that constitute the thesis focussed on a different aspect of 
this broader research question, investigating this broad reform dynamic from different angles. 
The first paper evaluated whether and how interventions in private pension provision have to 
be understood in relation to reform dynamics within the public sphere; this on basis of 
examining the incremental shift away from organising non-state pension provision on basis of 
voluntarism in the UK and Germany since the 1990s. The paper argued that public and 
private reforms are subject to different political-economic struggles that involve different 
interests, yet showed that they cannot be understood in isolation from each other. The second 
paper explained diverging experiences with collective risk-sharing arrangements in Denmark 
and the Netherlands throughout the financial crises in the 2000s. It argued that this difference 
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can be best explained on basis of the regulatory structure that underpins social partner 
coordination by constraining their discretion, rather than focusing on the agency of social 
partners as such. The third paper focused on explaining regulatory decisions in cases where 
commercial objectives of financial actors clash with social concerns. Examining the shift in 
the UK towards stricter regulation of the financial sector since the 2000s, this paper shows 
how the state plays an autonomous role; countering the argument that state intervention is 
after all shaped by pressure from voters or organised interest groups, including the financial 
sector. 
 
In this concluding chapter I discuss the findings of the three papers and how they 
contribute to the overall argument. The discussion of the main conclusions is structured on 
basis of three overarching themes which I briefly introduce below.   
 
The first theme focuses on the central role of the state in explaining private welfare 
reforms. Even when governments succeed in reducing direct fiscal commitments by limiting 
public pension promises, they face the challenge of ensuring adequate protection through the 
pension system as a whole – so public and private provision combined. Inability to achieve 
sufficient pension adequacy through private provision risks generating political instability, 
which could result in re-emerging pressure on public provision. This means that reducing 
public provision does not simply discharge governments from the need to organise social 
protection, but shifts the arena from public to private provision. Insofar as relying on 
voluntarism to organise private provision does not result in overall security that is politically 
stable, governments have replaced direct fiscal commitments with contingent liabilities. 
Accordingly, this thesis argues that the state’s objective to avoid re-emerging pressure on 
public provision plays an important role in explaining intensifying social interventions in the 
organisation of private pension provision.   
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The second theme focuses on the sustained negotiations between states and non-state 
actors, shaping regulatory interventions in private pension provision. This thesis argues that 
taking into account the interests of these non-state actors regarding the organisation of private 
pensions is important to explain both the timing and content of reform decisions. In particular, 
this thesis shows that financial pension providers play a crucial role in convincing reluctant 
governments to engage in costly regulations to improve the social characteristics of private 
pension provision. Even though they have clear commercial objectives, financial actors push 
for social interventions by appealing to the state’s own concern regarding social instability 
that arises from insufficient coverage and adequacy. Apart from financial actors, social 
partners also have a stake in the organisation of private pension provision for reasons other 
than social protection (e.g. collective bargaining or competitiveness). Even though this thesis 
finds that social partners do not drive regulatory intervention, they do shape the content of 
regulations by resisting or facilitating social interventions depending on whether they align 
with their own objectives. This thesis argues that these political-economic struggles regarding 
the organisation of private pensions help explaining when and how state interventions in 
private provision materialise.   
 
The third theme focuses on the importance of trust for achieving stability of the 
overall pension system. In order to expand coverage and adequacy, states require participation 
of households and cooperation by non-state actors. Yet widespread participation depends 
arguably on sufficient level of public trust in private pension provision. This perspective 
provides additional and more specific insights into what drives state intervention in private 
pension provision. On the one hand, certain regulatory interventions aim at circumventing 
trust by reducing discretion of non-state actors (e.g. auto-enrolment). On the other hand, 
several cases of regulatory intervention can be explained as efforts to promote trust rather 
than circumvent it; this in order to avoid the need to rely on increasing levels of compulsion. 
Throughout the three papers, we can recognise several instances where this general insight 
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regarding the importance of trust materialises in a concrete challenge. This does not only 
apply to challenges regarding sustaining household participation in private pensions (e.g. as 
result of possible disappointments with auto-enrolment, or in light of the decreasing security 
of private pension schemes); also getting and keeping social partners involved in organising 
widespread occupational provision requires trust among these actors.  
 
Following the discussion of these conclusions in the first section, the next section 
reflects on this thesis contributes to three major debates that go beyond the organisation of 
private pension provision. These broader debates relate to the relationship between states and 
markets, the conceptualization of the welfare state, and financialization. Finally I discuss 
limitations of this thesis as well as potential avenues for further research. 
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1. Overall conclusions of the thesis 
 
1.1 Theme I A state-centric explanation of private welfare reforms 
In what follows I draw on the findings of the three papers to elaborate on the main argument 
of this thesis, namely that states play an important role in explaining the dynamic of 
intensifying interventions in private pension provision. A key feature of this broad shift 
towards increasing state involvement in the organisation of private pensions is that it 
developed in a gradual manner, rather than in one sweeping reform. The first paper showed 
how both the German and British government shifted over the course of more than a decade 
from an initial strategy that was still broadly based on voluntarism, towards a strategy that 
included more explicit elements of compulsion. The third paper zoomed in on the gradual 
shift towards stricter regulations of the financial sector in the UK. Even in the case of the 
Netherlands, where governments already played a significant role in shaping occupational 
provision, the second paper showed a step-wise increase in state efforts to redirect the 
decisions made by social partners. In order to explain this gradual shift towards intensifying 
state intervention, this thesis showed how governments are compelled to intervene to prevent 
re-emerging pressure on public provision by preserving the political stability of the overall 
pension system.  
 
Before looking at what compels states to intervene, it is necessary to explain why 
governments found themselves reluctant to intervene in the first place. Such reluctance is not 
self-evident, this because these interventions entail clear social improvements in terms of 
promoting coverage and adequacy. Social regulation of private pension provision can and has 
been represented as a politically attractive alternative to expensive public provision on the 
one hand, and the socially unappealing reliance on voluntarism to organise private pensions 
on the other. Indeed, the first paper showed how the first interventions in private pensions by 
both the Schröder and Blair governments displayed outspoken enthusiasm regarding the 
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possibilities of this approach. Both governments were convinced that relatively light-handed 
interventions in private provision could result in boosting the overall participation in private 
pensions; this to compensate for lacking public provision. The idea was that private pension 
products could be made more appealing to lower-income households through a combination 
of fiscal incentives and social regulations (e.g. to keep prices low); in the UK this was 
attempted through Stakeholder Pensions, in Germany through the Riester Rente. This ‘private 
solution’ proved particularly appealing to Social-Democrats in the 1990s – the prospect of 
showcasing financial responsibility without abandoning their social policy credentials fitted 
perfectly within their ideas on the Third Way. Another reason why governments were lured to 
this policy option has to do with the conviction at that time that financial returns on funded 
pensions easily outperform those of un-funded schemes; an idea encouraged by booming 
markets, the financial industry and international organisations. In conclusion, rather than 
being reluctant, these governments were initially enthusiast in pursuing a strategy of 
compensating for low or declining public provision through promoting private savings.  
 
Reluctance emerged when the initial range of regulated products failed to meet their 
optimistic promises. Disappointment regarding the voluntaristic strategy did certainly not 
result in a decision to expand public provision instead, nor did it result in abandoning the goal 
of promoting private savings. Yet at the same time both governments proved hesitant to 
engage in new interventions in the private sphere. Each of the alternative strategies that were 
on the table had aspects that proved quite unappealing. First of all, the financial sector heavily 
promoted the idea of shifting towards mandatory private pension contributions; yet 
governments were disinclined to divert from voluntarism because they feared this would be 
considered as an additional tax. However, proceeding with the initial strategy of making 
private pensions more attractive to low-income households through tax incentives and 
regulation also had reached its limitations. The financial sector strongly resisted new 
regulations and even managed to dilute existing ones (both in Germany and the UK financial 
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actors attributed the failure of these products to too stringent regulations). At the same time, 
both governments were reluctant to further boost tax incentives – wary of rapidly rising 
expenditure levels. In conclusion, despite the attractive prospect of promoting social 
outcomes in private provision, governments often find themselves reluctant when confronted 
with the costs of social interventions.  
 
 What compelled governments to overcome their reluctance to intensify intervention 
in private pension provision? Each of the three papers provided evidence to support the 
general argument that, despite their reluctance, governments were ultimately compelled to 
intervene in order to promote its own objective: namely to prevent exposure to fiscal 
pressures in the long run, this when demands on public provision re-emerge because overall 
pension provision is considered inadequate. Both in Germany and the UK this concern was 
expressed in the idea of the ‘savings gap’ between what people expect to receive and what 
they are likely to receive given current arrangements. Even after the German government 
quietly abandoned its initial explicit promise (Gesamtversorgungsniveau), the implicit 
promise still lingered. But interestingly the same notion was prevalent in the UK, where the 
government never made such promises. Also in the Netherlands, where social partners are 
those in the front line in terms of accountability for occupational pensions, the state was 
concerned that deterioration of occupational pensions would result in new demands on public 
provision. This thesis borrows the concept of ‘contingent liabilities’ to capture the feature that 
– unlike direct fiscal liabilities – these liabilities only appear in the governments’ books when 
they materialise. However, existing references to contingent liabilities are often limited to 
situations where the state opens itself up to accountability by its ‘heavy hand’ in interfering in 
private provision (Polackova 1998; Mabbett 2012). Instead, my research suggests that also 
refraining from such interventions could result in contingent liabilities, given the expectation 
that governments can be held politically accountable when overall adequacy is considered 
inadequate. 
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  The three papers also revealed the limitations of alternative approaches that explain 
state interventions as a response to external pressure. First of all, even though unions are often 
considered to be key drivers of social interventions (Bonoli and Palier 2007; Trampusch 
2009), the first two papers showed that unions acted more like an interest group that had to be 
appeased before accepting these new regulations (this will be discussed more in depth in the 
next section). Even though unions and consumer groups did promote stricter regulations 
against the financial sector, paper three made clear that it is not their activity that can explain 
the regulatory shift in the UK. Secondly, regulatory interventions have been explained as 
result of partisan strategies to seek electoral gain by shaping private pensions in the interest of 
their electorate (Gingrich 2011; Hacker 2002). Yet this cannot explain why very different 
governments largely preserved the reform strategy of their predecessor after winning 
elections (this in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands). Finally, some argue that financial 
actors managed to convince governments to intervene in order to promote financial market 
development (Naczyk and Palier 2015). This thesis does find that financial actors played an 
important role in convincing reluctant governments to intervene (see next section). Yet paper 
three showed that interventions do not simply reflect financial interests. More generally, this 
thesis showed that financial actors manage to influence governments insofar as they can play 
into the state’s own concerns regarding re-emerging pressure on public provision. 
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1.2 Theme II Private welfare provision as a negotiated outcome 
The main argument is that governments mainly intervene to promote their own objectives, 
rather than in direct response to external pressure; yet this does not mean that states make 
these intervention decisions in isolation. In this section I discuss the main conclusions 
regarding the argument that explaining the timing and content of state interventions requires 
taking non-state actors into account. Recognising the scope for influence by non-state actors 
could be interpreted as a concession to those theoretical frameworks that focus on external 
pressure to explain state intervention (especially in light of the dominance regarding ruling 
classes often attributed to the state in more traditional state-centric literature; see for example 
Trimberger 1978). Nonetheless, this thesis sustains that integrating non-state actor influence 
qualifies rather than undermines the state-centric approach – this because the extent of non-
state actor influence is ultimately dependent on whether it aligns with the state’s own 
objectives or not.  
 
 This thesis acknowledged at least two reasons why there is scope for influence by 
non-state actors. First of all, policymakers have discretion in making intervention decisions – 
this because it is generally not straightforward whether further intervention is required in 
order to promote long-term stability or which interventions are most appropriate. This 
generates opportunities for non-state actors to shape the assessment of policymakers as to 
whether intervention is necessary or which interventions are most appropriate. A key example 
is the ability of the financial sector in Germany and the UK to instigate reform pressure by 
convincing governments that the present rules are likely to result in inadequate provision. 
Secondly, since governments rely on the cooperation by financial actors and social partners to 
expand private pension provision to the wider population, these non-state actors can use this 
dependency to generate leverage during negotiations about interventions driven by the state 
(this is most clear when social partners hold back initiatives to expand occupational welfare). 
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So what does this thesis conclude regarding the influence of non-state actors on shaping the 
timing and content of interventions in private provision? 
 
One of the key conclusions is the argument that financial actors, rather than social 
partners, are the main drivers of social interventions in private pension provision. This could 
be most directly observed in the discussion in the first paper of reform developments within 
Germany and the UK. Not only did social partners hamper the initial proposals by Blair and 
Schröder for social interventions in the private sphere; also later onwards they presented 
themselves reluctant rather than enthusiast regarding new social interventions in private 
provision. During those periods when both governments proved reluctant to intensify 
regulatory interventions (see above), it was financial actors who played a key role in 
convincing governments to expand fiscal incentives or shift in the direction of mandatory 
contributions (e.g. ‘Association of British Insurers’ in the UK, the ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft für 
betriebliche Altersversorgung’ in Germany). Pressure by financial actors therefore helps to 
explain the timing of interventions, especially in cases where we could otherwise expect less 
urgency in government decisions (given their reluctance and the absence of immediate 
electoral benefits or pressure by social partners).   
 
Interestingly, the papers revealed that financial actors formulated their arguments in 
terms of concerns regarding social adequacy – especially pointing at the gap between what 
people expect to receive and what they will receive under the status quo. This challenges 
those who analyse financial actors as opponents of social interests (Naczyk 2013). Instead it 
illustrates a pattern – proposed by Trumbull (2012) – where a smaller group with specific 
interests (i.e. the financial sector with commercial interest) try to influence policymakers by 
exploiting the coalescence with interests shared by a more numerous group that is not yet 
mobilised (i.e. social adequacy).  
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Furthermore, these findings challenge those who argue that social partners are the key 
actors in driving social protection within private pension provision (Johnston, Kornelakis, and 
d’Acri 2011; Trampusch 2009; Wiß 2015b). Given the central role of social partners in 
setting up and managing occupational schemes (Ebbinghaus 2010), the ability and willingness 
to cooperate through collective bargaining is often considered the main factor in explaining 
private social protection that compensates for state retrenchment (Trampusch 2009; a similar 
case has been made for occupational family policies; see Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein 
2009). Yet examining Denmark and the Netherlands (second paper) showed that even when 
social partners are mobilised and willing to organise social protection through collective risk-
sharing, they require state support in the form of a stable regulatory framework in order to 
overcome distributional conflicts. Moreover, despite recognising that the current framework 
was impaired, Dutch social partners still resisted efforts to reform the system.  
 
In order to explain why social partners were often reluctant to support social 
interventions in the private sphere (let alone driving them), this thesis proposed to look at 
whether these interventions are aligned with other non-social objectives by non-state actors. 
Just as expanding coverage and adequacy often tends to align well with commercial 
objectives of financial pension providers, these initiatives also happen to clash with several 
valid interests by social partners (particularly when these interventions limit their discretion; 
see the taxonomy of state interventions presented in the introduction). For example, 
employers in Germany and the UK were concerned about the effects of higher contributions 
on competitiveness; but also unions proved reluctant to push their members to divert an 
increasing part of their wage to private pension schemes (doing so exposes unions to criticism 
by members, especially when these schemes are risky). The resistance by German unions to 
the idea that the reformed occupational pensions would also benefit workers that are not 
covered by collective labour agreements furthermore illustrates the broader insight that 
unions often seek to preserve benefits for existing members, rather than expanding coverage 
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to non-members (Hassel 2014; for a more critical assessment, see Durazzi, Fleckenstein, and 
Lee 2018). On the other hand, the presence of non-social objectives can also help to convince 
unions to accept interventions it initially opposed; for example when German unions dropped 
resistance against expanding private provision after Riester redesigned the proposal in a way 
that would strengthen their hand at collective negotiations (combined with a significant 
amount of subsidies). So in conclusion, even if social partners did not drive interventions, 
governments still sought their cooperation to expand coverage which allowed social partners 
to shape interventions. The feasibility of regulations that promote coverage and adequacy 
therefore increases when negotiators manage to design them so they promote non-social 
interests (e.g. collective bargaining strength) while avoiding hampering other valid objectives 
(e.g. competitiveness; collective bargaining autonomy).  
 
Even though financial actors play a key role in driving social interventions, this does 
not mean that governments always follow the lead of financial actors. First of all, this thesis 
shows that governments are often hesitant or evasive in responding to the suggestions made 
by finance to promote private savings. For example, in the UK the government long resisted 
the insistence by financial actors on improving basic state pensions; as well as their 
suggestions to introduce mandatory pensions. This suggests that governments engage in 
assessing whether the concerns triggered by finance are justified or exaggerated. For example, 
the British government followed up on ABI pressure regarding the saving gap by carrying out 
its own estimations of under-saving in the UK (Ruth Kelly, then financial secretary at the 
Treasury, expressed “scepticism” regarding the numbers quoted by ABI, while recognising 
that the problem is indeed serious) (Select Committee on Treasury 2004a). More importantly, 
the third paper showed that in cases where social and commercial interests are not aligned, 
governments are prepared to pursue regulations that go against financial interests. Despite the 
non-commercial character of Dutch pension funds, a similar dynamic took place when the 
government insisted on change in pension fund practice against resistance by these funds.  
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Such cases of potential conflict between social and commercial interests reveal a 
rather complex relationship between states and markets. This relationship is built on mutual 
reliance – both actors depend on each other to pursue their own objectives. Because the 
government relies on the cooperation of financial welfare providers to provide the saving 
vehicles for widespread private pension provision, there are clear limits to its ability to 
enforce social regulations on pension providers. Financial welfare providers, on the other 
hand, also tend to depend on the state for their commercial success; mainly because they 
generally benefit handsomely from state measures aimed at encouraging participation in 
private schemes (e.g. fiscal incentives). As a result of this mutual dependence, neither finance 
nor governments should be expected to have the upper-hand in terms of shaping regulatory 
interventions in their interests. Given this perspective, the third paper represents a case of 
sustained negotiations between states and finance; centred around their attempts to balance 
commercial viability on the one hand, and social-political viability on the other. If 
governments are too forcefully in imposing social regulations on financial actors, they will 
bail out. For example, financial providers argued that strict social regulations of Stakeholder 
Pensions makes providing them commercially unviable – this because selling those products 
to low-income households is too much effort for too little return. Instead the government has 
decided to step in by introducing auto-enrolment (to reduce the cost of selling) and initiating a 
publicly organised scheme (NEST) to provide for the least commercially attractive 
households. Conversely, if financial actors are perceived to be incapable of supporting 
widespread social provision, governments will question the generous tax incentives they put 
into those schemes. So when high charges were perceived as a threat to the social viability of 
the auto-enrolment strategy, the government initiated a regulatory shift that is still changing 
the face of the asset management industry (see for example the repercussions of these rules 
for the active-passive investment debate).  
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So in conclusion, non-state actors do not only promote social interventions but also 
constitute limitations to what is feasible in terms of improving social outcomes through 
regulating private pensions. This is particularly the case for covering households that are 
commercially less interesting. This thesis suggests that regulatory outcomes will reflect 
sustained negotiations between states and the financial sector, this regarding the extent to 
which the state needs to step in through fiscal and regulatory incentives in order to get the 
financial sector on board to facilitate widespread coverage. But this conclusion regarding the 
negotiated character applies to all non-state actors whose cooperation is required – including 
the need to take into account the potential negative effect of social interventions on valid 
interests by social partners.  
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1.3 Theme III Achieving stability through trust 
A third theme that emerges from the three papers, is the importance of trust in order to 
achieve widespread coverage and adequacy. This thesis argued that governments that aim to 
reduce or contain public pension promises have a stake in promoting private pension savings; 
this because voluntarism is expected to result in insufficient levels of overall pension 
adequacy which could result in re-emerging pressure on public provision. Interventions aimed 
at promoting private coverage and adequacy do not happen in isolation; timing and content of 
these interventions are shaped by negotiations with non-state actors that also have a stake in 
these interventions and whose cooperation is required. This section looks at the challenge of 
achieving cooperation and participation in organising private pension provision from the 
perspective of trust. Each paper showed how governments face the challenge to foster trust in 
order to ensure the participation of both households and non-state actors in organising 
widespread private pensions. This aligns with findings of a growing body of literature that 
examines the importance of trust in welfare systems and pension provision in particular. After 
briefly reviewing this literature, this section will use the findings of the papers to identify and 
discuss three specific instances where trust plays a visible role. 
 
 Growing attention to welfare markets in the 1990s has led scholars to critically revisit 
the assumptions of rational behaviour that underpin these new policies – for example the 
reliance on market discipline to control behaviour (Le Grand 1997; Taylor-Gooby 2000). 
Pointing out the limitations of a market system that relies solely on self-interest, these 
scholars stress that “behaviour in market contexts is often in fact regulated by normative 
principles that transcend simple rationality” (Taylor-Gooby 1999, 98). Trust in particular is 
important for facilitating market transactions, especially when there is risk involved and 
information asymmetry makes it difficult to control welfare providers: “Individuals who trust 
each other are better equipped to reduce the transaction costs involved in the detailed and 
continual checking of contract compliance and can invest in the future with greater 
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confidence that obligations will be honoured” (Taylor-Gooby 1999, 103). Hence without 
widespread trust and confidence, governments find it hard to ensure widespread participation 
in private pension provision (see also Ring 2005; Vickerstaff et al. 2012). In a similar vein, 
Whiteside shows how governments seek to expand participation in private pensions by 
fostering trust and public confidence in pension markets – this through interventions such as 
the negotiation of international accounting standards, rules on disclosure and investment 
regulations (Clark and Whiteside 2003; Whiteside 2006b). The underlying reasoning is that 
successful social coordination depends on mutual expectations as to how the other actor will 
respond; absence of such ‘conventions’ brings uncertainty and distrust, which eventually 
results in the breakdown of cooperation (Whiteside 2006b, 2010). However, several scholars 
point at the limitations of promoting trust in pension markets. There are good indications that 
overall trust in both state and non-state pensions is eroding (Taylor-Gooby 2005), with trust 
in the financial service sector particularly lacking (Hyde, Dixon, and Drover 2007; Ring 
2005, 2012). Yet intensifying attempts to restore such trust by regulating market transactions 
has arguably resulted in undermining both public accountability and existing market 
mechanisms (Whiteside 2006a, 53). 
 
 Throughout this thesis, one can identify at least three specific instances of the general 
insight that trust is necessary to promote widespread participation in private pension provision 
(as well as of the challenges faced by governments to foster such trust). The most explicit of 
these instances is the need to promote trust in the context of auto-enrolment. Ring has argued 
how auto-enrolment in the UK was effectively a way for the government to circumvent the 
lack of public trust in private pension saving (Ring 2012). Yet he also noticed that this 
strategy does not do away with the sustained need for trust. This concern was amply 
illustrated by the findings of the third paper. In this paper I argued that the decision to 
introduce a price cap was motivated by the concern that bad-value schemes could undermine 
trust in the auto-enrolment and hence undermine the state’s strategy to promote private 
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savings. General breakdown of trust and participation (through widespread opt-outs) can 
happen even when only a few households find that they have been pushed in a bad-value 
scheme. Hence the cap was not just intended to prevent the corrosion of overall adequacy 
levels by high charges, but also to prevent the occurrence of the most harmful cases. This case 
clearly illustrates how trust cannot be replaced by intensifying state interventions: it is 
required to prevent reliance on ever greater compulsion to expand wider participation. At the 
same time, the case shows that fostering and maintaining trust often requires further state 
intervention; suggesting sustained state involvement. Even though this was shown for the UK 
case, it is very likely that the same principles are at work in other countries that are planning 
to rely on auto-enrolment.   
 
 A second instance where trust is crucial for widespread private pension provision 
stems from the limited feasibility to reduce uncertainty on basis of explicit pension promises. 
The widespread shift away from ‘Defined Benefit’ schemes in occupational pensions, hence 
deterioration of private pension security, has been widely attributed to the declining 
willingness of employers to engage in expensive obligations in an increasingly competitive 
climate (Munnell 2006). Arguably, governments have accelerated the trend of closing down 
DB schemes by introducing stricter regulations to protect scheme members against 
mismanagement or default. Yet this thesis also showed that governments have made it 
increasingly easy to organise schemes different than DB – see for example the recent 
introduction of DC schemes in Germany or the shift towards CDC in the Netherlands. This 
could be surprising given the broader argument that governments seek to promote overall 
pension adequacy. Nonetheless, this thesis would argue that these initiatives should be linked 
to the governments’ objective to promote coverage and adequacy. With respect to coverage, 
the papers suggest that relaxing pension promises is often clearly aimed at getting or keeping 
employers on board to provide widespread occupational pension schemes. For example, the 
German government has made the new DC scheme available on condition that it would be 
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used only through sectoral agreements in order to cover many new workers. Regarding 
adequacy, there is the now familiar trade-off between guarantees and returns: the obligation to 
meet explicit promises restrict funds to very safe investments, making it more difficult to 
achieve adequate returns (especially in a protracted low interest-rate environment; see 
Antolin, Schich, and Yermo 2011). Governments in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium arguably reduced mandatory promises in order to promote investment strategies that 
can deliver adequate returns in the first place. So this thesis stresses that we have to 
understand the sacrifice of traditional security against the background of overall efforts to 
improve coverage and adequacy (rather than a further step in overall abandonment of social 
characteristics of private pension provision; see Meyer, Bridgen, and Riedmüller 2007). In the 
absence of trust through fixed promises, governments have been investigating alternative 
ways to promote trust in private provision – for example by exploring ‘soft promises’ and 
new risk-sharing mechanisms among workers (such as ‘Defined Ambition’ pension plans and 
‘Collective Defined Contribution’) or by providing stability through investment techniques 
(such as lifecycle investing). 
 
 Whereas the previous two paragraphs pointed at the importance of trust to engage 
households in private pension saving, the following expands this to the challenge of involving 
non-state actors in the organisation of private pensions. It has been made clear that states 
require the cooperation by social partners to organise widespread private pension provision. 
Yet cases such as negotiations leading up to the Riester reform and the 2008 Pensions Act 
that introduced auto-enrolment reveal that this is not self-evident. Employers are reluctant to 
engage in expanding occupational schemes insofar as this involves costs and harms 
competitiveness. At the same time, unions proved quite wary about participating in a deal 
they considered to be unfair in terms of distributing the burden of expanded provision 
between workers and employers (see for example unions insistence on equal ‘Parität’ 
contribution shares in Germany). In both cases, the government (as well as the Pensions 
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Commission in the UK) had to carefully establish mutual trust that the achieved deal would 
be both effective and fair – this because all involved actors had to make some painful 
concessions. The second paper further revealed the importance of trust between social 
partners in order to ensure the persistence of collective risk-sharing arrangements (regardless 
of whether this includes explicit pension promises or not). Because collective risk-sharing 
against systemic risks involves sharing risks over time, participants across several generations 
have to trust that both contributions and benefits are allocated in a fair manner. The paper 
showed how governments in Denmark and the Netherlands design and maintain a regulatory 
framework that constrains social partner decisions, this in order to create the necessary trust 
to overcome such distributional conflicts. 
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2 Three broader contributions 
Even though the main argument of the thesis is developed within the context of private 
pension provision, the findings of this thesis have repercussions beyond the pension reform 
literature. In what follows I build on the main conclusions of this thesis to discuss how they 
contribute to three theoretical debates. First I engage with the broader debate on the 
relationship between states and markets. In the subsequent section, I briefly look at the 
repercussions for how we study welfare systems more generally. Finally, I discuss how my 
thesis can be situated within the emerging debate on financialization. 
 
2.1 State-market relationship 
Conceptualising and understanding the relationship between states and markets is a key 
theoretical debate within political economy. Welfare states have always been a central 
institution in terms of shaping this relationship. Traditionally, this relationship between states 
and markets was understood in an antagonistic manner – welfare policies compensate for 
market outcomes. Over time the opposite perspective gained in popularity – claiming that 
welfare policies and market dynamics can work in the same direction. This thesis, however, 
ties into yet another way to analyse the relationship between states and markets. Rather than 
counterbalancing or reinforcing each other, states can re-shape market dynamics in order to 
pursue its own objectives. In other words, we can analyse the relationship between states and 
markets as politics-against-markets, politics-for-markets and politics-through-markets. The 
latter option allows us to examine the intricate entanglement between states and markets, yet 
at the same time raises questions regarding the boundaries between states and markets. After 
briefly presenting the literature on each of these major perspectives on state-market 
relationships, I explore how this thesis can contribute to a better understanding of the 
entanglement between states and markets.  
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2.1.1 Politics-against-markets 
The underlying tension between states and markets – or democracy and capitalism – is at the 
core of political-economy debates. Democracy would allow for the egalitarian use of political 
power to redistribute from rich to poor; hereby correcting the social inequalities produced by 
free markets, but also reducing overall efficiency. This conflicting dynamic between equality 
and efficiency lies at the basis of analysing modern societies (Iversen 2006; Okun 1975; 
Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988). Welfare states are often considered key institutions in 
shaping this tension between states and markets: by using government policies to compensate 
for the unequal effects of market competition, welfare institutions help facilitating the 
viability of capitalism as an economic system. As such, welfare states are explained as the 
result of a ‘class compromise’ where the poor refrain from radical redistribution while the 
rich consent to some level of democracy and redistribution (Przeworski 1980; Garrett 1998).  
 
This antagonistic relationship between states and markets is most apparent in Esping-
Andersen’s use of “decommodification” to define and differentiate between welfare regimes. 
De-commodification reflects the idea that welfare states limit the scope of markets, this by 
providing a social income that reduces the reliance of workers on market income (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 22). Variation between welfare states is analysed in terms of how social 
expenditure is used to offer alternatives to market dependence (as well as whether such 
policies are used to preserve or change social structure). As such, different welfare regimes 
embody a different balance between states, markets and families (Esping-Andersen 1999a, 
26–27; but see also Titmuss 1958; and Hacker 2002). The premise that welfare policies 
restrict market outcomes underpins much of the traditional welfare state literature (e.g. 
Baldwin 1990; Häusermann 2010; Kersbergen 1995; Leibfried and Mau 2008). It also 
underpins the argument that big welfare states allow countries to accept globalisation by 
allowing for the compensation of losers (Garrett 1998; Rodrik 1998). Beyond welfare state 
research, one could argue that the politics-against-markets approach underpins much of the 
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Public Choice literature. Here the argument goes in the other direction – public choice 
scholars see markets as a cure for the rent-seeking behaviour of elected politicians (see for 
example Niskanen 1971). The underlying idea here is that promoting markets will limit the 
scope of the government and replace it with a more efficient organisation of social 
interactions (e.g. Marsland 1996; Seldon 1996).    
 
2.1.2 Politics-for-markets 
Against the background of the ‘politics-against-markets’ perspective, a different argument 
emerged that considered the (welfare) state and markets less as enemies than complementing 
institutions. Establishing public welfare does not necessarily correct or contain markets, but in 
fact allows them to flourish. Moreover, promoting markets can support the achievement of 
welfare objectives. This more benign interpretation of the relationship between states and 
markets can be identified in welfare state research that points out that employers did not 
systematically opposed welfare expansion, but in fact welcomed social policies (van 
Kersbergen 2000, 27; Mares 2003; Swenson 2002). The idea that social policies can foster the 
functioning of markets is also very much in line with the Varieties of Capitalism framework 
(Estévez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2015). Welfare economists 
took on the challenge to explain why social policies can promote efficiency rather than 
undermine it (Barr 2012b; P. Lindert 2002; Mirrlees 2006).  
 
At the same time, the claim that welfare policies do not necessarily have to compete 
with markets has also inspired several new approaches to welfare policies. In contrast to the 
previous perspective – pitching social policy as a compensation for market outcomes – these 
approaches all share the goal to use social policies in order to help individuals participating in 
markets. One key example is the promotion of the welfare state as an “enabling state” (Gilbert 
and Gilbert 1989). But it is also the basis for flexicurity and the ‘social investment state’ 
(Busemeyer et al. 2018). A more critical perspective on the ‘market creating’ effects of social 
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policies shows how providing households with basic social protection allows for creating 
failing markets (e.g. affordable housing creates a mass mortgage markets) (Schelkle 2012). 
Beyond the literature on welfare states, one could argue that the New Public Management 
approach can be interpreted within this framework. In contrast to the public choice approach, 
these scholars see markets as a technocratic means for improving public services, not a 
replacement for them (Lundsgaard 2002).  
 
2.1.3 Politics-through-markets 
The dynamics studied in this thesis do not fit nicely into one of the previous two options. The 
starting point of the thesis is that governments do not just choose between more intervention 
through public provision or promoting more laissez-faire within welfare markets. They also 
choose whether and how to intervene in private welfare markets, recognising that changing its 
organisation results in different distributional outcomes. As such, politics is not simply about 
restricting or encouraging market dynamics; it is actively changing markets towards its own 
objectives. Rather than politics against or for markets, it makes more sense to talk about 
politics-through-markets.  
 
Though less prominent than the other two approaches, the idea that politics shapes 
market dynamics towards its own purposes is not new. Whiteside revealed the historical 
efforts of governments to secure political objectives within the private sphere, often resulting 
in blurring boundaries between public and private (Whiteside 2006a). Schelkle focuses on 
how policy interventions do not just alter market outcomes ex post, but also aim to adjust 
market outcomes ex ante; this by changing the relationship between buyer and seller before 
the transaction takes place (Schelkle 2012, 4). The idea of politics-through-markets also 
features prominently in Gingrich’s analysis of welfare markets. As discussed in the 
introduction, Gingrich stresses that market reforms can have very different distributional 
implications. This opens it up as an arena for partisan struggle: “the distributive implications 
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of markets vary – not always benefiting the constituents of the Right – and that the Left has 
used market reforms differently to the Right.” (Gingrich 2011, 25). Beyond the field of social 
policy, the idea can be recognised in Vogel’s insight that re-regulation accompanying 
liberalisation can be used in different ways; it can be used to enhance competition, but also to 
preserve political dominance over industry after opening up ‘public sectors’ to competition 
(Vogel 1998). These proposals share the idea that shaping markets differently reflects a 
political struggle. This requires a more nuanced understanding of how states and markets are 
differentiated, going beyond analysing them as fully distinct entities that either compete or 
work in the same direction. 
 
2.1.4 Entanglement between states and markets: politicisation or de-politicisation? 
Whereas the two traditional perspectives (politics against or for markets) rest on a reasonably 
clear demarcation between states and markets, recognising that politics can also shape 
markets precludes a clear division between state and market. The question on how to interpret 
the resulting entanglement between states and markets goes back to Polanyi’s concept of 
“embeddedness” (Polanyi 1957). Despite heated discussions as to whether ‘disembedded 
markets’ is a useful concept or not (Block 1990, 2003; Granovetter 1985; Krippner et al. 
2004), the general consensus is that “markets are always politically embedded” (Block 2004, 
117–18). It underlines the need to move away from understanding entanglement as a mix of 
states and markets as separate entities. Yet the question remains: if socially regulated welfare 
markets do not clearly fall within either the public or private sphere, how then should we 
characterise such entanglement?  
 
One interpretation sees entanglement as a way to politicise the outcomes of private 
welfare provision. This interpretation is most in line with the approach taken by Gingrich 
(2011). Rather than understanding welfare privatisation as a way of “surrendering public 
responsibility” (Gilbert 2002), she sees reforms in welfare markets as a way to draw this 
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private sphere within the political arena (Gingrich 2011, 25). This is an extension of Hacker’s 
argument that the expansion of private welfare is the result of a political strategy that is 
dominated by Conservative parties (Hacker 2002). More generally, Schelkle envisions the 
possibility of governments “self-confidently moulding markets for social welfare purposes” 
(Schelkle 2012, 5). 
 
Another interpretation sees entanglement that follows from active state intervention 
in the private sphere as part of a broader depoliticization strategy (Flinders and Buller 2006). 
The idea is that governments seek to remain arm’s-length control over economic and social 
processes, while shielding themselves from the consequences of unpopular policies; or as 
Burnham formulates it: “De-politicisation as a governing strategy is the process of placing at 
one remove the political character of decision-making.” (Burnham 2001, 128–29). In other 
words, insofar as governments seek to intervene and maintain control over the private sphere, 
this should be interpreted as an effort to reduce political involvement. “Thus, what gets 
‘squeezed out’ by de-politicisation, is not politics per se, but rather the responsibility, blame, 
costs and discretion associated with policy making.” (Foster, Kerr, and Byrne 2014, 229). 
 
Both politicisation and de-politicization are plausible interpretations of the 
developments within the area of private pension provision.  In line with the former it has been 
argued that governments, when constrained to pursue social or electoral goals through public 
provision of welfare, shift attention to different policy instruments to obtain similar outcomes 
within the private area (Hyde and Dixon 2008). Others have stressed the appeal of promoting 
funded pensions from the perspective of de-politicisation: “Perhaps the greatest advantage of 
fully funded schemes is that there is an automatic adjustment of the level of pensions to the 
available resources. If available resources are lower than expected then either equity returns 
are also lower than expected or the real value of financial claims are reduced by inflation. 
Both processes operate “automatically”.  Pensioners may be disappointed with their pensions, 
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but “they do not perceive any deliberate political decision in the reduction of their pensions 
by inflation or by the failure to attain a suitable return in the financial markets” (Eatwell 
2003, 8).   
 
Nonetheless, these interpretations are not necessarily compatible since they point in 
different directions in terms of whether states seek to contain rather than expand the public 
sphere. This thesis suggests that such confusion often arises because the relevant perspective 
tends to shift over time. Even if governments clearly seek depoliticization at one point, the 
difficulty of achieving this often elicits further intervention; this up to the point where 
governments are rather openly steering outcomes towards desired outcomes. For example, the 
New Labour government was very explicit about establishing the priority of private 
responsibility and containing the responsibility for the state; its starting principle was that 
“those who are able, should save what they can for their retirement. The Government should 
support those who cannot save” (Secretary of State for Social Security 1998, 3). Yet as we 
have seen, failure to achieve broader coverage through voluntarism was succeeded by a shift 
towards auto-enrolment –  making the hand of the state ever more visible. Today the UK 
government openly recognizes that it bears a responsibility to ensure that those who are 
pushed into private saving schemes do not feel deceived; meaning that the outcomes of auto-
enrolment are now at least partly within the domain of political accountability. The possibility 
of such ‘creeping shift’ between de-politicisation and politicisation is recognised in the 
broader privatisation literature: “It is politicians who make decisions about what functions 
should be ‘depoliticised’, and [...] it is politicians who may from time to time face pressures 
to either justify their choices or even re-politicise certain issues in terms of adopting a direct 
governing relationship.” (Flinders and Buller 2006, 296). 
 
The lack of clear demarcation between state and market results in blurring lines 
between public and private responsibility (Ebbinghaus and Whiteside 2012): very often it is 
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simply not clear whether states or households are expected to take responsibility for 
potentially disappointing outcomes of private pension provision. This ambiguity is considered 
problematic for very good reasons: it creates “public uncertainty, opposition and non-
participation” (Whiteside 2006a, 53). Nonetheless, this thesis suggests that governments do 
not necessarily seek to resolve ambiguity regarding accountability for private pensions. Even 
if it is an unintentional consequence of previous interventions, it can be considered an 
essential part of its broader strategy to contain fiscal liabilities. Unambiguously assuming 
public responsibility for such outcomes would resemble direct liabilities akin to PAYG 
promises (with corresponding pressure to account for them in current fiscal calculations). On 
the other hand, unambiguously allocating responsibility with individuals is politically not 
credible (democratic governments will always have an incentive to respond to public 
pressure; see for example mis-selling scandals) and could trigger backlash against 
privatisation. As a result, governments could have an incentive to preserve ambiguity 
regarding public versus private responsibility. This does not mean that problems regarding 
public uncertainty and opposition are not relevant. It just highlights why state interventions 
seek to generate trust (see section 1.3) and mitigate the probability that contingent liabilities 
materialise in the first place (see section 1.1 and 1.2). Whether this is a good or stable strategy 
to deal with fiscal liabilities remains to be seen.   
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2.2 Conceptualising welfare states 
The focus of this thesis is on developing a better understanding of what shapes state 
intervention in private pension provision. It argues that private welfare reforms cannot be 
understood without also taking into account what happens within the public sphere – both are 
interlinked because governments that aim to contain public expenditure are often compelled 
to intervene more intensively in private welfare provision. Taking this argument to its natural 
conclusion poses a new question that goes beyond the immediate scope of this thesis: if it is 
not possible to understand private welfare interventions without reference to public welfare 
reform, is it then possible to understand public reform politics without taking private welfare 
into account?  
 
This question goes back to an on-going and tricky debate in the welfare state 
literature that focuses on what is the appropriate ‘dependent variable’ of welfare studies. 
Since Esping-Andersen, welfare studies have shifted beyond focusing on the level of social 
expenditure as the main dependent variable. It is now widely accepted that one should take 
into account how the same amount of social expenditure can have very different 
consequences, depending on how it is spent. In a similar way, studies of welfare retrenchment 
have shifted beyond their initial focus on declining levels of welfare spending – or its 
surprising absence – and instead expanded the scope of investigation to more nuanced shifts 
in the content of welfare programmes (e.g. re-commodification and recalibration). Much less 
agreement exists on whether the focus of welfare studies should expand beyond public 
welfare provision. Several scholars have made the case for doing so (Shalev 1996; Howard 
1997; Hacker 2002). Pierson himself argued that there should be a very good reason to 
‘stretch’ our concept of the welfare state; this in order to avoid confusion among scholars as 
to what needs to be explained (Pierson 2001a, 420). Green-Pedersen echoes the concern that 
alternative conceptualizations of the welfare state limit the prospect of engaging in a common 
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debate; arguing that “moving away from defining the welfare state as social transfers and 
services requires strong arguments” (Green-Pedersen 2004, 6).  
 
Nevertheless, the findings of this thesis would strengthen the case that there are at 
least very good reasons to consider expanding our notion of the welfare state to include 
private welfare provision. Not just because it determines so much of the actual distributional 
outcomes; also because there are very good indications that private provision has important 
consequences for how public welfare is shaped. The reasoning, in short, would be that 
governments shape public provision differently depending on what is feasible within private 
welfare provision. Public and private reforms are interlinked: the political stability of public 
welfare reforms is conditional upon the success of efforts to shape the outcome of private 
welfare provision. This implies that private reform developments are not just interesting, but 
also an integral part of the welfare system we want to explain.  
 
  In what follows I illustrate this argument by examining one key reason why leaving 
private provision out of the scope of mainstream welfare research could result in a biased 
understanding of public welfare reforms. In short, the exclusive attention to how public 
provision is organised does not allow for the possibility that governments engage in a 
‘division of labour’ between public and private provision. Consider for example the 
widespread trend of reshaping public provision towards a basic state pension, with flat 
benefits but on more or less universal basis. For Conservative countries this represents a shift 
away from public provision of earnings-related pensions that allow for consumption 
smoothing; yet also Liberal countries are slowly moving away from means-testing (Gelepithis 
2014; Meyer and Bridgen 2012). Considering these public reforms in isolation, one could 
hypothesise that welfare states are abandoning objectives related to insurance, instead 
focusing on redistribution. This observation would go against the argument that welfare states 
are predominantly about moderating risks, with redistribution across classes being a by-
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product of action (see debate involving Esping-Andersen 1999b, 32; Rehm 2009; Baldwin 
1990; Moene and Wallerstein 2001). However, taking into account state efforts beyond public 
provision strongly suggest that this would be a misrepresentation: states remain quite 
involved in promoting earnings-related pensions through private provision (even in Liberal 
countries which are normally considered to be concerned about basic levels of pension 
security). This suggests a division of labour in which states design public provision to focus 
on one task (e.g. poverty prevention), while trying to achieve other objectives within the 
private sphere (e.g. consumption smoothing). In fact, a major argument in Liberal countries to 
shift away from means-testing in state pensions was the concern that means-testing dis-
incentivises private saving (Pensions Commission 2006, 16; Mabbett 2011). More broadly, a 
basic state pension (that takes care of low income or high-risk households) is often considered 
to be an important building block for facilitating widespread private insurance.  
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2.3 Financialization debate 
This thesis has argued that we need a more nuanced approach to studying the role of finance 
in welfare reforms, this by taking into account the possible alliance between commercial and 
social interests. Doing so builds on earlier work that investigates the nexus between finance 
and welfare. Even though the scholarship on financialization and welfare reforms has 
developed rather independently from each other, several scholars have investigated the 
financial consequences of current welfare state arrangements (Estévez-Abe 2001; Jackson and 
Vitols 2001; Naczyk 2016). This reflects the broader concern of the financialization literature 
that financial considerations increasingly penetrate into other dimensions of social life (for 
example, a good share of this literature studies how financial imperatives start to dominate 
corporate governance).  
 
This attention to the financial dimension of social policies certainly deserves more 
scholarly attention; yet this thesis strongly suggests that the nexus between welfare and 
finance nexus should be studied in both direction. In light of our earlier discussion on the 
difficulty to disentangle state and market (section 2.1), this thesis triggers a different question: 
to what extent does the social sphere penetrate the financial world? There are good 
indications that welfare privatisation does not just result in a growing role of financial 
markets in providing social protection; it also transposes ‘social considerations’ in what used 
to be a more straightforward market place. For example, financial actors openly present their 
activities as a key service within overall welfare provision; often to justify why the state 
should encourage people to participate in these markets. While this discourse obviously has 
commercial motivations, it would be too easy to fully disregard it as cheap talk. In several 
cases, financial providers (albeit reluctantly) accept quite far-reaching restrictions – ranging 
from price setting to dealing with clients – that would be alien to traditional markets. In other 
words, in order to benefit from the expansion of financial ‘welfare’ markets, financial actors 
start behaving according to social maxims. More generally, one could argue that promoting 
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the participation of ‘normal households’ in financial markets has resulted in the justification 
of social imperatives to financial markets. Not only can we see a clear public debate regarding 
the social responsibility of financial firms (not just in Germany and the Netherlands, but also 
in the UK); one can even discern a tendency of introducing organisational features in private 
pension markets that are normally associated with social insurance (e.g. restrictions to risk-
differentiation; shift towards mandatory provision; attempts to ‘contain’ the salary of 
financial sector professionals working for pension funds, despite competition for talent; etc.). 
In short, whereas existing approaches to the welfare-finance nexus have focused on how 
social policies are shaped with financial concerns in mind; this thesis draws attention to how 
parts of the financial sphere are shaped on basis of social considerations.  
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3. Limitations and future research questions 
This final section looks at limitations of this research project and outlines how the concepts 
introduced in this thesis trigger new questions for future research.  
 
3.1 Limitations 
This thesis highlights how states make autonomous decisions in order to promote their own 
goal of containing fiscal exposure; not just in the short run through public reforms, but also in 
the long term by shaping private provision in order to avoid re-emerging fiscal pressure. It 
suggests that states are ultimately pragmatic in their interventions. But this takes a short-cut 
and could be understood as treating states as monolithic actors that are always focused on 
promoting long-term stability. More could be said about this. For instance, we observe that 
the daily political perception matters when the Coalition government in the UK decided to 
abolish compulsory annuities in 2014: providing more choice in this area was politically 
attractive, given the rotten deal many people got in the existing annuity markets. At the same 
time it can only amplify the challenge of pension security when retirees are allowed to take 
out the lump sum. Similarly, the parliamentary debates in the UK regarding pension charges 
revealed that certainly not all politicians were taking the long-term perspective; some 
Conservatives appeared more eager to avoid the difficult issue by defending non-action on 
grounds that it was Labour that had not introduced a cap in the first place, or by remarking 
that it was Labour that softened the cap on Stakeholder Pensions. Or, to take another example, 
the bitter opposition by the CDU/CSU against Schröder’s initial reform proposals – mainly 
because they felt betrayed by the SPD election campaign against their original pension cuts – 
is another interesting example of partisan feud.  
 
However, this example stands out exactly because it signified a break with the long-
term cross-partisan cooperation in Germany in the area of pension reforms (Jochem and 
Schulze 2007). Indeed, both for the 2005 federal election in Germany and the 2010 general 
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election in the UK, we see that the new government almost seamlessly continues the reform 
strategy that had been set out by the political opposition. In that sense, the argument that the 
‘long-term perspective’ seems to prevail can be understood in context of the more general 
insight that parties have an incentive for cross-party cooperation and to keep pension reforms 
outside electoral struggle; this to allow for blame diffusion (Green-Pedersen 2002) and to 
avoid constant undermining of long-term reforms (Hering 2005).  
 
The second limitation concerns the limited availability of data in light of the 
complexity of interventions in private pension provision. This thesis focused on how 
interventions aim at promoting coverage and adequacy within countries; it also stressed that 
this is particularly challenging for lower-income groups. However, different measures can be 
expected to have a differentiated impact within the population. For example, the Riester Rente 
entails subsidies that were targeted at low-income households only; whereas regulations that 
promote transparency and reporting standards are more likely to benefit middle- and higher-
income households. For many such interventions, it is difficult to assess in advance what the 
likely distributional impact will be; in particular when the outcome depends on individual 
discretion and market fluctuations. Nonetheless, having a more fine-grained understanding of 
how interventions affect different groups within a country allows for a more nuanced analysis 
than is currently possible. This is especially the case if policy-makers have their own 
estimations as to which part of the electorate would benefit or lose from certain proposals. If 
that turns out to be a relevant issue, it could open the door for more explicit partisan 
considerations. Even if different parties promote the broad goal of expanding private 
provision, they could put a different emphasis as to where to focus their regulatory efforts. 
This could be linked to the broader literature that examines how parties respond to changing 
socio-structural electoral constituencies (e.g. Häusermann, Picot, and Geering 2013), as well 
as literature that focuses on explaining differences in popular support for the welfare state 
(e.g. C. Brooks and Manza 2007; Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012).  
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The final limitation regards the approach taken by this thesis regarding involving the 
EU in the analysis of the papers, as outlined in the introduction (see section 2.3). On the basis 
of an overview of EU policies that could shape regulatory reforms at the domestic level, I 
concluded that it is not likely that these shifts away from voluntarism are driven by pressure 
stemming from the EU level. Nonetheless, the interaction between reform initiatives at EU 
and the domestic level could be the subject of a separate paper. This could include an effort to 
trace back the interest in pension adequacy within the European institutions and aim at 
explaining the source of such concerns (for example, social objectives could be ‘uploaded’ by 
national governments; driven by ‘social actors’ within the European Parliament and 
Commission; or derived from other concerns). Such an exercise would allow for a more 
nuanced understanding of how different objectives regarding pension at European level relate 
to each other; including market-making (e.g. promoting labour portability and cross-border 
financial markets), social objectives (e.g. gender-equality, old age poverty and delivering 
decent living standards more generally) and other objectives (e.g. financial sustainability). 
Examining the process behind the proposed new “Pan-European Personal Pension Product”, 
Schelkle (forthcoming)  shows that the driving objective is not necessarily stable but changes 
with the actors  involved.  
 
In the context of this thesis, there are good indications that the social objectives 
regarding ‘adequacy’ (as expressed in the 2012 White Paper) are to a significant extent 
derived from the primary objective of ‘financial stability’; rather than being a stand-alone 
objective. Florian Blank comments that the White Paper in general subordinates social policy 
to other policy fields, rendering it “a rather mechanistic exercise that tries to solve perceived 
problems of public expenditure” (Blank 2013). Indeed, the Commission has been quite 
straightforward about the need to promote complementary private savings to compensate for 
lower replacement rates that will result from efforts to sustain financial stability of public 
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provision (European Commission 2012, 4–5); this in contrast to asking whether adequacy 
concerns can be best addressed through public or private provision. It also recognizes that 
doing so is not straightforward; with the financial crisis highlighting the need for additional 
initiatives in order to promote the safety of private pensions, as well as their expansion 
(European Commission 2012, 13). In an earlier document, the Commission reckoned that: 
“Unless financial markets perform over time as expected, private schemes will not be able to 
deliver their increased expected contribution to adequate pensions. Where schemes 
underperform in major ways it may also imply that political pressures for compensation may 
weigh on public budgets. Pension reforms providing an increasing role to funded schemes 
will therefore have to be implemented in a context of appropriate regulation of private 
pension provision.” (European Commission 2010, 77). In conclusion, even if the 2012 
initiatives on adequacy come too late to explain domestic reform developments, it would be 
interesting to examine whether the drivers behind European initiatives to promote ‘social 
interventions’ are mirroring the reform dynamic at national level. Concerns regarding 
financial stability generate a push for privatisation, followed by more intensive social 
interventions when the vulnerability of private provision becomes more visible. A counter-
hypothesis could be that member states push back against EU social regulation because they 
fear to lose control over the fiscal implications of pension adequacy, even though their own 
interventions incur contingent liabilities. 
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3.2 Future research questions 
In order to explain the incremental shift towards more intensive state intervention in the 
organization of private pension provision, this thesis has highlighted the role of ‘contingent 
liabilities’. Borrowed from the fiscal stability literature (Altman 1992; Polackova 1998; 
Heller 1998), this concept refers to fiscal liabilities that materialise only when a certain event 
occurs (e.g. public pressure to improve overall pension adequacy). Accordingly, this thesis 
argued that state interventions in private pension provision can be understood as efforts to 
minimise the probability that such contingent liabilities materialise. This provided an answer 
to the question why governments engage in regulatory interventions that restrict the discretion 
of non-state actors – even if doing so requires them to overcome political resistance (e.g. by 
social partners) whereas the expectation of electoral reward is low and the political risk of 
electoral backlash is significant (Mabbett 2012; Vis 2010, 19). 
 
 While the importance of contingent liabilities has been introduced as a finding, this 
notion deserves further theoretical exploration. The reason is that this concept implies that 
policy-makers take into account the long-term consequences of current decisions (i.e. 
consequences occurring well beyond the next election). This assumption is not self-evident, 
given the “well-established insight […] that, in general, governments will impose short-term 
costs only when the risks of electoral punishment for doing so are low.” (Jacobs 2008, 203). 
Barbara Vis argued that policy-makers can still be willing to take political risks when the 
prospect of loss is high (Vis 2010, 20–22); yet given that in the case of pensions such losses 
could take many years to materialise, it leaves open the question why governments care about 
these long-term consequences. Alan Jacobs provides a different answer, namely that “their 
policy decisions about the long run are likely to be driven in part by actors who are far more 
attentive to distant consequences than is the median voter: organized groups.” (Jacobs 2008, 
203). While this aligns with the finding that financial actors play an important role in driving 
intervention, it does not explain why governments also take decisions that go against the 
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interests of the financial sector (as is the case in the third paper). Hence the question remains: 
why do governments seem to care about long-term consequences of current decisions?  
 
 There are at least three possible approaches to this question that could be examined 
further. One option would be to look at the role of the bureaucracy as a stable core within the 
governments (this goes back to the original state-centric literature; e.g. Heclo 1974). The idea 
is that, even if politicians are focused on the short-term, their civil servants have a longer 
time-frame. The influence of civil servants on their political masters results in a longer-term 
perspective than they would have otherwise. Another hypothesis would focus on how parties 
(rather than bureaucrats) constrain politicians. In contrast to politicians, parties as a whole 
persist over time which could result in a longer-term perspective; this for example because 
parties build up a reputation that transcends that of individual politicians (e.g. Born 1990) or 
because parties are increasingly required to take a ‘responsible’ governmental role (e.g. Mair 
2009). So even if certain decisions are not opportune from an individual point of 
view, politicians could be disciplined by the party to take the long-term into account. Finally, 
some suggest the opposite approach (Croley 2008; Ginosar 2014); this by arguing that even if 
politicians care about re-election, they also aim to advance their beliefs as to what improves 
society; even if pursuing this entails political risks or effort.  
 
 Although evaluating and further developing hypotheses regarding the long-term 
perspective in policy-making falls outside the scope of this thesis, this would help us to 
further improve our understanding of the reasons why governments do not seem to be able to 
retreat from organising pension security.  
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